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1. Introduction 
 
The last decades have been stage to increasing presence of faith-based organizations 
(FBOs)/religiously motivated civil society associations (RMAs) in the social policy 
arena of various welfare states1. The kick off was from America, in the 1980s when 
the Reagan administration announced religious organizations as being more effective 
than state agencies and secular voluntary associations in the provision of welfare. The 
rise of the concept of Charitable Choice as an important part of comprehensive 
welfare reform in 1996 was the second step, making the area of welfare accessible 
and inviting for the religious associations. This opening has been taken further by the 
Compassionate Conservatism initiative of the Bush government after 2001.  
Similarly in the United Kingdom, the momentum increased in the 1980s and 1990s 
with Thatcher’s policies of ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’ and rising emphasis 
on the role of ‘active citizens’ (Billis and Harris 1992). So the rise of the discourse 
around the concept is mainly a development triggered by the political sphere in the 
American context, and diffused first to the British and later on to some of the 
European countries. Harris et.al. point to the growing cross-party interest in religious 
organizations in the United Kingdom, especially in the last two decades (Harris, 
Halfpenny et al. 2003: 93). They mark the Conservative Party’s launch of the social 
policy initiative called ‘Renewing One Nation’ as a groundbreaking event as 
presenting faith groups as innovators in solving persistent social problems and 
creating ‘compassionate communities’ (ibid: 95). As suggested by Philpot this idea of 
compassionate conservatism was borrowed from the Republican Party’s discourse in 
America (Philpot 2001: 75). As he argues, Hague took this idea further by arguing 
that the faith communities will even replace all the government programs which was 
confirmed by Tim Mongomerie- director of Conservative Christian Fellowship with 
the statement that “(…) all existing government programs would be maintained 
indefinitely until faith communities, charities and other voluntary groups were ready 
to take on the challenge of providing them. Change would only occur after extensive 
consultation and with, where appropriate, piloting” (Mongomerie 2001). New Labour 
                                                 
1 The concepts of religiously motivated associations and faith-based organizations will be used 
interchangeably in this thesis. The reasons on this decision will be discussed in the Chapter 2. 
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government and Tony Blair also shown great interest in the capacity of faith-based 
organizations in contributing to social welfare, providing social provision, and 
regenerating communities (Harris et. al. 2003:96; Philpot 2001:78).  
The rise of interest on FBOs/RMAs is not limited to the cases of the US and UK, 
which can be categorized as liberal welfare states. Welfare states that are representing 
other parts of the welfare typology (Esping-Andersen 1990) such as Conservative 
corporatist, Scandinavian, and Southern have also have been focus of research for the 
changing share of religiously motivated associations in their welfare mixes2. In 
addition to the European welfare states, the role of religion in the welfare arena 
became an area of interest for the Middle Eastern countries too3. In the majority of 
these studies, rearrangements in the area of welfare, which is also named as 
retrenchments or the withdrawal of state from the area of welfare provision, are 
pointed out as the main reasons of the increasing presence of religion in the area of 
welfare. My aim in this thesis will be to show that neither the reasons, nor the 
outcomes of what is currently witnessed in the area of social provision in different 
welfare states are identical. The historical analyses of the five cases included in this 
project will demonstrate that both the processes behind the contemporary proliferation 
of religiously motivated associations, and the contemporary roles and functions of 
these associations in welfare arena vary depending on the historical specificities of the 
country under analysis.  
 
1.1. What is a Faith-Based Organization? 
The literature on faith-based organizations is a recent and limited one. A clear-cut 
definition of the term does not exist up to this point, and the academic discussion on 
the concept is also dispersed in the areas of social policy, social exclusion, 
development and civil society studies. In this part I will briefly go into the existing 
                                                 
2See Melville, R. and C. McDonald (2006). "Faith-Based Organizations and Contemporary Welfare." 
Australian Journal of Social Issues 41(1): 69-84. 
 , Dierckx, D., J. Vranken, et al. (2009). Faith-based Organisations and Social Exclusion in 
European Cities: National Context Reports. FACIT. Leuven, Research Centre on Inequality, Poverty, 
Social Exclusion and the City. 
  
3 See Jawad, R. (2009). Social Welfare and Religion in the Middle East: A Labanese perspective. 
Bristol, Policy Press. 
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discussions on the phenomenon of faith-based organizations; discuss their 
achievements and shortcomings.  
One of the major concerns of any study that makes use of the term faith-based 
organization or religious organization is to provide the reader with a definition of the 
concept and its coverage area. This conceptual problem is not inherent to the literature 
on faith-based organizations. Nevertheless, the ambiguous nature of the concepts such 
as religion and faith makes the issue more burdensome in this area. The questions 
involved are numerous, and the answers are case specific. Every single case differs in 
what faith means for that specific context, what is included in the area of faith-based 
organizations, and according to which criteria it is defined. Congregations at the 
national and local level, churches, and other forms of worshipping communities, 
sectarian agencies, and mosques are only a few examples of the possible forms of 
organizations that are included under the title of faith-based organizations. Apart from 
them, there are also organizations that are religiously affiliated but not religious in the 
strictest sense of the term. The fact that religion and religiously related issues were 
neglected in most areas of social sciences in the period before the last decades is one 
of the reasons for the lack of conceptual language and methodological tools to 
undertake research in these areas4. As a possible solution, most of the scholars 
working in the area came up with typologies either by focusing on the institutional 
characteristics of the organizations or the level of religiosity involved in them (see 
Monsma 1996; Smith and Sosin 2002; Jeavons 2004). As will be discussed in the 
empirical chapters, this thesis also dealt with this problem of conceptualization by 
developing a typology on the level of religiosity. 
The literature that concentrate on the FBOs as agents of social work mainly studies on 
the questions related to the functions of them in social/public provision and the 
questions on the issues such as capability and effectiveness (see Cnaan 1999; Boddie 
and Cnaan 2006; Dinham 2009). This focus of the literature makes more sense once 
we remember that the welfare reforms both in the cases of the US and UK put 
emphasis on the FBOs as being more effective or successful providers than state 
                                                 
4 For a study of methodological and conceptual problems see McGrew, C. C. and R. A. Cnaan (2006). 
Finding Congregations: Developing Conceptual Clarity in the Study of Faith-Based Social Services. 
Faith-Based Social Services: Measures, Assesments and Effectiveness. S. C. Boddie and R. A. Cnaan. 
Binghamton, Haworth Pastoral Press. 
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agencies and secular non-profit organizations (see Philpot 2001; Melville R.; 
McDonald 2006; Nagel 2006). In the case of the US, the emphasis on religious 
communities and organizations as possible actors of social service provision has 
increased since the Reagan era. This period after the 1980s marked the rise of 
nostalgia for the good old days of pre-modern welfare when the pious people helped 
one another and when the “evil” of impersonal services and bureaucracy was not 
invented yet5. Supporters of the idea that FBOs should be major providers generally 
point to factors such as committed volunteers, spirits of care and hope, available 
resources, and better knowledge of needs of the locals as making faith-based services 
superior to the secular ones6. Either as welfare providers or as participants in new 
forms of governance, one of the main questions around the issue of increasing 
presence of faith-based or religions organizations in the public realm is whether they 
contribute to solving social problems and increase well-being and/or contribute to the 
ideal of social cohesion. To answer these questions, the studies center on the scope of 
activity fields of FBOs, and study the outcomes of example projects undertaken by 
them7. Yet, the number of studies and their coverage area is very limited to prove any 
of these claims. 
The interest of the studies, especially in the US and the UK is most of the time on the 
organizations that are active on the local level. What Cnaan defines as “newer deal” is 
the reverse trend of the one in the 1960s, in which local responsibilities were on the 
decline and the central ones were prominent (Cnaan 1999: 4). As the report on FBOs 
as social providers suggests for the case of UK:  
                                                 
5 As an example of nostalgia for the golden ages of service delivery in the pre-twentieth century see 
Olasky, M. M. (1992). The Tragedy of American Compassion. Wahington D.C., Regnery Gateway. 
  
6 See Carlson-Thies, S. W. and J. W. Skillen (1996). Welfare in America: Christian Perspectives on a 
Policy Crisis. Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans Publishing Company. 
  
7 See Harris, M., R. Hutchison, et al. (2005). "Community -Wide Planning for Faith-Based Service 
Provision: Practical, Policy anc Conceptual Challanges." Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 
34(1): 88-109. 
 , Campbell, D. and E. Glunt (2006). Assessing the Effectiveness of Faith-Based Programs: A 
Local Network Perspective. Faith-Based Social Services: Measures, Assesments and Effectiveness. S. 
C. Boddie and R. A. Cnaan. Binghamton, Haworth Pastoral Press. 
 , Graddy, E. A. (2006). How Do They Fit? Assessing the Role of Faith-Based Organizations 
in Social Service Provision. Faith-Based Social Services: Measures, Assesments and Effectiveness. S. 
C. Boddie and R. A. Cnaan. Binghamton, Haworth Pastoral Press. 
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The renewal of interest in the potential contribution of faith-based organizations as 
providers of public services does not concern itself with those large national or regional 
institutions whose role in the welfare mix is taken for granted and whose religious 
origins are forgotten or overlooked. Instead, the contemporary policy current is directed 
towards small-scale activity which takes place at a local or community level and is 
undertaken by people from a much wider variety of faiths than the Christian and Jewish 
congregations which played a prominent role in the 19th and much of the 20th 
centuries (Rochester, Bissett et al. 2007: 43). 
Therefore, there is a strong emphasis on the FBOs as local agents, who are able to 
find local solutions to the problems of locality. Nevertheless, less is known about how 
these organizations operate in specific local settings, and how the relations between 
providers and benefices are formed in these localities.  
As will be discussed in the historical parts, involvement of religious or faith-based 
organizations in social welfare provision has always been the case both in the 
Christian and the Muslim world. Then the first question to ask is “why there is a 
contemporary rise of them in various welfare states?” Existing literature lacks a focus 
on the possible political reasons of the renewal of interest in the faith-based 
associations. I find Habermas’ conceptualization of the renewal of religious 
movements all over the world—including the heart of the Western one—as the 
‘political revitalization of religion’ very helpful (Habermas 2006). Since neither the 
role of religion in the social provision area, nor the role of religious organizations in 
the welfare mixes is something new, this thesis claims that what we are currently 
witnessing is a political process that invites faith-based organizations to the public 
arena as possible solutions to the contemporary problems of societies.  
The changing relation between states and religious organizations is also one of the 
frequently researched issues in the last decades. The amount of funding available for 
these organizations increased in most countries, and new forms of interaction such as 
partnerships in governance structures are on the rise8. It is in this new environment of 
                                                 
8 For the case of UK see Lewis, J. (1999). "Reviewing the Relationship between the Voluntary Sector 
and the State in Britain in the 1990s." Voluntas 10(3): 255-270. 
 , Deakin, N. (2001). Public Policy, Social Policy and Voluntary Organisations. Voluntary 
Organisations and Social Policy in Britain: Perspectives on Change and Choice. M. Harris and C. 
Rochester. Hampshire, Palgrave. 
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governance that questions of autonomy such as ‘can a voluntary agency/religious 
organization protect its independence while getting most of its funding from state 
agencies? How can faith-based organizations fulfill secular bureaucratic criteria 
associated with government funding?’ are on the rise9. Partnerships between 
government and religious bodies are not always interpreted positively, as the 
following quote demonstrates: “The more a religious organization adapts modern, 
hierarchical, bureaucratic forms, the more difficult it is to maintain and protect its 
religious identity and uniqueness” (Vanderwoerd 2004: 242). As a solution, some of 
the organizations set up quotas for limiting the amount of money accepted from 
central institutions.  
In addition to the area of social provision, the issue of faith and the organizations that 
are established around it are also of interest for the studies on social integration and 
cohesion. Especially in the multicultural countries of the developed capitalist world, 
faith started to be used as the main distinguishing characteristics of the migrant 
groups, in replacing the categories of race and ethnicity (Ahmed, Cantle et al. 2009). 
In contrast to the emphasis on race and ethnicities as the major determinant of identity 
in the 1990s, the current emphasis of political discourse is on belonging to different 
faith groups. This shift is also an indicator of how religion is used to achieve political 
aims such as pacifying the possible conflicts between different faith traditions. 
Woolcock’s distinction between bonding, bridging and linking types of social capital 
has been used as a guide to study the contributions of faith-based organizations to the 
establishment of well-connected communities (Woolcock 2001; Furbey, Dinham et al. 
2006; Harris 2009). The distinction made is similar to Granovetter’s famous analysis 
of differences between weak and strong ties (Granovetter 1973). Proponents of the 
idea claim that supporting faith-based organizations also triggers establishment of 
cross faith connections, which helps development of ‘bridges’ in forms of increasing 
understanding and/or creating connections between different faith backgrounds.  
A crucial aspect that did not receive attention in the literature is the historical 
mechanisms behind the proliferation of these associations in different countries. The 
                                                 
9 In the interviews I have conducted in Britain, this was one of the frequently referred issues. The 
struggle the Catholic Children’s Society and the central government had on the issue of adoption rights 
for gay couples is a good example of the possible questions of autonomy. Whether the voluntary 
organizations are becoming mere expansion of state institutions or will it be possible for them to 
protect their values, and identity is a question that should be a topic for future research.  
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international research project titled Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion 
in the European Cities, which is a European Commission funded project that is in 
progress, is undertaking an analysis of FBOs in five countries (Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom). The project, in a comparative 
fashion, studies the different roles of FBOs in different countries by focusing on their 
welfare state types and the position of religion in their political structures. 
Nevertheless, the project—in its current status—fails to provide historical 
explanations for the rise of these associations in each of the cases. Instead, it follows 
the convergence model and argues that the FBOs are on the rise in order to fill the gap 
opened due to the retrenchments of the welfare states. Rejecting this general 
explanation, this thesis will undertake a historical institutionalist approach to 
understand the mechanisms of change that bring about the rise of FBOs in different 
welfare states. 
 
1.2. Case Background: understanding Turkey in relation to the existing variety 
in Europe 
Turkey is the main case under analysis. Turkey is a member of the NATO, Council of 
Europe, OECD, one of the G-20 major economies, an important ally of the United 
States in its Middle Eastern politics, and the first state with a majority of Muslim 
population that is a candidate for the European Union membership. The rise of Islam 
in the political, economic and social spheres of this country, whose main development 
aims in the last century can be summarized as secularization, westernization and 
modernization, is obviously a question of interest for all of these publics. The 
historical analysis of Turkey, which can be marked as a borderline case in comparison 
to the group of European cases under analysis, will demonstrate that differences 
between the social and political roles of the organizations in different countries are 
not due to being Christian or Muslim, but due to the historical configurations of 
power between state and religion and the maturity level of the welfare state under 
analysis.  
Four European countries—Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden—are included in 
the analysis, in addition to the main case of Turkey. These country studies will be 
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used as shadow comparisons in order to arrive at an understanding of the historical 
mechanisms behind the current religious dynamics in the area of welfare. They have 
been chosen to represent available configurations of state-church relations in the area 
of welfare: Britain a liberal welfare state, with a state church and a quite secular 
institutionalization of welfare provision since the last decades; Germany, a 
conservative welfare state, having a historical system of cooperation between two 
main churches and the state in the provision of welfare; France, also a conservative 
welfare state, with a strict separation of state and church; and Sweden, a Scandinavian 
welfare state, with an established church that is abolished in 2003. The main aim for 
this project to include these country studies is not to come up with a general theory of 
religiously motivated social provision. On the contrary, the research by focusing on an 
in-depth study of a borderline case like Turkey, in comparison to the European cases 
such as Britain, Germany, France, and Sweden aims to point at the reflections of 
historical trajectories on contemporary changes.  
 
1.3. The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2, following the introductory chapter, presents the connections of this 
dissertation to the existing literatures of welfare and religion, welfare mixes, third 
sector and sociology of religion; and introduces the analytical framework of the study. 
The chapter starts with a discussion on the “evolution” of social policy from being a 
form of religious charity to social citizenship right, and questions whether the rise of 
emphasis on the religiously motivated associations in the contemporary times can be 
interpreted as a move reversing this course of evolution. Following this, the focus is 
on the main discussions in the literatures on welfare mixes and third sector and the 
question of whether the phenomenon of the religiously motivated associations can be 
understood in relation to the shift welfare states are undergoing in the last decades. 
Finally the aim and scope of the study is outlined by touching upon on the issues of 
methodology and main concepts. 
The historical and empirical research undertaken is organized in three main parts, 
following the introductory and the theoretical chapters. Part I concentrates on the 
European variety in the area of religion and welfare by studying the cases of Britain, 
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Germany, France and Sweden. Two chapters included in this part aim to go into a 
detailed exploration of the interactions between religion, state and society in the area 
of social provision and to supply the reader with a historical understanding of 
religiously motivated associations as social policy actors. Chapter 3, the first one of 
this part, looks into pre-modern forms of social policy in the period before the 
establishment of the modern welfare states. The time of national revolutions is studied 
as the period in which main conflicts between religion and the newly rising nation 
states took place on the issue of who will be the main provider in the social sphere. By 
following the steps of religion and welfare literature, this chapter presents different 
patterns of religion and state relations and their reflection on the area of welfare. 
Chapter 4 looks into the time period after the 1970s and study the contemporary 
changes in the area of state-society and state-religion relations. Following up on the 
historical analysis introduced in the previous chapter, this one aims to designate how 
shifts in the welfare configurations on the one hand, and the shifts in the way the 
states are arranging their relations with religious institutions and groups, on the other 
hand defines the current position of RMAs in various welfare states. 
Part II undertakes a comprehensive study of the Turkish case, by focusing on the two 
mechanisms of change that are defined as explanatory for the proliferation of 
religiously motivated associations in the previous part. Chapter 5 engages in a 
historical study of the development of social welfare in Turkey in the light of the 
developments in the European welfare arena. This analysis of the expansion of the 
welfare system in Turkey concentrates on the main characteristics of state-society 
relations and asks whether the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in 
the social sphere of the country marks a change or not. Chapter 6 investigates the 
specific secularization path Turkey followed in the last century. It puts light on the 
main shifts in the balance between religious and secular forces in the social and 
political spheres in Turkey and demonstrates how the rise of religion as a main 
cleavage line in the political sphere set the stage for the proliferation of religiously 
motivated associations in the last decade. 
The last section—Part III—takes up on how RMAs function at the micro level by 
analyzing the findings of the empirical research conducted on these associations in 
Turkey. The main aim of this part is to demonstrate how the dynamics of state-
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religion relations at the macro level is reflected on the meso level. Chapter 7 starts 
with providing information on the universe of RMAs in Turkey and the empirical 
research undertaken. Following this introduction, a brief presentation of the activity 
areas, organizational characteristics, and practices of provision is carried out. Chapter 
8 focuses on the differences in the political and religious identities of the RMAs 
included in the sample. It sheds light on how the identities of single RMAs are 
contingent on their different positions within the constituency of political Islam in 
Turkey and in the international Islamic movement.  
Chapter 9 is the concluding part in which discussion of the major findings of the 
study, its contribution to the related literatures and suggestions for future research is 
included.  
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2. Theorizing Religiously Motivated Social Provision 
 
This chapter starts with a brief discussion of the research questions guiding this 
dissertation, and places these questions in relation to the existing literatures around 
the issue of religiously motivated social provision. Following the review of the 
literature, and identifying the gaps in it, the scope and the aims of the thesis will be 
introduced, and the expected contributions will be presented. Against this 
background, a discussion of the methodology and the conceptual issues will be 
included in the last sub section.  
The two main questions this dissertation deals with are “What are the historical 
mechanisms behind the contemporary rise of religiously motivated welfare 
associations? What are the main characteristics of these “new” social policy 
providers?” As it is the case most of the time, to answer these questions is only 
possible through delving into many more questions at the intersection of different 
social phenomena. The first question to start with is whether faith-based/religiously 
motivated provision is a new phenomenon or not. There is a popular discourse on the 
concept of faith-based organizations in the last decade, both in the academic and 
political spheres, especially in Britain and the United States. The discourse is 
relatively new, but if the phenomenon itself is new or not is probably the very first 
question that one should delve into. So, do we witness the rise of FBOs as a new actor 
in welfare provision or do we witness an increase in the visibility of the already 
existing ones? Some additional questions may be asked about the meaning of their 
increasing visibility or increase in number: Are these organizations suggest that there 
is a return to older forms of solidarity? Can we declare that this development is an 
outcome of increasing presence of religion in the public sphere OR an outcome of 
retrenchments in the welfare states? All of the questions listed above are of interest 
for this research project, and they will be returned to, since the possible political and 
social outcomes of provision by these associations can not be understood in isolation 
from them. The issue is broad and it encompasses more than a single clearly defined 
academic field. Hence, this chapter will go into a brief discussion of the related fields 
such as religious charity, welfare state, third sector, welfare mixes, and sociology of 
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religion and present how the research questions undertaken in this study are related to 
these existing literatures.  
 
2.1. Two Competing Stories: Return of Religion or Shift in Welfare Mixes? 
The concept of faith-based organizations is a new one, although what it refers to—if 
interpreted as religious charity—can be argued to be one of the oldest institutions of 
human history. After reading what current literature names as FBOs, and I name 
RMAs as a contemporary form of religious charities, which ruled the social policy 
arena in a period starting from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century. Following 
this interpretation, the first sub-part of the chapter will explore religious charities as 
the preliminary forms of social provision and pose the question whether the 
contemporary proliferation of these associations can be analyzed as a failure of the 
secularization and the modernization paradigms and as a proof of the return of 
religion to the public sphere. The second sub-part focuses on the literature on welfare 
mixes, welfare governance and third sector and asks the question whether the 
increasing importance of FBOs in the social policy arena can be interpreted as an 
outcome of retrenchments in the welfare arena or a shift in the welfare mixes—mainly 
characterized by increasing activity by civil society and private actors and decreasing 
state action as a result of welfare retrenchments. 
 
2.1.1. The Return of Religious Charity? 
The increasing importance and visibility of faith-based organizations in the provision 
of social welfare can be interpreted as a challenge to the main paradigms of 
modernization and secularization. Religious forms of provision were the forerunners 
of modern social policies by the state. The establishment of modern welfare states, 
which resulted in a decrease in the activity areas of religious institutions, is only a 
development of the twentieth century. Following this historical development line of 
social policy, one may suggest that the current “rise” “return” or “increasing 
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visibility”10 of faith-based organizations is a reverse step in the historical path, or a 
backward move in the line of evolution. This part of the chapter goes into a discussion 
about the plausibility of this argument. The first sub-section briefly presents the 
foundations of religious forms of provision in the Christian and Muslim contexts, and 
goes into a discussion of the secularization and the modernization paradigms and a 
critique of their reading of the development of the modern welfare state. Finally the 
third sub-part looks into the sociology of religion literature with a specific 
concentration on the debate about the return of religion in the public sphere. 
 
Religious Charity in the Christian and Muslim Contexts and the Modernist Challenge 
Before being a welfare state provision or a citizenship right, care for the poor has been 
defined as a pious and moral duty in the religious texts of Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam. How poverty and inequality have been perceived varied through time and 
space, but any faith tradition that existed in human history searched for possible 
solutions to the problem of poverty. Being aware of the great variety of approaches to 
poverty by different confessions even in the same religion11 and taking the risk of 
simplifying, the aim of this part will be to point at the common roots of charity in the 
Christian and Muslim contexts.  
Charity with its different forms of provision has been the main social welfare 
institution in the Christian world, before the emergence of welfare states as such. 
Geremek’s study Poverty: a History is one of the influential works looking into how 
poverty has been framed and dealt with in different societies, in a time period from 
the Middle Ages onwards (Geremek 1994: 120). Geremek starts his work by 
informing the reader that in the medieval era charity was a universal duty, and it was 
the most important way of creating bonds in the society (ibid:15-52). As he describes, 
the Christian doctrine of poverty before the eleventh century had little to do with 
                                                 
10 Which one of the three is true depends on the country under analysis. For some of the European 
cases it is possible to talk about increasing visibility of FBOs that has always been there. In some 
others there is an increasing number and plurality.  
 
11 For a study on the different Christian heritages on poverty policy see Kahl, S. (2005). "The Religious 
Roots of Modern Poverty Policy: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Protestant Traditions Compared." 
European Journal of Social Policy 46(1): 91-126. 
 . 
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social reality, it was purely a spiritual value: the criterion of poverty was not the lack 
of material wealth but the lack of power, privilege and social position. Twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries were marked as the time of expansion of charities in Western 
countries of the Christian world. According to Geremek, charity at the time was a way 
to strengthen relations between religious institutions and the faithful (ibid: 23). 
Moreover, the act of charity was also a kind of contract between the recipient and the 
pauper: in exchange for the material alms given to the poor, the poor promised 
spiritual support. As de Swaan argues the care of the poor has always been a Christian 
duty: “It is customary to describe this care in terms of individual, altruistic 
motivations, and an affair between two parties, the charitable and the beneficiary, the 
giver and the receiver of alms. In fact, from early on care of the poor was the object of 
collective action and served a collective goal” (De Swaan 1988: 21).  
This rule of religious charity, as the main form of provision by the churches, has been 
the case before the nation state formation period in Europe. The rise of nation state as 
an outcome of liberalization ideals by the end of the nineteenth century challenged the 
presence of church in all political areas (see Gould 1999), welfare provision being the 
most important one. As Morgan exhibits, the building of nation states in this century 
resulted in the direct competition between the national governments and the church 
for the hearts and minds of people (Morgan 2002: 124). Since the main ways of 
getting hold of the hearts and minds of people were through education, health and 
assistance, the area of welfare state became an area of struggle between the liberal and 
the religious elite.  
The prevailing picture in the area of social provision in the Islamic part of the world 
was similar. Helping the co-believers has always been one of the main rules of 
Islamic religious belief. In Islam, as argued by Dean and Khan, if it were possible to 
identify the moral principle underlying welfare provision in an ideal Islamic state, it 
would be embodied in the concept of Zakat, the religious duty imposed on Muslims to 
give a proportion of their disposable wealth for distribution to members of the 
Ummah who are in need12. Zakat is one of the five central pillars of the Muslim faith, 
                                                 
12 Although I will make an introductory presentation of the existing literature here, whether zakat can 
be seen as an instrument of fighting poverty or redistribution is a highly contested issue. For a detailed 
study see Kuran, T. (2003). Islamic Redistribution through Zakat: Historical Record and Modern 
Realities. Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts. M. Bonner, M. Ener and A. Singer. Albany, 
State University of New York. 
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each of which represents an absolute religious obligation. Zakat is ‘enrobed’ with 
religious sanctity and ensures the redistribution of wealth, not by coercion, but 
through the acceptance of moral principles. Though subsequently constituted as an 
annual religious tax on property, Zakat is for the benefit of the Ummah as a whole and 
is supposed ultimately to bring to the donor an increase of property in this world and 
religious merit in the next. The giving of Zakat can therefore be both altruistic and 
instrumental (Dean and Khan 1997: 196-197). 
The most important social policy institution in the Islamic empires was vakif/Waqf, 
which has its foundations in the 10th century. Dallal defines Waqf as “the detention of 
the corpus from the ownership of any person, and the gift of its income either 
presently or in the future, to some charitable purpose” (Dallal 2004: 13). The origins 
of the institution of Waqf in Islam are similar, even identical, to those of ancient 
church property, with collective ownership and use by the religious community 
(Othman 1983). Waqf, the standards of which were provided by the Islamic law, was 
mainly an institution to perform many of the services that are the responsibility of the 
public sector in the modern state. As Makdisi puts forward, “waqf systems duplicate 
many of the roles played in the modern states by public, non trading corporations, 
religious and charitable foundations and trusts, religious offices and family 
settlements” (Makdisi 1981).  
This brief overview of “pre-modern” forms of religious institutions taking care of the 
poor in Christianity and Islam makes the common roots of welfare provision in these 
two belief systems apparent. Whether these support mechanisms established on 
religious forms of belonging will survive into the modern period has been one of the 
main questions of the discipline of sociology in the late nineteenth-early twentieth 
century. Founding fathers of classical social theory characterized modernization as a 
process of structural-functional differentiation that will lead to linear progress. The 
Durkheimian understanding of modern social structures were built on the 
fragmentation, specialization and differentiation of the social order, which 
subsequently will result in dissolving of the mechanic solidarities that were created 
around traditional values such as family, religion, and kinship (Durkheim 1893 
[1966]). Following this idea of modernization, establishment of the modern welfare 
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states were interpreted as the main solution to the newly rising needs of the populace 
in an era of increasing industrialization. Institutionalization of the state provided 
welfare was supposed to result in the decline of religiously motivated social policy, 
since both the need for it will disappear and also the forms of solidarity that feeds it 
will not be able to persist in the “modern era”. The theories of secularization in the 
period after the 1970s also supported these interpretations of welfare development 
that are declaring the decline of religious institutions and their impact on society and 
culture (see Chadwick 1975; Martin 1978; Berger 1982; Berger 1990; Bruce 2002). 
The possibility that religious ways of thinking and acting can survive in the public 
realm was not given credit by these scholars. The expectation was either complete 
demise of religious institutions or total retreat of religious activity to the private 
realm. 
One can defend that the increasing emphasis on the faith-based organizations in 
different spheres of society in the 21st century is a mere indicator of failure for the 
secularization thesis. Nevertheless, this will not only be an ahistorical argument, it 
will also represent a crude oversimplification of secularization thesis to the single idea 
of religious decline. Gorski’s studies on secularization debate can be referred to for 
getting a grasp of the multiplicity of the debates on what secularization is (Gorski 
2000; Gorski and Altinordu 2008). While historically situating different theories of 
secularization in an analytical map, Gorski makes it clear that different lines of 
secularization debate put forward different projections about the future of religion in 
society. One common thesis, which constitutes the core of the secularization 
paradigm, present in the studies of scholars such as Comte, Weber, Berger, 
Luckmann, Parsons, Wilson, Bruce, and Casanova is the differentiation thesis. 
Differentiation idea affirms that “religious and nonreligious institutions have become 
increasingly differentiated overtime” (Gorski 2000: 140). As will be analyzed in the 
empirical chapters, faith-based organizations can be seen as a threat to this main thesis 
of secularization owing to their hybrid motivations and organizational style that are 
cross-cutting the religious and the secular arenas.  
The second issue that has to be kept in mind, while going into a discussion of whether 
the rise of FBOs can be interpreted as a failure of secularization paradigms is that 
secularization is not a single paradigm, nor is its claims generalizable for every 
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society. The multiplicity and variety of secularization histories has been mostly 
neglected by the scholars in the field. David Martin’s work On Secularization is one 
of the exceptions that is crucial both to gain an understanding of the ‘several stories’ 
on secularization and also the historical specificities behind different patterns of it 
(Martin 2005). In addition to the sociology of religion literature, there is also a 
growing interest in political science literature on the varieties of secularisms in 
different countries. Two exemplary historical comparative studies in this area are one 
by Kuru focusing on different forms of secularisms as an outcome of historical 
relations between state and religion (Kuru 2007; Kuru 2009); the other by Monsma 
and Soper that studies church and state relations in different democracies (Monsma 
and Soper 2009). Both of the studies, in a very successful manner, challenge the 
single theory of secularism that is valid in all countries at all times. How relations 
between religion/church and state formed various forms of secularisms in different 
countries is one of the main theses of both.  
Following a similar line of argument, I will be pinpointing different forms of 
secularisms as one of the main criteria to define the current position and the roles of 
faith-based/religiously motivated organizations in different welfare mixes. When we 
remember that provision of welfare has always been an area of institutionalization for 
religion in the public sphere, it should not be surprising that the shifts in its position in 
the political and public arenas are also influencing the area of welfare to a great 
extent. The number of studies increasing in the area of welfare and religion is also an 
important proof of this argument (Bäckström and Davie 2009; Van Kersbergen and 
Manow 2009). The European project titled Welfare and Religion in a European 
Perspective (WREP) can be marked to be exemplary with its center on relations 
between different churches, church state relationships and welfare states from 
sociology of religion perspective. Another study, with a very similar direction but 
from a political science outlook is Religion, Class Coalitions and Welfare States by 
Van Kersbergen, and Manow which will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section as one of the main lines of literature this research projects benefits from. 
To conclude, we can argue that the expected linear development line—from religious 
charity to modern and secular state provided welfare—did not come into existence 
neither in the European countries nor in the US. Current patterns of social provision in 
 18
different countries all around the Western and the non-Western world makes it clear 
that the convergence model suggested by the modernization and secularization 
paradigms did not come into reality. It is a clear fact that the amount of state provided 
welfare increased in the beginning of twentieth century, and one of the main reasons 
for this was increasing need as a result of commodification of labor. Many scholars 
point to the time period between 1880 and 1914 as the birth of the welfare state by 
making references to major developments such as the introduction of social insurance, 
the extension of citizenship, the de-pauperization of welfare and the growth of social 
expenditure (Powell and Hewitt 2002: 12). Nevertheless, the expectation that this path 
of modernization and secularization will result in universalization of social citizenship 
rights that “encompass the whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share in the social heritage, and to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950) 
did not come true as the current evidence suggests. Religious organizations, either 
church related or private have never disappeared from the provision arena. Their area 
of activity varied over time and space, nevertheless total secularization of the welfare 
arena had not been the case either in the European or in the American context.  
Consequently, I see the studies putting emphasis on the historical differences between 
various forms of developments in state-church relations to have more explanatory 
power than a general understanding of modernization or secularization paradigms. For 
that reason the next chapter will take up on the possible patterns of social policy 
provision by focusing on the relations between state and religion. Yet, before going 
into this, the next sub-section will present a contemporary discussion on the religion 
and public sphere and how this discussion can be valid for the research on faith-based 
organizations. 
 
The return of religion to the public sphere?  
The contemporary discussions around secularization, post-secularism, the return of 
religion, the rise of public religions are also relevant for this research project. Even 
though it is not the main area of interest, I believe that questions such as ‘why is there 
a growing interest on the specific type of civil society organizations that are 
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religious/faith-based? Is this situation an outcome of increasing demand (from parts of 
population and governments), or increasing supply (from religious institutions or 
groups)? Can we really talk about a rise in religiosity or is it just an increase in the 
visibility of religion or publicity of religion?’ are important questions to bear in mind.  
Casanova’s influential book of Public Religions in the Modern World distinguishes 
between three main claims of secularization thesis that are differentiation, 
privatization and religious decline (Casanova 1994). According to him, the end of the 
twentieth century is marked by ‘deprivatization’ of religion as an outcome of 
differentiation. The ongoing presence of religion in the public sphere, as an important 
part of civil society, is for Casanova the proof demonstrating that the decline and the 
privatization theses failed. “Public” for Casanova refers to three main areas of the 
polity that are the state, political society and civil society (Casanova 2003: 111). He 
asserts that these three realms are the most important actuality areas for religion in the 
contemporary times. The cases in the book demonstrate civil society as the 
fundamental locus for religious action after the 1980s. The increasing visibility of 
faith-based organizations in civil society can also be marked as another example of 
Casanova’s thesis of public religion. Although his approach is based on a 
differentiation between the public and private spheres, Casanova also puts emphasis 
on the necessity to reconsider “the issue of challenging boundaries between 
differentiated spheres (public and private) and the possible structural roles religion 
may have within those differentiated spheres as well as the role it may have in 
challenging the boundaries themselves” (Casanova 1994: 7). So he does not totally 
exclude the idea that the boundaries of these spheres are porous.  
The main claims of Casanova on the issue of public religions can be useful in 
analyzing the increasing emphasis on FBOs in the social spheres of different societies. 
Nevertheless, whether this increase can be interpreted as an example of 
desecularization at the meso-level as an outcome of secularization at the macro level 
is a debatable question. An additional question that is triggered by an analysis of 
Casanova’s suggestions is whether it is the religious forces that “challenge the 
boundaries” of different spheres or whether it is the boundaries that have been 
anyways under transformation due to the changes at the socioeconomic structures of 
the countries. Giving tentative answers to these questions will be one of the main aims 
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while undertaking the analysis of the empirical material in the following parts of the 
study.  
Religion Returns to the Public Square is another study identifying the relation 
between religion, civil society and public policy (Heclo and McClay 2003). While the 
volume mainly takes up on the case of the United States, the declarations about 
“going public” of religion are not even limited to the West, as Heclo puts forward in 
the introductory chapter: “Religion refused to stay in the private ghetto to which 
modernity had assigned it. From the Islamic revolution in Iran, to the Catholic Church 
in communist Eastern Europe, to the Religious Right in the United States, religion 
reengaged with political history” (Heclo 2003: 7). Heclo defines the relation between 
religion and public policy as an “inescapable coupling”, due to the “profound and 
unavoidable” connections between them (Heclo 2003: 17). The chapters by Coleman 
on American Catholicism, Charities, and Welfare Reform (Coleman 2003) and 
Carlson-Thies on Charitable Choice Initiative (Carlson-Thies 2003) present 
religiously-motivated/faith-based social provision as an outcome of the return of 
religion to the public sphere. The authors point at the old times when religion was an 
important part of welfare, before extension of government provision, and to the 
new/contemporary times in which religion is again involved in welfare. Yet, the 
question whether the increasing presence or visibility of religious organizations in the 
public sphere can be interpreted in the same way in different countries with different 
histories of secularization is not even mentioned in this edited volume.  
This sub-section of the chapter focused on two main lines of literature to give a 
tentative answer to the question of whether the increasing presence of the FBOs in the 
social policy arena can be interpreted as a failure of modernization and secularization 
paradigms, and whether this can be seen in line with the popular conception of the 
return of religion to the public sphere. As the discussion demonstrated all of these 
literatures have partial explanatory powers to help us understand the rise of faith-
based organizations in the social provision arena. Yet, none of them is comprehensive 
enough to equip us with the instruments to understand the mechanisms behind this 
change. It is true that there is a change in the public presence of religion in some of 
the countries in the last decades. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily explain the 
rise of religiously motivated associations in the welfare arena. In order to arrive at a 
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more complete understanding of the concrete processes, the transformation of social 
policy structures in the last decades should be analyzed. The next section will center 
on this other side of the medal. 
 
2.1.2 A shift in the welfare mix? 
Existing research on welfare mixes has increased mainly in relation to the so-called 
crises of the European welfare states in the period after the 1980s. In the period 
following the late 1970s, the increasing pressures on the nation states to survive in the 
open economy (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000) and to preserve existing levels and forms 
of social provision became strenuous. The period starting from the late 1970s marked 
a crises period for the European welfare states due to the increasing disorganization of 
the political economy. Disorganization, as described by Streeck, ‘denotes a decline in 
centralized control and authoritative coordination in favor of dispersed competition 
and spontaneous, market-like aggregation of competing preferences and 
individualized decisions’ (Streeck 2009: 96). This process of disorganization triggered 
revisions in the welfare mixes of many countries. The increases in the share of 
private/voluntary/civil society actors in welfare provision have been the common 
trend. In addition to the changing allocations of different providers in the welfare 
mixes, there have been shifts in the nature of relationships between them. Changing 
boundaries and blurring of lines between different providers became one of the 
commonly discussed characteristics of the new welfare mixes. This subsection of the 
chapter will mainly focus on two lines of literature; welfare mixes approach and third 
sector studies, as offering possible explanations for the transformations of the welfare 
arena, and the increasing number and/or visibility of faith-based/religiously-motivated 
organizations in this arena. 
The main argument of the welfare mixes approach is that social policy has always 
been an arena shared by the public and private actors and institutions throughout 
history (Wuthnow 1991; Evers 1993; Abrahamson 1995; Evers and Olk 1996; 
Abrahamson 1999; Ascoli and Ranci 2002). The configurations of the welfare mix, 
which consists of family, state, market and voluntary sector, have always been in a 
making and remaking process as part of the dynamic changes in the political, 
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economic and social spheres of societies. The scholars of the welfare mixes approach 
agree upon the argument that welfare states are going through a period of 
transformation in which the voluntary sector is becoming a major provider in the 
period after 1980s. Although I agree with the main claims of the current literature in 
marking the shift in the welfare mixes, I have concerns about the accuracy of the 
assertion that there is a common state of transformation bringing about identical 
outcomes (see Bode 2006) throughout the Western Europe. I claim that the first thing 
in order to undertake an analysis of change in the welfare mixes is to comprehend the 
diversity of welfare mixes in comparative terms. There may be a common shift 
towards a governance approach, but I argue that historical specificities play the 
determining role for the diverse outcomes of the welfare shifts in each case. 
 In close connection with the studies on the issue of welfare mixes is the recent 
emphasis on the issue of governance in the area of social policy (Jessop 1999; Daly 
2003; Bode 2006). The governance approach focuses more on the nature of the 
relationship between different providers. Although its main area of usage is not social 
policy, the concept of governance began to appear in discussions of it (Daly 2003). 
Governance in social policy field mainly refers to increasing of decentralized and 
diffused forms of policy making and provision as an outcome of coordination between 
private and public bodies. The functioning of the faith-based/religiously-motivated 
organizations can be seen as a good example for the new forms of governance. In the 
case of the United Kingdom the phrase “state as a steerer rather than rower” which 
used to define governance under New Labour is quite informative to understand the 
nature of relationship between various providers (Daly 2003: 120). In many countries, 
the number of partnerships between states and private and voluntary agencies are on 
the rise as an outcome of the increasing emphasis on the governance approach. 
Nonetheless, whether states will give up their roles to be rowers is still unknown for 
most of the European cases. 
A highly related literature that should not be left out of the discussion is the one on 
the so-called third sector (Anheier and Seibel 1990; Seibel 1990; Gidron, Kramer et 
al. 1992; Evers and Laville 2003; Kendall 2009). Third sector is also an area of 
research that has gained increasing importance in Europe in the period after the 1990s, 
in close connection to the welfare mixes approach. Third sector research does not 
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exclusively focus on the area of social policy, yet in this project it will be mainly 
studied in relation to the ‘recalibration’ (Pierson 2001) of the welfare state in the last 
decades. Although the definition and clarity of the concept third sector is contested, 
its quality in bringing an improvement to the public-private duality is clear in 
distinguishing the market from the voluntary sector, and in pointing to the unclear 
boundaries between them. Third sector research mainly took a sociological and 
political perspective for the analysis of organizations that are situated in the 
intermediate area between market, state and private households (Evers 1990). The 
focus on the intermediary nature of third sector makes clear that “there is no clear line 
of demarcation between, on the one hand, the market place, the political arena, 
communities and state organizations, and on the other the third sector” (Evers and 
Laville 2003: 36). Faith-based organizations are good examples representing this 
intermediary nature of the third sector, as the empirical chapters will present. An 
additional powerful side of third sector studies is the attention they pay to historical 
specificities of state civil society relations in order to explain the backgrounds of 
current developments.  
The change in the nature of the political and social movements in the last decades is 
also a core area for third sector studies. The movements of the 21st century are defined 
to be more diverse and plural than the class based interest groups that ruled the 
politics before 1980s. Current diversity of the social service organizations in terms of 
resources, goals, steering mechanisms and corporate identity are defined using the 
analytical concept of hybrid organizations (Evers and Laville 2003: 237-252). A 
further defining characteristic of these organizations is the forms of cooperation and 
partnerships within themselves and between them and the state. Some of the scholars 
interpreted new forms of cooperation such as networks and partnerships as creating 
‘win-win’ situations for all participants such as markets, civil society, community 
based initiatives and state (Evers and Laville 2003: 37). Others point at the possible 
issues of dependency creation and instrumentality that can rise between governments 
and the civil society organizations (Lewis 1999; Dahrendorf 2001; Lewis 2004). I 
would claim that the nature of relationships between civil society organizations and 
state becomes even more interesting when the organizations under focus are the 
religious or faith-based ones. Whether faith-based organizations are sacrificing from 
their religious aims and motivations in order to work together with state agencies, or it 
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is the secular states who are giving up some of their criteria of social policy making 
and provision is an important distinction that needs to be taken into consideration by 
future research. 
Existing literature does not pay specific attention to the issue of religion and how it 
can be significant for the formation of diverse third sectors in different countries. I see 
this as a weak point and claim that a complete understanding of the third sector is not 
possible without a focus on the relations between religious and secular authorities in a 
country. Robert Wuthnow is one of the exceptions to the trend of neglecting religion 
in the study of voluntary organizations (Wuthnow 1991). He sees the distinction 
between religious and secular forms of voluntary organizations crucial due to two 
historical reasons: first is the determining role of religious values and organizations in 
providing a ground for the rise of other kinds of voluntary organizations, and second 
is the determining role of state-religion conflicts in shaping the voluntary sector (ibid: 
20). I agree with his claim that “much of the variation in the scope and functions of 
the voluntary sector in contemporary advanced industrial societies can be traced to the 
historical patterns that were established during the Enlightenment, and later, during 
the republican revolutions and social–democratic upheavals of the nineteenth century” 
(Wuthnow 1991: 21). According to him, to get a better understanding of the voluntary 
sector one should be attentive to the relevancy of the social and cultural changes for 
the religious dimension in a society, since the changing role of religion in return may 
give a hint about the transformations in the composition and orientation of the 
voluntary sector (ibid: 22). His approach is quite helpful for the study of current 
changes in the voluntary social provision arena in general and for the study of faith-
based organizations in specific. Nevertheless, the case studies in his edited volume 
Between States and Markets unfortunately fail to put the necessary emphasis on the 
issue of state-church conflicts on the one hand, and the changing role of religion on 
the other, which are two important factors shaping the voluntary sector.  
In conclusion, the existing literatures that are candidates in explaining the rise of 
FBOs in the social policy arena either fail to pay attention to the history of these 
formations in different welfare states or they miss the shifts in the area of religion and 
politics as possible influential factors. Moreover, there are no studies that reconcile 
these two possible explanations—the return of religion and the shift in the welfare 
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mixes—to arrive at a more complete understanding of the phenomenon of faith-
based/religiously motivated associations. The next session will identify how this 
research deals with the weak points of the existing literatures and will present the 
main arguments of the thesis. 
 
2.2. The scope of the project and expected contributions 
As the discussion of the literature made clear, faith-based organizations is quite a 
recent area of study. The research conducted on the topic is quite limited, and most of 
it is concentrated on the cases of United States and United Kingdom. Moreover, the 
existing studies do not take into consideration the relevance of the topic in an 
interdisciplinary manner; their approach is limited to single fields such as social 
policy, urban development, sociology of religion and social cohesion. On the other 
hand, the interests of these single literatures do not intersect and therefore they do not 
communicate with each other. The overall aim of this thesis is to provide the reader 
with a historical and interdisciplinary understanding of religiously motivated 
associations in different welfare mixes. While doing this, the research will benefit 
from a wide variety of social science literatures and theories, and will also contribute 
to them. The expected contributions can be discussed under three main titles that 
represent the three main interests of this thesis. 
The main question guiding the research undertaken for the first two main parts of this 
dissertation is: What are the historical mechanisms behind the contemporary rise of 
religiously motivated associations in the area of social provision? The first aim of 
this research is to provide an overall historical understanding of the rise of FBOs in 
different welfare states, and investigate the possible mechanisms behind “the return of 
religious charity” in the area of welfare. This is mainly achieved by defining social 
provision arena as a dynamic one that has always been under continuous change to 
reconcile the balance between different providers. This first section characterize 
social provision as a form of give and take relationship which has always been 
important for different actors in order to raise their political power, social prestige, or 
influence on various populations. Churches and state, being the main providers in the 
arena, have been through periods of conflict and/or cooperation in different 
geographies. The question then becomes how did a balance come to place between 
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these different providers? What arrangements does politics find to reconcile the 
sacred and the secular claims? The crucial era that has been under scrutiny to answer 
these questions is the time of national revolutions. The settlements between states and 
churches at the crucial periods of late nineteenth, early twentieth century have been 
analyzed as the main influential factor defining the role of religious actors and 
institutions in the newly establishing welfare states. This part mainly benefits from 
discussions on religion and welfare, and religion and politics. 
Part I focuses on four different European countries in order to present how 
interactions between state and church influenced the shaping of social policy arena in 
each of them. Two main periods are studied for each of the countries under analysis: 
the first one is the period in which the formative historical solution between the state 
and church settled (late nineteenth, early twentieth century), and the second one is the 
current period where a “renaissance of charitable organizations” is the case. The 
presentation of these four cases provides us with a panorama of the existing patterns 
of relationships in the area of welfare, and equips us with an understanding of two 
explanatory mechanisms that have determined the contemporary presence of RMAs in 
a welfare state. Part II made use of the findings in Part I for an in-depth analysis of the 
Turkish case and demonstrated that in contrast to the general perception, Turkey is not 
a peculiar case. Two main contributions are expected from these two main parts of the 
dissertation. The first one is an interdisciplinary historical understanding of the 
phenomenon of FBOs. The discussions in this part are expected to contribute to the 
literatures on welfare mixes, religion and welfare and third sector. The second one is 
an-depth understanding of the development of state-society and state-religion 
relations in Turkey, which is the only country that does not have the institutionalized 
religious partner (church) in the area of provision. 
The third contribution of this research to the existing literature will be through the 
empirical study of religiously motivated associations in Turkey. This part aims to 
point out the politics of religiously motivated welfare provision at the meso level, by 
making an in-depth study of the main aims, connections and functioning of the 
RMAs. The main question guiding this last section is “What are the main 
characteristics of these “new” social policy providers?” The presentation of the areas 
of activities, organizational characteristics, decision making mechanisms and 
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practices of provision will be the main focus of the chapters in this part. The 
differences in the identities of the associations and the discussion on the reasons 
behind these differences are expected to contribute mainly to the literature on faith-
based organizations in Europe and on religion and welfare in the Middle East.  
 
2.3. Methodology 
As asserted by Pierson ‘Placing politics in time can greatly enrich both the 
explanations we offer for social outcomes of interest, and the very outcomes that we 
identify as worth explaining’ (Pierson 2004: 2). Consequently, trying to understand 
the current roles of religiously motivated associations in contemporary welfare 
systems would be a hopeless effort without getting an understanding of the history 
behind their existence. Therefore, the main research methodology that will be used in 
the first two parts is historical analysis to explain the causal mechanisms behind the 
contemporary increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy arena. Historical in 
this research means that the researcher situates the study within the relevant contexts, 
takes a sophisticated approach towards historiography, thinks seriously about issues 
of process, timing, and historical trajectories, and gains a deep understanding of the 
cases (Amenta 2003: 94).  
As Mayntz maintains, a study with the aim of causal reconstruction of a specific 
macro phenomenon and the exploration of mechanisms begins with the identification 
of an explanandum (Mayntz 2003: 5). According to her, ‘Processes generally do not 
come as discernable, "given" units; they have no naturally given beginning and end. 
We artificially pick out a sequence, a part of the ongoing process, and try to explain 
how it has come to the particular point that is our explanandum’ (ibid.). The 
explanandum of this research is the increasing role of religiously motivated 
associations in social provision. To follow the processes that resulted in this 
explanandum, the research will focus on the history of social policy, starting from 
early nation state formation period to today. While doing this, the main lines of 
interest will be the history of state and religion relations, and the state and society 
interactions in the area of welfare provision. The analysis of the relations between 
religion, state and society is expected to result in an comprehensive understanding of 
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the mechanisms behind the changing role of RMAs in the welfare state structures. The 
procedure to be followed will be to give thick descriptions of state, society and 
religion interactions in each period and to analyze the possible reflections of them on 
the social policy arena. As Myntz argues, ‘mechanisms state how, by what 
intermediate steps, a certain outcome follows from a set of initial conditions’ (Mayntz 
2003: 4). Following this idea, critical junctures of each period will be analyzed by 
focusing on the institutions and actors in the field of social policy in order to follow 
the chains of different mechanisms which jointly generated the outcome of increasing 
presence of RMAs in the social policy field. 
Following the historical part, the third main part of presents the empirical analysis of 
the religiously motivated associations that have been founded in the last decades. In-
depth interviews conducted with the administrators and volunteers of the RMAs, the 
local and central social policy administrators, and scholars working in the area are the 
main sources of data. The main field research has been carried out in Turkey in the 
period between January 2008 and June 2009. Access to the field was not easy. These 
organizations are most of the time reluctant to talk about their activities. Especially 
after the huge corruption scandal of the biggest RMA in mid 2007; it became even 
harder to reach these groups. A couple of months before I went to Turkey to conduct 
the main field research the largest RMA in Turkey had been taken to the court in 
Germany due to illegal transfer of donations collected from Turks living in Germany 
to certain businesses companies in Turkey. Obviously, this issue had huge 
repercussions on the Turkish branches of the organization as well as the other RMAs 
doing similar activities. The organizations were quite hesitant towards my interview 
request. One of the resources I used to get in touch with the RMAs was the internet: I 
searched the existing civil society organizations working in social assistance and 
solidarity areas in each of the three cities. After creating a list, I have gone through 
their web-pages to see whether they do explicit or implicit references to Islam, God, 
Prophet Muhammad, or other divine issues, so that I could make a preliminary 
decision on whether they can be considered as FBOs or not. In the third stage, I 
phoned these organizations and asked for appointments by stating that I am a PhD 
student doing research in the area. Sometimes I managed to get a positive answer after 
a couple of phone calls to the organization, talking to various people, explaining in 
detail, who I am, what I want to learn from them, what my aim is etc. Sometimes I 
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had to use some personal connections to reach some people. But there were also 
exceptional cases in which they kept postponing me for weeks, or politely refused the 
interview request.  
The interviews consisted of semi-structured, open ended questions. Each interview 
was around an hour, in which the following data is collected: (1) History of the 
organization- founding date of the organization, professional and educational 
backgrounds of the founders, their main motivations while founding the organization. 
(2) Organizational details- number of employees and volunteers, scope of action, 
main activities, decision making, and resources. (3) Connections- relations to 
institutions, other civil society organizations, municipalities, political parties, media 
and business. The data gathered from the in-depth interviews have been analyzed by 
using coding and content analysis. 
 
2.4. Conceptual Clarifications 
I believe that the most comprehensible and valuable theories of social science are the 
ones that are crystal clear about the concepts they utilize. Nevertheless, any social 
scientist very well knows that being clear about the concepts we use is one of the most 
strenuous parts of research. Interdisciplinary research agendas are one of the most 
problematic ones in achieving this conceptual clarity since definitions, and 
understanding attached to most concepts differ from one discipline to the other. A 
further problematic research agenda is the intercultural and/or international 
comparative case studies, given that one to one matching of concepts through 
different cultures and nations is an extremely rare case: If one is doing cross-country 
comparisons, and trying to understand similar situations in different social and 
political environments, in-depth explanations of what is meant by the usage of one 
specific concept becomes even more important. Research done on faith-based 
organizations, charities, and/or religiously motivated social provision in the last 
decades involves the complications of both being interdisciplinary and comparative. I 
will try to inhabit future rise of misunderstandings in my study by starting with a 
discussion of concepts.  
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As already mentioned in the introduction and the title of this chapter, the concept I 
utilize for this research is religiously motivated organizations (RMAs). The concept of 
RMAs should be understood as a more general concept than FBOs, which is also 
suitable to use in the Muslim context in addition to the Christian. Faith-based 
organizations, as the concept is used in Europe and the United States, refers to a group 
of organizations that includes institutionalized religion (churches, religious 
congregations) in addition to charitable and philanthropic organizations that are 
grounded in the main faith traditions of the societies. Their references to religion, 
religious aims and practices are open. Most of the time, moreover, these are places of 
worship or connected to places of worship. Moreover, religious faith is the main 
component of self-definition in most of the cases. The situation in Turkey presents a 
contrast to these structures in the European and the American contexts. The absence 
of institutionalized religion—in the form of a church—is obviously the main 
difference between the Turkish case and the others. Mosque in the Muslim world 
cannot be accepted as a counterpart to the churches in the Christian tradition. 
Mosques are only places of worshipping; historically they have never had social 
functions that are comparable to the churches in the Christian world. They have never 
had either political or economic freedom from the state. Therefore they have never 
been institutionalized as partners of social provision, nor have they ever undertaken 
social assistance activities except from very minor attempts. Therefore, the 
organizations I refer to under the title of RMAs are not mosques; instead, they are 
private organizations that are free from any forms of institutionalized religion or place 
of worship. The main reasons for conceptualizing them as religiously motivated are 
the underlying driving forces for their provision of welfare and—most of the time 
veiled—connections they have to religious groups, sects or tarikats (Sufi orders and 
communities). In short these organizations I refer to are part of third sector/civil 
society/voluntary sector, they are non-state and non-profit, and they are working in 
the area of social welfare/social policy provision.  
I prefer to use a very general definition of what association is, following the French 
sociologist Alain Caille. In looking at the relationship between gift and association, 
Caille defines association as a convention in which two or more people pool their 
material resources, their knowledge for undertaking activities for a purpose that is not 
principally that of sharing material profits (Caille 2000: 52). The RMAs I am referring 
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to as being the center of attention for this research are associations that are formed by 
pooling of some material and non-material resources by a group of individuals on a 
voluntary basis for the provision of social services or goods for the poor and needy. 
So the associations that are under focus are the ones that are active in the area of 
social provision, for increasing the material and sometimes also non-material 
(spiritual, metaphysical) well-being of their recipients.  
What about being religiously motivated? What does this research refer to with the 
concepts of religion and religious? According to Durkheim: “A religion is a unified 
system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart 
and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community 
called a Church, all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim 1917: 62). Durkheim’s 
definition makes references to a unified set of beliefs, and an institution (Church) that 
unites all who believe. Beckford, on the other hand, criticizes Durkheim for defining 
religion “too closely related with very rigid sense of the sacred, community and moral 
obligation” (Beckford 1994: 319). The relatively flexible definition of Beckford, 
which does not necessarily draw a strict line between the sacred and the profane, have 
been preferred as it is more suitable for defining the characteristics of religious 
organizations included in this research project.  
George Simmel is also one of the names Beckford draws on, while formulating this 
designation of religion. Simmel’s contribution to the sociology of religion in early 
twentieth century is worth looking into as it represents quite an inclusive 
interpretation of what religious is (Simmel 1905). He defines religious relations 
dispersed in the daily life of people: “I do not believe that the religious feelings and 
impulses manifest themselves in religion only; rather, that they are to be found in 
many connections, a co-operating element in various situations, whose extreme 
development and differentiation is religion as an independent content of life” (Simmel 
1905: 360). So what religious is, is not strictly and inevitably connected to what 
sacred is and is not perfectly distinguishable from what profane is. One of the 
characteristics of utilizing such a definition of religion and religious is its instability 
and not rigid form: What religious is, or what can be included in the area of religion is 
in a constant process of definition and redefinition.  
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Luckmann’s theory of levels of transcendence can also be helpful to get a better 
understanding the relations between what “natural/profane/nonreligious” and 
“supernatural/sacred/religious” are: 
“Religion” is commonly taken to refer to a particular part of human existence, 
the part that is concerned with the “supernatural”, with the “ultimate meanings” 
of life, with “transcendence.” However, no matter into how many different parts 
one divides human life, it constitutes a single trajectory between birth and death, 
a trajectory which normally has a certain elementary, pre-reflective, taken-for-
granted unity of meaning, and identity. In human life the “supernatural” is 
bound up with the “natural”; “ultimate” meanings of life make sense only in the 
context of the significance of common everyday affairs; and the “transcendent” 
is only transcendent with respect to something “immanent.” (Luckmann 1990: 
128). 
In such an understanding of religion and transcendence, what is religious is not 
necessarily limited to the strict dichotomy of sacred and profane, or is not necessarily 
part of institutionalized religion in the form of a church or mosque.  
Wuthnow’s emphasis on the social dimension of religion and its “functionality” 
becomes relevant at this point. As he argues,  
“Religion has an organic quality, a communal and moral dimension that binds 
people to one another and creates close dependencies between them and their 
environments. […] Religions become embodied as moral communities—as 
networks of deeply felt obligation to one another and to collective rituals and 
beliefs, all of which provide a sense of belonging, even security to the 
participants” (Wuthnow 1988: 308). 
Further consideration of these dependencies and the bounds created will be of crucial 
importance to understand the functioning of the RMAs in various networks of 
reciprocity. 
In conclusion, following Luckmann, Simmel, Beckford, and Wuthnow when I talk 
about religiously motivated associations in this study, I will be referring to any 
association built on some forms of organic quality (Wuthnow 1988), undertaking 
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social provision activities as an outcome of various levels of transcendence as a 
motivation (Luckmann 1990), and by connecting their actions to some form of a 
deeper and ultimate reality (Beckford 1994: 339). 
 
… 
The next part of the will focus on a historical study of the European variety in state, 
religion and society relations in the area of welfare provision, and how this variety is 
shaping the contemporary developments in the area of religiously motivated welfare 
provision.  
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3. State, Religion and Social Policy at the Time of National 
Revolutions 
 
In order to provide a dynamic historical understanding of social policy, I define it as 
an area of loyalty creation and contract revision between providers and 
beneficiaries—these two sides can be state and society, church and believers, 
voluntary organizations and various groups of needy. I argue that provision of welfare 
should be understood as a continuously negotiated relation between these two sides. 
Failure to provide may mean losing the loyalties created through distribution of 
benefits and a decline of power13. Historically, the costs and benefits of welfare 
provision have been shared mainly between state and society. Various institutions of 
local or central state, and different subsections of society have been eager for the 
provision of social benefits. Family, civil society associations, religious institutions 
can be listed as some of the main ones that undertook this role in different time 
periods.  
This chapter will focus on the interaction between religion and state—as the main 
institutions which have been responsible to provide for the poor and needy—at the 
turn of the twentieth century. Various forms of cooperation and conflict between these 
two institutions at the time of national revolutions will be analyzed as the main factor 
explaining the disproportionate presence of religion in the newly rising welfare states 
in different societies. Before going into further discussion, I need to clarify that 
whether to include religion in the area of state or society is a case and time specific 
decision, outcome of which influenced the configurations of social provision mixes in 
different countries. Nevertheless, for the sake of analysis I will define the area of 
religion, which includes both formal and informal religious institutions and 
organizations, as a separate area from the areas of state and society. Following this 
line of argument, the area of social provision will be defined as one of a continuous 
interaction between state, religion and society. In order to get a full grasp of the 
argument and to sketch a variety of possible forms of state-religion relations in the 
                                                 
13 What I refer to by the concept of power is cultural, social, but mainly political influence on the 
beneficiaries.  
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area of welfare, the cases of Britain, Germany, France and Sweden will be under 
analysis in the following section.  
The main theoretical framework to undertake this analysis is borrowed from the 
welfare and religion literature. I will adapt the cleavage theory of the Norwegian 
political scientist Stein Rokkan (1970), and look into the nation state formation period 
in different welfare state structures. My main argument behind this inquiry is that the 
contemporary change in the area of religiously motivated social provision can only be 
understood in relation to the historical cleavage structures in a society. Therefore, I 
will go into an exploration of how this theory has been used as a base for an 
understanding of different welfare state structures by Van Kersbergen and Manow 
(2009) and expand this understanding to explain the differences and similarities 
between the current share and roles of religiously motivated civil society 
organizations in a variety of welfare states. 
 
3.1. Taking Religion and State Relations Serious 
Religion has always been a neglected area in the welfare state research. Apart from a 
couple of exceptions, not much emphasis was put on it neither as an explanatory 
variable for understanding the varieties of welfare states, nor for understanding the 
current changes in them. When I talk about taking religion seriously, as a factor for 
understanding the changes in different welfare configurations, I will mainly be 
referring to religious institutions and organizations as players in the social provision 
arena. Therefore, I will be referring to religion as a resource and a cleavage that 
organizes society, not as a set of beliefs and practices14.  
In their study Religion Class Coalitions and Welfare States, Van Kersbergen and 
Manow point out four main problematic or missing parts of existing welfare state 
research. According to them, for a better understanding of welfare state types (1) 
exclusive focus on worker mobilization is not enough; (2) not only the capital-labor 
                                                 
14 I will leave out the contents of the belief systems as possible explanatory factors for the rise of 
various welfare arrangements. Nevertheless, I want to make sure that this does not necessarily mean 
that I argue the content of the belief systems do not matter. An exemplary work demonstrating how 
they matter is S. Kahl (2009). Yet, my focus especially in explaining the increasing emphasis on the 
religiously motivated organizations will be on religion as an organizing structure and a religious 
institutions and actors as political players.   
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but also church-state conflict; (3) historical facts such as liberalism and anti-
clericalism; (4) not only Catholic Church but also the Protestantism should be taken 
into consideration as having important influence in the development of welfare (Van 
Kersbergen and Manow 2009). Therefore, using the main conceptual framework of 
Stein Rokkan (1970), and building on the theories of Flora and Heidenheimer (1981) 
they emphasize the role of religious cleavages in shaping political class coalitions and 
welfare states. Van Kersbergen and Manow (2009) point out the functionalist ways in 
which the welfare state researchers (such as Flora 1983; Heidenheimer 1983; Berger 
1990) made a causal connection between the decline of religion and the rise of 
Protestantism and the development of the welfare state (Van Kersbergen and Manow 
2009: 13-17). Nevertheless, they also argue that these theories, despite their 
interpretation of religion as a structural variable, were important in making a first 
attempt to emphasize religious cleavages in a society as a factor in defining the type 
of welfare state. Their approach, therefore, provides an historical answer to the variety 
of welfare states by focusing on mainly the developments of the late 19th, early 
twentieth century at the time of national revolutions and by analyzing not only the 
relations between states and churches but also political alliance formations around 
main cleavages in a society. They explain welfare regimes “as formulas of political 
compromise between different electoral and societal groups, […] Yet in order to 
understand which kind of political class-compromises were struck in the different 
European countries, we need to analyze systematically the presence or absence of 
different societal cleavage lines”(Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009: 33). A similar 
argument pointing at the influence of different religious confessions on the early state 
formation and on the formation of various welfare state types in Europe comes from 
Gorski in his work Disciplinary Revolution (Gorski 2003).  
Social provision became an area of struggle for the first time in the nation state 
formation period, owing to the claims of the newly rising state structures on 
monopolizing welfare provision. Late nineteenth, early twentieth century is the period 
in which formative historical solution between state and church has been formed. As 
Kalyvas asserts, in the second half of the nineteenth century, “Catholic Europe 
became the scene of unbridgeable conflict between those who are determined to limit 
or abolish the ancient church’s rights and influence and those who saw damnation, 
temporal as well as eternal, in a divorcement of church and state” (Kalyvas 1996: 
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172). Church-state conflict and how it has been resolved in different nation states has 
been one of the main lines of literature that this research project benefits from 
(Kalyvas 1996; Gould 1999; Gorski 2003).  
The end of nineteenth, beginning of twentieth century is also crucial as a period of 
political class conflicts between different groups of elites in European countries. With 
the rise of liberalism ‘as a movement for political reform’ the absolutist regimes of 
Europe went into a period of change which will result in different political formations 
in each of them. Gould criticizes the approaches that explain regime change as a pure 
outcome of economic development. As he presents “transitions to liberal regimes 
among the countries of Europe were also relatively independent of economic 
development and were influenced by the choices of political movement leaders and 
other elites in the institutions of states and churches” (Gould 1999: 12). While 
explaining origins of liberal reform in different European cases, he focuses on the 
relations between state and church and the political actors as the main factors shaping 
the outcomes. Social policy, although not as the main focus of analysis, is very 
relevant in the study of different cases as the most crucial area of struggle between the 
state and church.  
The emphasis on state-church conflict in the welfare state research mainly 
concentrates on the explanation of different types of welfare states. My research 
project by connecting these arguments to current developments in the area of 
religiously motivated social provision will show how these historical formations 
between state and church and between different elite groups representing these two 
institutions influence the current roles and functions of religiously motivated social 
assistance organizations in different countries. Gould suggests “Religion as an 
institution determined the fate of attempts at liberal reform” (Gould 1999: 115). 
Taking this argument one step further, this research project will show how religion 
and state relations in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century determined the faith 
of religiously motivated social provision in the end of twentieth and early twenty-first 
century.  
I assert that national revolutions are crucial to study not only for an explanation of the 
welfare state types but also for a better understanding of the current transformations 
of the welfare states. Forms of nation state and religion cooperations or conflicts have 
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been the defining factor for the role of religious institutions in the area of provision. 
What kind of a role religious institutions were guaranteed has been different in the 
cases like Britain, where a strong struggle between the church has never occurred; 
Germany, where a balance between the dual church structure had to be settled; 
France, where strict laicism of the Republic excluded religion from all of the public 
arenas, and Sweden where the socialist movement and the single state church tried to 
find the right balance between who would be the provider. Therefore, the following 
sections of this chapter will go into a presentation of the state-religion relations at the 
time period of nation state formation in a variety of European cases and demonstrate 
how the cooperation or conflict lines defined the role of religion/religious institutions 
in different welfare states types.  
 
3.2. Patterns of Social Policy Field in Europe  
The four cases that will be analyzed as presenting a variety of state-religion and state-
society15 interactions in the area of social policy are Britain, France, Germany and 
Sweden. The table below present the summary of the cases included:  
Table 3.1 
 Britain France Germany Sweden 
State-Church 
interaction 
Single state 
church 
Strict 
separation 
Dual state 
church 
Single state 
church 
State-society 
interaction 
Liberal Corporatist-
Statist  
Conservative-
Corporatist  
Social 
democratic 
 
The selection of the cases have been undertaken by following a similar typology to 
that of other scholars who are undertaking research in the politics and religion arena 
(Minkenberg 2003; Robbers 2008; Barbier 1995). In my model, France is the country 
with strict separation between religion and state. Although it is a conservative welfare 
state like Germany, the position of the church is not similar: Catholic Church’s 
significant power in terms of charity came into conflict with the Republican 
Egalitarianism in the twentieth century. Germany is the system of cooperation 
between religion and state. The principle of subsidiary and the presence of two 
                                                 
15 What is meant by state-society interactions is the type of the welfare state.  
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denominations in the country shaped its corporatist structure. Britain is the country 
with a state church, so there has never been a major conflict between the state and the 
Church, and religious charities have always been part of the welfare structure. Finally, 
the case of Sweden represented a less liberal form of the state-church cooperation 
where a social democratic welfare state did not leave much area to the religious 
institutions in the area of provision. One of these countries will be under focus in each 
of the subsections of this chapter with the main aim of analyzing the historical roots 
of different patterns of state-religion and state-society relationships in the social 
provision arena.  
 
3.2.1. Britain 
In different classifications of varieties in state church relationships, Britain has been 
categorized as being non-laicist by Barbier, as a state church system by Robbers and 
as having a close relationship between state power and church by Minkenberg (see 
Minkenberg 2003). Since 1707, the Monarch of England has also been the head of the 
Church of England and this resulted in the realization of close relations between the 
religious and the governmental substructures, and moreover sharing of some state 
functions with the Church. McLeod puts forward that the ecclesiastical structure of 
this country is a mixture of the continental European pattern and the North American 
pattern. Similar to most European countries, England had a dominant, privileged 
established church allied with the forces of political conservatism. However, similar 
to the United States, it is a multi-religious country in which large numbers of religious 
denominations were able to coexist due to its history of religious toleration (McLeod 
1996). These characteristics of the British church and state relations have been a 
major factor in the early advancement of liberalism in this country in the nineteenth 
century.  
When the history of church and state is focused in England, one can see that clergy 
and religious organizations of all kinds had an important role in the development of 
liberalism in the nineteenth century. As McLeod stresses England was 
overwhelmingly a Christian and Protestant nation and the kind of secular liberalism 
that was crucial in many continental European countries was never the case in 
 41
England (McLeod 1996: 2). A specific emphasis had been given to the role of the 
Liberal Party and its Anglican leader Gladstone in successfully using religious forces 
for supporting liberal ideas between 1867 and 1875 (De Ruggiero 1959; Bentley 
1987; Breuilly 1992; Gould 1999). In this period, the legitimate authority of the 
government and the church were upheld, as Parry asserts (Parry 1986). There was no 
hostile relationship between the religious forces and the liberal ones as it had been the 
case in some continental countries like France. In contrast, religious forces have been 
part of the supporter groups for liberalization and in exchange for this support; 
liberals assured programs for their religiously motivated supporters (Bentley 1987: 
15). The multi religious structure of the country was also a reason for the 
establishment of close connections between church and the liberal movement. The 
non-conformist Protestant churches and the unprivileged Catholic Church both in 
specific ways supported the Liberal Party with the hope of improving their position. 
The only opposition was to the privileged position of the Church of England which 
served the advancement of British liberal movement under Gladstone (Gould 1999: 
31-32, 88, 109, 120-123). 
It is possible to see the imprints of this relatively peaceful coexistence of the liberal 
order and religious groups throughout the history of welfare state development in 
Britain. The country kept its long tradition of charity alive up until today as a 
supporter of the state provision of welfare. The evolution of the social policy sphere 
in Britain was also one of a gradual secularization and formalization of the voluntary 
organizations (Kendall and Knapp 1993). The existing literature on pre-modern forms 
of social policy in Britain demonstrates that voluntary organizations based on the 
ideals of helping your co-believers have existed centuries before the establishment of 
state institutions that are responsible for the care of the poor and the sick. The 
overwhelming majority of the organizations working in the social assistance field 
starting from the early seventeenth century were religious charities. Kramer, in his 
book Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State exhibits that the starting point of the 
modern British law of charities was adopted in 1601. For the next three hundred 
years, apart from parish, poor relief and some types of public institutional care: 
“religious and philanthropic organizations were almost alone in the social services. 
They established numerous homes, hospitals, schools, training institutions, 
workshops, and clubs and organized visiting and other forms of what are called the 
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personal social services” (Kramer 1981: 37). The nineteenth century was marked by 
further expansion of charity in Britain (Fraser 1973; Thane 1978; Kramer 1981; Jones 
2000). The main period that is pointed out for the rise of charities is the Victorian age 
between 1837 and 1901. As Fraser argues, there was apparently no subject that could 
not arouse the philanthropic urge of the Victorian public, which resulted in an 
impressive growth in the charities in the nineteenth century. According to him, in the 
course of Victorian periods the emphasis of religion shifted from man serving God to 
man serving his fellow-man. Especially in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
much religious activity came to be socially oriented, religion became imbued with an 
essentially social conscience (Fraser 1973: 117-118). Kramer, similarly points out the 
groundbreaking role of voluntary organizations in the development of welfare state in 
Britain by arguing that “The evolution of the British welfare state from its religious 
and philanthropic origins to the present statutory structure occurred within the context 
of a set of values and norms regarding citizen participation that has become a 
prototype for other Western democracies” (Kramer 1981: 54). 
The early twentieth century in Britain is marked with the increasing role of state 
activities in the social arena. Yet, different than in many of the European cases this 
secularization process was free of major clashes between state and church. The state 
started to acknowledge responsibility for the poor and the sick and the first modern 
statutory social services introduced between 1905 and 1914. For Britain, that was the 
time when substantial social legislation was introduced by the Liberal Party under the 
leadership of Lloyd George (Kramer 1981: 38). The main reasons for the introduction 
of these basic social policies in the early years of twentieth century were to control 
labor and to increase efficiency. As argued by Clarke, Langan and Williams, the 
welfare benefits that were introduced in the first half of the century were concerned 
with appeasing and supervising the increasingly “militant” working class and sustain 
the stability of the country (Clarke, Langan et al. 2001: 32). Therefore it is possible to 
see secular state gradually stepping in the area of provision in the period following the 
nation state formation. 
As presented, the lack of conflict between the state and the Church of England; and 
the liberal attitude of the state that did not exclude religious charities from the social 
provision arena resulted in the establishment of a balance between religious and 
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secular agencies in the early twentieth century. The role of churches and other forms 
of religious organizations have not been institutionalized as main partners of social 
provision as it has been the case in of Germany, yet they were also not excluded from 
the arena as it has been in the cases of France and Turkey. As will be discussed in the 
next chapter on contemporary changes, this established balance between religion and 
state would only go through some minor changes in the period after the 1980s.  
 
3.2.2. France 
France is a country that is characterized by laicism, which means a strict separation 
between the state and the church. The roots of this strict separation can be traced back 
to the nineteenth century France. As Morgan maintains, France in nineteenth century 
is often presented as consisting of two conflicting worlds: one resolutely monarchist, 
pro-clerical, and reactionary, and the other just as determinedly revolutionary, 
anticlerical, and republican (Morgan 2002: 35). This main cleavage in the social and 
political life of the country resulted in a power struggle between Catholics and the 
anti-clericalists on who will have more influence over the state, community and the 
family (ibid:38). The history of secularization (or laicism) in France presents a 
completely different picture than the gradual and harmonious secularization of the 
British case. Following a Rokkanian analysis, this can be explained as an outcome of 
the different cleavage lines in the two societies. The social and political sphere of 
France, different than Britain, was marked by the deep cleavage between the sacred 
and the secular authorities. The ruling period of the Third Republic is specifically 
important in terms of the rise of anti-clericalism. The aim to eliminate the power of 
clergy from the social and the political spheres was the grounding principle and the 
“real cement” for the republican party (Mayeur and Reberioux 1987: 84). As Ertman 
argues: “Republicans in France used anticlericalism to create a broad-based 
movement uniting peasants and local notables in regions traditionally hostile to the 
Church with urban democrats in support of the new regime” (Ertman 2009: 50). 
Peasants also supported the republicans against the Church in the late 19th century, 
and this was mainly due to the church’s position as being the owner of a relatively 
large percentage of the land (Gibson 1991: 113; Gould 1999: 59). Archambault also 
points out the opposition between Catholicism and Republicanism as the main 
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dividing line in French politics. The historical analysis demonstrates that this cleavage 
was also clearly reflected on the social provision arena as a fierce competition 
between the religious and secular social provision institutions.  The practice of charity 
being a crucial integral part of Catholic ideology was in complete contrast to the 
Republican ideologies that aims industrializing and urbanizing and the state provision 
of welfare (Archambault 1993: 13).  
The hostile relationships between the church and the state in the late nineteenth, early 
twentieth century resulted in the formation of a closed Catholic work in the French 
case. As Berger puts it the church built “a dense and wide-ranging network of 
associations (…) with sharply defined and well-protected boundaries” (Berger 1987: 
128). According to him, “These associations were to be mass movements of ordinary 
people, replacing the study and prayer groups of small elites that the church had 
promoted in the nineteenth century. Catholic Action movements made explicit one of 
the principle tenets of integralist belief: that religion should not be simply a matter of 
private life, but a commitment to collective action” (Berger 1987: 130). So, the 
religious forces were able to organize in forms of associations however a confessional 
party did not rise in the case of France, between 1871 and 1940 although it did in the 
other European states like Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and 
Austria (Kalyvas 1996; Gould 1999; Warner 2000; Palier and Manow 2009). There is 
a recurrent question in the literature: why could or did the French Catholics not 
organize a political party? I will not go into the details of the discussions about why it 
was not the case; however I would claim that the absence of political representation of 
the church and/or religious forces in the form of a political party that can fight for 
their rights resulted in a relatively abrupt secularization of the country16. Since the 
balance of forces shifted between the church and the liberal forces starting from the 
late nineteenth century positioning them in totally conflicting positions, a gradual 
secularization period as it was the case in Britain was not possible in France.  
Pre-modern social policy in France, similar to the other Catholic countries, was 
mainly marked by the activities of Church and the religious charities. As it is the case 
in all European countries, ancient charities have been the forerunners of secular social 
policies. As Archambault puts forward, two pillars of social protection was 
                                                 
16 This abrupt secularization France is quite similar to the case of Turkey, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
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functioning in France in the Middle Ages: (1) charitable organizations of the parishes 
and the monastic orders that are active in the areas of hospitals, asylums and 
orphanages, and (2) charitable brotherhoods that are part of guild system 
(Archambault 2001: 207). Ullman describes this period of pre-modern social policy 
being characterized by the leading role of charity in addition to collaborative efforts 
of state and church (Ullman 1998: 49). In the late nineteenth early twentieth century 
France, social policy became one of the main battle fields of this conflict between the 
state and the church. As Smith puts forward “Catholicism, after all, stressed local, 
parish based charitable works—the very antithesis of secular, national state welfare” 
(Smith 2003: 24). The centralization and homogenization of the social structure of the 
society was the main aim of the governments that came to power after the French 
revolution, so the public education system was especially crucial in achieving this 
aim. As Morgan demonstrates, the conflicts in the Protestant countries resolved easier 
as the church became a partner of the state in the education policy. Catholic countries, 
in contrast went through fierce battles to decide on who controls education (Morgan 
2002: 124). France is an example of the fiercest of these conflicts which ended with 
the victory of the state excluding church from the educational sector and closing up 
more than 2,500 Catholic schools in 1904 (Palier and Manow 2009: 154). 
One specifity of the French welfare state is the introduction of the social assistance 
system before the introduction of social insurance. As Childers suggests, the 
development of social assistance system enable the construction of France as a nation: 
“Social solidarity was created through the expansion of social rights, as French 
citizens shifted their loyalties from local and traditional forms of assistance to 
nationally administrated welfare” (Childers 2006: 130). This should also be 
understood in relation to the specific position of state-church conflict in the France 
case. As Renards present: “For the policy of assistance publique set in motion in the 
1880s was explicitly locates in the context of policies aimed at strengthening the 
Republic. Its principle aim was, in its early stages at least to play a part in the struggle 
against the Catholic church, which was deeply involved in the welfare institutions of 
the period, and to redefine relations between public and private in this sector, which 
was then being reshaped” (Renard 1994: 95). The main aim of the Republic was to 
fight against church’s existence in the social and political arena, while introducing 
reforms such as assistance for abandoned children in 1889, medical assistance in 
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1893, children in 1904, old-aged in 1905. Merrien stated that the main intention of the 
introduction of these social assistance and public relief measures were to replace the 
private charities and to pursue with the “laïcisation de l’action sociale” (Merrien 
1990: 164-166). One further move that was taken by the government to establish 
authority over the various existing public assistance schemes was to introduce the 
Direction de l’Assistance Publique under the responsibility of Ministry of the Interior 
(Weiss 1983: 59). All these legislations that are introduced by the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century have been important steps in the 
way towards the creation of a strictly secular welfare state. Palier and Manow name 
this process of secularization as “Consolidating the Nation through the ‘Laïcisation de 
la Protection Sociale; by giving the examples of how the entire debates of social 
policy—such as schooling, child and family policy and social assistance—were 
dominated by the state-church cleavage (Palier and Manow 2009: 150-151).  
This specific pattern of secularization that the French state pursued resulted in the 
exclusion of the church and religious charities from most of the social provision 
arenas and the rise of a welfare state with a weak voluntary sector and lack of 
cooperation between religious and secular providers. Transformations in the 
composition of the society resulted in some shifts in the last decades. Yet, as will be 
presented in the next chapter, France still is the case with the strictest control on the 
possible increases of religiously motivated provision in its social policy arena.  
 
3.2.3. Germany 
In classifications of state-church relationships, Germany is generally placed half way 
between France and Britain. While the French case is marked with high degree of 
contradiction and separation and the British case with non-separation, Germany is 
classified as a system of common tasks by Robbers (Robbers 2005), and as semi-
laicist by Barbier (Barbier 1995). According to Minkenberg, the idea of separation in 
Germany has been modified by some overlap of state and church responsibilities 
which resulted in upholding of some privileges of the main churches (Minkenberg 
2003). More than the conflict between the state and the church, the conflict between 
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two denominations—Catholicism and Protestantism—marked the political and social 
history of Germany.  
In relative terms, modern social policy in Germany has developed quite early in 
comparison to other European countries. Already in the eighteenth century provision 
of poor relief was accepted as public responsibility. A modern social security system 
was formed as early as the Wilhelmine period. As Sachsse states, the working class 
question was clearly distinguished from the question of poor by legislation and 
administrative institutions with the introduction of “workers insurance” in 1880 
(Sachsse 1996: 149). In addition to the public services of welfare, there was a wide 
variety of civil associations and private charities in the field of social welfare in the 
nineteenth century Germany. Starting from 1870s social associations at the national 
level were formed to achieve scientific and professional goals for social policy 
(Sachsse 1996: 157). These reforms were steps towards the modernization and 
secularization of the traditional charity structure that was based on religious 
motivations. The main associations established in the period are “Verein für 
Socialpolitik” (Association for Social Policy) founded in 1873, “Deutscher Verein für 
Armenpflege und Wohltätigkeit” (German Association for Poor Relief and Charity) 
among many others (ibid.). The history of associations and public social provision in 
Germany, presents the relatively peaceful coexistence of the private and public, 
religious and secular forces in the area of social policy starting from the early ages to 
today.  
Centralization and reorganization of the private welfare sector in Germany took place 
in the Weimar period. Central nationwide associations like the Protestant “Central 
Committee of the Inner Mission” the Catholic “Caritas Association” are established in 
this period in 1848 and 1897 respectively (Sachsse 1996: 166). In Sachsse’s words: 
“With the extension of the Weimar Welfare State the strict distinction of state and 
society as separate spheres stemming from the 19th century tradition in German social 
and constitutional theory collapsed. A new sector consisting of private agencies, 
public funds, para-governmental and para-fiscal organizations developed that was 
neither state nor non-state in the traditional sense” (Sachsse 1996: 169). “After World 
War I, the Weimer Constitution discontinued the traditional union of church and state. 
Therefore, the Christian welfare organizations sought both to institutionalize the 
 48
primary of private over public welfare in social welfare legislation, and to exclude 
political welfare organizations, and the interests they represented” (Bauer 1990: 104). 
Both the Protestant and the Catholic churches established solid networks of welfare 
services in the Weimer Republic (Heinze and Olk 1981). Caritas and Diakonie as the 
largest umbrella organizations of the German welfare arena have been the most 
important examples of this division. These associations were already founded in 
German Empire, and after that moved to the position of being umbrella associations in 
the early years of Weimer Republic (Sachsse 1996). As Zimmer interprets it, the 
acceptance of both of these associations as counterparts by the state bridged the 
religious division between Catholics and Protestants in the welfare policy field 
(Zimmer 1999: 41). Although conflicts existed in some time periods between these 
three actors of the social policy, a rapture of bonds never occurred as it was the case 
in France for example. Hence, the German political authorities have managed to keep 
up their cooperation both with the church and the voluntary organizations. In contrast 
to the case of France, German democracy has been identified with an attitude of anti-
etatism (Seibel 1992: 59).  
The main period of conflict between the liberals and the religious authorities took 
place in the united Germany under the rule of Bismarck. The Bismarckian period, 
with its policy of Kulturkampf in between 1871 and 1882, was stage to the fiercest 
struggle between the two sides. In Sperber’s words: “The ministry, with the 
enthusiastic support of the Liberal parliamentary majority, attempted to re-assert the 
predominant influence of the state over the church in a wide variety of arenas, ranging 
from the control of the educational system to the legal validity of marriage, to the 
education, appointment and discipline of the Catholic clergy” (Sperber 1980: 320). In 
this period, the state directly attacked the Catholic Church and moreover denounced 
the power of the Church in 1853 (Kalyvas 1996: 204). In Gould’s interpretation, this 
movement of the Bismarckian German state to deprive the Catholic Church from its 
privileges resulted in the consolidation of political Catholicism that lead to the 
formation of the Center Party in 1870 (Gould 1999). The influence of the party 
increased in the political arena in 1872 due to state’s attack against the Catholic 
Church, which according to Ross turned into “the major religio-political conflict in 
nineteenth century Germany” (Ross 1976: 15). State subsidies to the Catholic Church 
were cut in 1875 and all Catholic schools were taken under state control in 1972. This 
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period, by the end of nineteenth century, can be marked as the main clash between the 
secular and the religious forces over the division of responsibilities in social welfare. 
The Catholic Church lost its influence especially in the area of education; however 
religious forces in general uphold and even reinforce their influence in the areas of 
social welfare services with the principle of subsidiarity. 
In order to achieve a balance of forces between religious and secular authorities, 
Catholic Church developed the principle of subsidiarity in the first half of the 
twentieth century. As clearly explained by Anheier, this principle of Catholic 
philosophy is a response to two main challenges the church has to face in the 
nineteenth century: “(1) greater individualism, which, outside the realm of the family 
and the local parish, coincided with an increased need for forms of social solidarity 
and nonfamily-based social services and welfare; and (2) the emergence of the secular 
nation-state, with its large scale bureaucracy, which challenged the position of the 
Catholic Church” (Anheier 1992: 33). By referring to the Papal Encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno, McIlroy explains the major characteristics of subsidiarity by 
communicating Pius XI’s statement that “it is gravely wrong to take from individuals 
what they can achieve by their own initiative and give it to the community; decisions 
should be taken at the lowest level possible which is compatible with good 
government” (McIlroy 2003: 739). Therefore the principle of sharing power as 
downwards as possible has been an important ruling idea of German politics starting 
from nineteenth century. As Anheier suggests the principle was included in most of 
the legislation introduced between 1950 and 1975- like the Social Code, the Federal 
Social Assistance Act, and the Youth Welfare Act, which resulted in the creation of 
highly protected, state-financed system of assistance delivery by autonomous 
nonprofit organizations (Anheier 1992: 37).  
Consequently, these characteristics of the history of cooperation between the state, the 
established churches and the voluntary sector in Germany enabled a balanced division 
of labor—between the sacred and secular authorities—in the social policy sphere. The 
study of the contemporary period in the next chapter will demonstrate how these 
established relations hinder change in the German welfare arena and determine the 
future of the social welfare provision in Germany. 
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3.2.4. Sweden 
Sweden represents one end of the separation, openness and regulation scales of 
church-state relations in Europe, whereas France represents the other one (see 
Minkenberg 2003: 200). In the period after the Lutheran Reformation in the sixteenth 
century, the transition from Roman Catholic to Evangelical-Lutheran Christianity, the 
creation of the national church and the Swedish kingdom had been parallel 
developments. Evangelical Lutheran Church was the only state church in Sweden 
until 2000 and membership to it was obligatory by law until 1951. Belonging to the 
Church of Sweden and attending to its major activities had been considered as a 
necessary part of being a Swedish citizen. As suggested by Bäckstöm, the transition 
took off during the emergence of the industrial society; resulted in the development of 
the Church as “a state institution among others at a national level and a municipal 
organization in parallel with the secular authorities at a local level” (Bäckström, 
Beckman et al. 2004: 45). He labels this process as the development of the Folk 
Church as a part of the Folk Home (ibid.). This period of complete fusion between 
state and church, in which there was no form of religious liberty available, and the 
priests—as civil servants—were also undertaking non-religious tasks, has been 
defined as “the century of Lutheran orthodoxy” (Gustafsson 2003: 51). As stressed by 
scholars in the field, the inseparability of the state and the Church was clear from the 
establishment of priests and bishops as one of the four estates of the Swedish 
Parliament (Bäckström, Beckman et al. 2004: 32-34).  
In addition to its public and political roles, the social provision roles of the Church—
in areas such as health, education and social care—were also crucial in the period 
before mid nineteenth century when a slow process of change started. A turning point 
in this process of gradual change was a reform of local administration, which 
introduced separation between parishes and municipalities. The government reform 
undertaken in 1862 resulted in the secularization of the services in the areas such as 
poor relief, education and daily care. As claimed by Anderson, these secularization 
measures attracted some opposition from the Church and the religious circles in the 
later years (Anderson 2009: 221). Nevertheless, this opposition remained at a quite 
ineffective level since no political division was present between the Church and state, 
and the Church was highly dependant on the State for its economic survival. As a 
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response to the rise of public poor relief, there have been minor attempts to increase 
the Church’s influence and role in the public system, yet it was only in the twentieth 
century that these attempts became more determined (Anderson 2009: 222). Rapid 
industrialization, the emergence of a labor movement, and the Free Churches17 
movement in the last quarter of the 19th century could be mentioned as explanatory 
factors for the increasing interest of the Church to be influential in the social policy 
arena.  
The emergence of these two main lines of popular movements—Labor and Free 
Churches—was threatening the Church of Sweden’s monopoly in the area of religion 
and presence in the area of social services—especially education. Similar to the other 
European cases, liberalism has also been an influential political force in the nineteenth 
century Sweden. Liberals did not directly oppose the Church of Sweden nevertheless; 
the rise of liberal ideologies may anyways be marked as an influencing factor on the 
cultural and religious orthodoxy of the state and church in Sweden18. The rise of 
social democrats in late nineteenth century constituted a further threat to the authority 
of the Church. In its early years after the establishment in 1889 the Social Democratic 
Party (SAP), has been both an anti-clerical and anti-religious force in politics. 
Nevertheless, they moderated their discourse in the early twentieth century with the 
fear to offend parts of the population with religious sensitivities19. As argued by the 
scholars working in the area, the years in between the establishment of the Social 
Democratic Party and the 1920s and 1930s were marked by the gradual move of both 
the Party and the Church to a moderate position due to the rise of the political power 
of the Party on the one hand, and the increasing interest of the Church to be active in 
the area of social reforms on the other hand (Tingsten 1973; Anderson 2009: 229). An 
important move by the social democratic party to decrease the role of religion as a 
potential oppositional political force was the establishment of Social Democratic 
                                                 
17 Mainly composed of Liberals, who are in favor of religious liberty and equality between different 
religious organizations, see Olsson, S. E. (1990). Social Policy and welfare State in Sweden. Lund, 
Arkiv. 
  
 
18 For further analysis see Gustafsson, G. (2003). "Church-State Seperation Swedish Style." West 
European Politcs 26(1): 51-72. 
  
19 Especially the worker groups with religious sensitivities and the Liberals with their relations to the 
Free churches. For a detailed study see Tingsten, H. (1973). The Swedish Social Democrats. Their 
Ideological Development. New Jersey, Bedminster Press. 
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Brotherhood, which made possible attracting believers. This move also was a step to 
mark the main cleavage in politics on the line of socialist-non-socialist (Anderson 
2009: 230).  
In comparison to the other cases under analysis, the case of Sweden can be labeled as 
the country in which little or even no political conflict took place over who would be 
the main provider of social policies. The transfer of most of the social services—such 
as education, health, care—from the Church to the state took place in the early stages 
of welfare state development. Yet the specific characteristics of the relationship 
between state and the Church resulted in the peaceful nature of these transfers. The 
Church of Sweden has never become a separate political or economic power. As 
explained by Bäckström, the Church of Sweden did not become a part of voluntary 
sector either; instead the State had a strict control and administrative power on the 
church in assigning it a range of services in the welfare arena (Bäckström, Beckman 
et al. 2004: 47).  
As a result, in comparison to state-church conflict or cooperation having an important 
shaping power in the cases like France and Germany, in the case of Sweden the lack 
of a cleavage line on this axis resulted in the minor role of religion shaping the early 
social policy arena. As put forward by Morgan, “…the collaborative and relatively 
non-conflictual relationship between the established church and the state in Sweden, 
as in other Nordic countries precluded the formation of religious cleavages around 
religion” (Morgan 2002: 132). The Church, despite having a prominent presence in 
the area of provision in pre-twentieth century, could not play a significant role as an 
alternative to state action in the period after. As argued by Andersen, “the Church 
tried to influence the course of social policy in the formative period of the welfare 
state, but failed: Liberals, Social democrats and Agrarians competed to control the 
content of early social policy” (Anderson 2009: 231). In conclusion, these historical 
specificities of the Swedish state-church relations resulted in the establishment of a 
Scandinavian welfare state that did not incorporate churches or religious voluntary 
organizations as social policy providers. The reflections of this historical background 
on the contemporary social policy developments will be a discussion point in the next 
chapter. 
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3.3. Conclusion 
The brief presentation of the case studies on the history of state-church relations in the 
nation state formation period, and establishment of the modern welfare states aimed to 
equip the reader with a broad picture of various historical arrangements existing in 
Europe. How different patterns of cooperation or conflict between state and church in 
the area of provision determined the future integration or exclusion of religious 
institutions in different welfare typologies have been the question dealt with in each 
of the cases.  
As discussed for each of the cases above, the rise of the nation states, accompanied by 
the ideal of social provision as an area of state action resulted in key transformations 
in the provision arena. Different welfare mixes grown out of the interactions between 
religious and secular institutions as providers of social services. I argue that it is 
crucial to understand how these power struggles between different providers of social 
welfare shaped the early welfare state structures. Building on this understanding, the 
next chapter will aim at bridging the historical specificities of the countries presented 
in this chapter with the contemporary developments in the area of welfare (i.e. 
increasing presence of FBOs in the social policy arena). 
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4. Contemporary Shifts in State, Religion and Society Relations in 
Europe 
 
The main arguments of the religion and welfare literature on how different 
formulations of the state-church relations played an important role in the 
establishment of welfare state typologies have already been discussed in the last 
chapter. What I find lacking in these existing literatures is the attempt to make a 
connection between the historical explanations and the contemporary developments. 
Manow and Kersbergen (2009) concentrate on different state-religion configurations, 
and different class coalitions, as two main influencing factors in the establishment of 
different welfare state types at the time of national revolutions. Nevertheless, they do 
not pay attention to how current changes in the political relevance of religion and the 
relations between religious and secular forces in the political field may effect 
transformation of welfare states. My main aim in this chapter will be to demonstrate 
the reflections of historical trajectories on the contemporary developments in various 
welfare state types.   
As presented in the previous chapters, existing theories explain the rising interest on 
FBOs as social policy providers either as a response to the retrenchments in welfare 
states, or a return of religion to the public sphere. The main aim of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that neither the rise of religion nor the retrenchment of the welfare states 
arguments are enough for a comprehensive understanding of the historical processes 
behind the rise of religiously motivated associations in single cases. I do not contend 
that these factors may not have an explanatory power for some of the cases. 
Nonetheless, I suggest that a better understanding of the phenomenon needs a 
redefinition of the explanatory factors. This chapter points out a lack of attention to 
the relevance of interactions between religion and politics in the discussions of the 
rise of RMAs in the welfare arena. It is commonly overlooked that the rise of these 
associations in the social sphere is an outcome of the political choices. I suggest that it 
is not the return of religion but the changing relevance of religion in politics and 
changing relations between state and religion/religious groups that is the first factor 
explaining the increase in the religiously motivated provision. Instead of a general 
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‘one fits all’ kind of argument about the return of religion in the public sphere, I claim 
that the increasing visibility or number of these associations in different welfare 
structures can only be understood by looking at the religion and state relations in each 
specific case.  
The second factor that is generally defined as retrenchments in the welfare arena or 
the shifts in the provision of welfare from state to civil society and private actors is 
also problematic as such. These literatures mark the increasing presence of voluntary 
organizations in the welfare mixes or the expanding of third sector in the area of 
welfare as the common changes in the European welfare states in the last years. I 
agree that in many countries it is possible to talk about an increasing presence of civil 
society actors in the area of social provision, yet whether these adjustments mark a 
reform in the way a state organizes relations with its citizens is the main question that 
is of interest in my understanding. I claim that answers to questions such as whether 
the state is giving up its role of being the main provider, and whether there is a 
refitting in the position of the state in comparison to the civil society associations can 
provide us with a much better understanding than any convergence argument. 
Consequently, this chapter defines the changing position of religiously motivated 
associations’ contingent on the interaction between the shifts in these two axes of 
state-society and state-religion relations. Britain and Sweden will represent the cases 
of medium level of change, in comparison to the low level of change in the cases of 
Germany and France20. The case studies of France, Sweden, Germany and the United 
Kingdom will demonstrate that change in these countries is smaller in comparison to 
Turkey. The relative stability of the four European cases will be explained in relation 
to the inhibiting role of the well-established patterns either in state-society (Germany, 
Sweden) or in state-religion (Britain and France) relations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Amount of change is defined in comparison to the case of Turkey, which is the country with the 
biggest amount of change. As the coming chapters will present, the Turkish case is a critical one due to 
the major changes in both of these axis in the last years. 
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4.1. The cases of medium degree of change: Britain and Sweden 
Britain and Sweden are the cases in which both the numbers of and the interest on 
faith-based organizations are on the rise in the last two decades. There is a rising 
presence of these organizations in the public spheres of both of the countries. There is 
an increasing material and ideological support by the governments for their increasing 
presence as social actors. Nevertheless, the mechanisms that triggered the rise of these 
phenomena in these two countries are not necessarily the same. This section will 
demonstrate that while the shift in the state-religion relations is more dominant in 
determining the increasing interest in the FBOs as social actors in the case of Sweden, 
the shift in the state-society relations is the more dominant factor in Britain. The 
following in-depth analysis of areas of religion, politics and social policy in the two 
cases will prove the significance of historical patterns of state-society and state-
religion relations in shaping the responses of different welfare structures to the 
contemporary challenges.  
 
4.1.1. The transformation of state-society relations in Britain 
The 1970s came with crisis in Britain, similar to most other European countries. 
While the consensus on the crucial role of social policy ended in this period, the rising 
belief was that Keynesian economics did not function anymore. Different approaches 
emphasizing the responsibilities of citizens and the importance of having plural actors 
in the welfare arena gained significance in this period. Margaret Thatcher came to 
power in 1979, replacing the Labour Government, which was a milestone 
representing that monetarism in politics and economics would dominate the following 
decade in the UK. Rising ideologies of the period designated increasing importance 
given to individual freedoms and a lesser role to state intervention in the economy. 
The withdrawal of the state from the social policy field transferred the responsibilities 
to other agencies such as private enterprises, NGOs and families as a part of ‘welfare 
pluralism approach’ (Wolfenden 1978; Gladstone 1979).  
As Jones suggests, it is in this period of two consecutive conservative government 
administrations of 1979-83 and 1983-87 that it become fashionable again to talk of 
‘the poor’ as a single class, and of ‘scroungers’ and ‘layabouts’ who would not work. 
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‘Greed and acquisitiveness were extolled as virtues, and the gap between rich and 
poor got wider’ (Jones 2000: 163). To think about the poor as a single class is also 
closely related to the social exclusion discourse that to a great extent replaced the 
inequality and the poverty discourses in Britain after the 1980s. This discourse veils 
the multiple class structure of the society. When social policy defines poor as a single 
class then the solutions that will be proposed to solve the problems will not aim at 
redistribution to fight inequality that is present at all levels in the society but it will 
only focus on helping the neediest parts of the population to make a living possible 
for them.  
In the 1997 elections, the promise to tackle social exclusion was successfully used as 
a strategy by Tony Blair. After the victory of the Labour Party in the elections, the 
Social Exclusion Unit was set up by the Prime Ministry to “fight” against social 
exclusion. As Lister persuasively puts forward, “work not welfare represents the 
passport to social inclusion” (Lister 1998: 220). In this understanding of New Labour, 
the duties and personal responsibilities are emphasized more than the rights to 
welfare. In his book, Work Consumerism and the New Poor, Bauman explains how 
the new poor became more marginalized as the state withdrew support (Bauman 
1998). While the discourse on the rights of the poor was declining, a discourse about 
responsibilities arose. Clarke, Langan and Williams summarize the objectives of 
Conservative policy making in the 1980s and 1990s as to ‘(1) reduce the disincentive 
and dependency-creating effects of benefits; (2) create a more efficient benefits 
system by “targeting” benefits at the most needy; and (3) encourage moves away from 
the state as the primary agency of social insurance’ (Clarke, Langan et al. 2001: 80). 
All of these points indicate a major shift in the state-society relations. 
This third shift of encouraging moves away from state as the primary agency of social 
insurance mainly turned the focus to the voluntary sector, as the oldest actor of the 
social work field. Thatcher’s coming to power in 1979 and the policies she followed 
to limit the role of state feed into to the rise of the voluntary sector. Scholars interpret 
the name change of the National Council of Social Service to the National Council for 
Voluntary Organizations in 1980 as a hint signaling a major shift (Harris, Rochester et 
al. 2001: 2). The scholars agree on the idea that the role of voluntary organizations in 
social policy field has moved from periphery to the center in these decades. Voluntary 
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sector was not anymore seen as complimentary or supporting to the main provider of 
the state anymore—as it was the case in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. Starting 
from the late 1970s voluntary organizations moved to the position of main provider in 
many areas of social policy (Billis and Harris 1992; Johnson 1992; Harris, Rochester 
et al. 2001). When the aims of the neo-liberals to decrease their responsibility in the 
social policy arena came together with the religious group’s aims of increasing the 
number of their supporters came together, the holy combination between religion and 
neo-liberal politics was on the stage. Harris et.al. point to the growing cross-party 
interest in religious organizations in the UK, especially in the last two decades 
(Harris, Halfpenny et al. 2003: 93). They mark the launch of the Conservative Party’s 
introduction of a social policy initiative called ‘Renewing One Nation’ as a 
groundbreaking event mentioning faith groups as innovators in solving persistent 
social problems and creating ‘compassionate communities’ (ibid: 95). One can argue 
that a new consensus arises in the social policy field starting from 1980s, which is 
characterized by the emphasis put on the voluntary actors—especially religious 
ones—as one of the main providers of the social welfare. Following the Conservative 
Party, New Labour government and Tony Blair have also shown great interest in the 
capacity of faith based organizations roles in contributing to social welfare, providing 
social provision, and regenerating communities (Philpot 2001; Harris, Halfpenny et 
al. 2003). In conclusion, the transformations the British welfare state has gone 
through in the time period starting from the late 1970s can be interpreted as a main 
shift in how the state defines its relations with its citizens. The state deciding to be the 
steerer of the welfare arena paved the way for the increasing presence of FBOs in the 
social sphere.  
The shifts in the area of religion and politics have only been a supplementary factor 
for the increasing presence of FBOs in social policy sphere in the case of Britain. The 
interest of the governments in the material and non-material resources of the FBOs is 
one of the main reasons for the increasing emphasis on these organizations. In a 
period of financial problems for the welfare state, the governments realized the 
already existing resources that FBOs and churches have and wanted to make use of 
these resources to support their welfare and cohesion activities. These resources that 
are referred to are both material –such  as buildings, volunteers, donations—and  not 
material ones such as the historical experience of churches on the issue of charity, 
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religious values in terms of giving. Dinham and Lowndes put emphasis on the same 
reasons to explain the increasing presence of FBOs in the public realm: “Since the 
mid-1990s and from 1997 in particular, governments have identified the potential for 
building on the traditional service role of faith bodies (for instance in education, 
housing, fostering and adaptation) and extending this into new areas (including urban 
and rural regeneration, community safety, childcare and health promotion)” (Dinham 
and Lowndes 2009). The second commonly enumerated reason in explaining the 
increasing visibility of FBOs is the influence of political leaders with strong faith 
commitments21. One name that popped up nearly in all interviews is Tony Blair, with 
the references he made to the importance of faith in some public speeches. The 
respondents argued that religion in the political and social spheres is not a taboo 
anymore: The visibility of religion and reference to religious groups and beliefs 
started to be accepted as something normal.  
This increasing interest of governments in FBOs has a political reason in addition to 
the material. This generally left out reason is the aim of prevention of religious 
extremism. This is especially in the agenda after the terrorist attacks in the US and 
UK. Some social policies that are introduced after this date are in favor of supporting 
different religious groups economically in order to give them a chance of presence 
and representation in the social and political spheres. The success of FBOs in serving 
“hard to reach groups” is also a shared explanation for the rise of these groups. It is a 
generally accepted idea that FBOs are more successful in fulfilling some specific 
needs, owing to their success in targeted, and customer-tailored policy provision. 
These areas are the ones where the proliferation of new organizations is the case. As 
an outcome of increasing number of programs that were introduced, and availability 
of funding options different faith communities who did not organize under FBOs 
before are encouraged to do so. 
To put it in crude terms we can say that religion as a variable is back to the political 
arena. The increasing problems of the people of different faiths alert governments to 
take action in these areas. The existing welfare structures are not enough to meet the 
needs of all parts of the population. The changes in the state-society relations leave 
more people susceptible to different forms of provision. Putting more emphasis on the 
                                                 
21 Information gathered through the interviews conducted with scholars working in the area, and 
voluntary sector administrators.  
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faith communities does not only equip the governments with political support from 
these groups, it also provides them with support from the general public (since 
satisfaction of the needs of minorities is expected to bring cohesion and public peace). 
Although the dominant reason of change is defined as the shift in the position of the 
state in the welfare arena, the changing political relevance of religion should not be 
left out as a complimentary cause. 
 
4.1.2. The transformation of state-religion alliance in Sweden 
The case of Sweden is also defined as one of a medium level of change. The principal 
reason of increasing presence of faith-based organizations in the public sphere in 
Sweden is marked as the contemporary shift in the area of religion and state relations 
in this country. As already introduced in the third chapter, Sweden had its own style 
of state-church separation22 which could be seen as non-existent for many. The 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Sweden and the state was one and indivisible for a 
period over three centuries. Religious liberty was not extant in the country in the 
period before 1952, when it was allowed in the form of possibility of withdrawal from 
the membership to the state church. Finally, as of January 1, 2000 the Church of 
Sweden is in the same status with the institutions of other beliefs—such as 
Christianity, Islam or Hindu, Jewish etc.—existing in the country23. As put forward by 
Bäckström, “During the period 1862-2000, the church has developed from being an 
official, unifying and integral part of society where it enjoyed a religious monopoly 
into a semi-official organization which competes with others in the sphere of beliefs 
and views of life, within what may be described as a deregulated, religious market 
economy” (Bäckström, Beckman et al. 2004: 51). I claim that this change in the state-
religion relations is the dominant explanatory factor behind the rise of interest in 
FBOs in the social arena.  
                                                 
22 See Gustafsson’s (2003) explanation of the Swedish-style church-state separation stating with the 
first reforms in 1900-1952, continuing with the optimistic phase between 1956 and 1972, meeting with 
resistances between 1973 and 1979, going through an exploratory phase in the 1980s, arriving to a 
decision phase after 1992, before it arrived to a consensual outcome of disestablishment of the state 
church in 2000.  
23 In the period after 1998 all of these communities have the right to register and get their portion from 
the church taxes collected by the state, as a portion of the income tax.  
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Religion has never been a political cleavage in Sweden, due to this cooperative and 
nonconflictual link with the state, but the relations of it with the state and citizens 
were not developed on liberal lines such as in the case of Britain. A more 
authoritarian and regulative framework dominated the relations between state and 
church. The universal and egalitarian characteristics of the welfare state, limiting the 
space available for the rise of religious charities as alternative social provision actors, 
was also a reason for the lack of conflict between the sacred and the secular 
institutions. Still, the shift happening in the last decades, due to the increasing 
diversity of the needs of the multicultural and the multi-faith society opens up a space 
available for the rise of faith-based organizations. Moreover, the necessity to fulfill 
the needs of this new populace makes it essential for the state to support the 
establishment of these FBOs, since religion is after a long time rising to the position 
of a politically relevant issue. Failing to fulfill the needs of these groups, would not 
only delay the integration of them, but can also result in creation of general unrest in 
the society and possible loss of political power for the governing parties. Therefore, I 
argue that the recent split between the state and church, and opening up of the public 
arena for various faith communities’ set the necessary ground for the rise of FBOs in 
Sweden.  
Lundsröm and Wijkström define the period after the 1970s as one of the new social 
movements and a growing welfare mix in Sweden (Lundström and Wijkström 1995). 
The current picture presents a situation where the Swedish state is trying to keep the 
same distance from all the faith communities but also “keen to keep some control at 
arms length” (Fridolfsson, Elander et al. 2009: 184). Official registration of the FBOs, 
distribution of government grants, and assistance provided to collect their 
membership fees are listed as some of the ways of government interest in these 
organizations (ibid.). So what we see is the expanding of the state-religion relations to 
include believers other than the members of the Evangelical Lutheran church. The 
government introduced an agreement to recognize and reinforce the role of idea-based 
voluntary organizations in 2007.  
The shifts in the area of state and society relations are smaller in comparison to 
change in the state and religion relations in Sweden. The redistributive and universal 
characteristics of the Swedish welfare state have always been a defining factor for the 
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state-society relations. The state and the non-profit sector have been in close 
cooperation, but different than the cases of Britain and Germany, the Swedish welfare 
state did not incorporate voluntary organizations into the welfare arena as social 
service providers. Instead, the role of voluntary organizations active in the area have 
mainly been as democratic agents (Klausen and Selle 1996). Complete coverage of 
state in the arena especially in the period following the Second World War, resulted in 
state’s taking over of the social service tasks from these associations and in some 
cases forced exclusion of them through legislation changes or the cuts in the subsidies 
(Lundström and Wijkström 1995; Lundström 1996: 133-134). One issue that needs to 
be mentioned at this point is the difference in the perception of charity in Sweden. 
Unlike the American or the European contexts, charity is perceived as something 
negative in Sweden “stemming from the image of the poor, helpless human beings 
heavily dependant on a wealthy and paternalistic, sometimes capricious upper class” 
(Lundström and Wijkström 1995: 7). The transition of the services from the charitable 
organizations to the state institutions generally marked the expansion of the coverage 
area and fair distribution as the main aims (Lundström 1996). In their analysis of the 
Swedish non-profit sector, Lundstrom and Wijkstrom argue that the sector is well 
developed in the areas of culture, leisure and advocacy, but not in the areas of health 
and social services—as it is the case in most of the other European countries 
(Lundström and Wijkström 1995: 1). 
There are scholars claiming that the current problems the Swedish welfare state is 
facing brings forward reforms similar to the ones in the other European countries, 
such as deregulation, decentralization and privatization resulting in the increasing role 
of voluntary associations in the welfare arena (Lundström and Wijkström 1995; 
Lundström 1996; Bäckström, Beckman et al. 2004; Pestoff 2004; Fridolfsson, Elander 
et al. 2009). The increasing pressure on the financing of the universal welfare state in 
a period of economic liberalization resulted in a change that aims efficiency more 
than democracy (Fridolfsson, Elander et al. 2009: 180). Joining the European Union 
has been a further move that opened a door for the reforms in the relations between 
local, national and international level. In this international arena, where the states lost 
control over some of their functions, municipalities came into a position where they 
can easily get into partnerships with voluntary associations and search for support at 
the supranational arena. The explanatory research conducted on the Swedish FBOs 
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sector, shows that cooperation by the municipalities and faith based associations is a 
trend in the last decade, yet this is still a phenomenon limited to the larger cities. 
Voluntary service production do not exist in many Swedish municipalities 
(Fridolfsson, Elander et al. 2009: 181).  
Whether the changes that are on the agenda as a response to the common challenges 
of internationalization and neo-liberalization will result in a convergence or would the 
Swedish welfare state manage to protect its characteristics to be the main provider is 
still an open question. Looking at the historical specificities in the state, religion and 
society relationships, I would claim that it will. Although there is an increasing 
interest on voluntary organizations in general, the main sources of funding are still the 
subsidies from local and central governments (Boli 1991; Lundström 1996). 
Therefore, the argument that the voluntary sectors are becoming producers of services 
do not hold, at least for now. The research undertaken on the FBOs in Sweden 
demonstrates that, it is still not possible to see FBOs as actors of social service 
delivery at the national level (Fridolfsson, Elander et al. 2009). There might be a rise 
in the share of the third sector in the Swedish welfare state mix, in parallel to the ones 
in the other European cases. Yet, I approach Pestoff’s argument on the changing role 
of third sector “from advocates and/or innovators into professionalized service 
providers” (Pestoff 2004: 77) with caution. Especially the non-socialist government 
period between 1976 and 1982 have been stage to some rising interest on the possible 
social provision roles for the voluntary sector, but the current picture demonstrates 
that the main historical roles of the third sector in Sweden as “schools of democracy” 
(undertaking action in advocacy and representation) is still dominant.  
As the evidence suggests, both the dynamics in the area of state-society, state-religion 
relations had an influence on the increasing number and diversity of the FBOs in the 
Swedish context. Yet, in a relative perspective the gradual changes in the state-society 
relations would not have been enough to cause the rise of FBOs without the shift in 
the state-religion relations. Consequently, the novelty in this area of state-religion 
relations is marked as the dominant reason of increasing emphasis on the FBOs in the 
case of Sweden. Religiosity is marked to be absent from the political context in 
Sweden in the studies undertaken in the period before 1990s (see Boli 1991). Yet the 
 64
developments after this period demonstrate that religion is back to the political sphere 
and it is not a marginal issue in the area of welfare state politics anymore.  
 
4.2. The cases of low degree of change: Germany and France 
Germany and France are the cases in which the amount of change concerning the 
position of FBOs in the area of welfare is minor. A brief overview of religion, state 
and social policy relations in these two countries makes it clear that resistance to 
change is due to long lived institutional conflicts or cooperation’s that are settled early 
in the 20th century. Therefore, the fact that there is no proliferation of religiously 
motivated associations in these two cases does not mean that there is no restructuring 
in these two axes. Instead, it means that the well-institutionalized structures of state-
society and state-religion relations in these two countries are more resistant to 
revisions. Similar to the cases of medium level of change, one of the explanatory 
factors is more dominant than the other for fostering change, in each of the cases. In 
the case of Germany, it is the reorganization of the relations of the diverse faith 
groups with the state.  In the case of France, it is inclusion of the third sector as a 
possible actor in the area of provision. 
 
4.2.1. The rearrangement of the state-religion relations in Germany 
As the historical analysis proved, Germany is a country with one of the most solid 
foundational arrangements between state and its two main churches. This is true 
especially when the area of welfare provision is concerned. As discussed in the 
previous chapter this power settlement between state and the two churches, resulted in 
the rise of the corporatist structure of the German welfare state that included religious 
charities as main providers in the social policy arena. Welfare associations—
Wohlfahrtsverbände—that are organized at the national scale have always been the 
main actors of social policy field in Germany. Consequently, the phenomenon of 
FBOs is not something new in the German social policy arena. The rise of new faith 
communities and a rearrangement of state-religion relations in order to include these 
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diverse groups in the existing structures are the main changes that are taking place in 
the case of Germany. 
A tradition of cooperation has existed in the history of the German third sector 
starting from the early stages. As suggested by authors working in the area, Germany, 
being composed of the Protestant Kingdom of Prussia and the Catholic Empire of 
Austria, has remained politically as well as religiously divided for centuries (see 
Anheier and Siebel 1993). Hence, the centralization of the state authority in politics 
was not the case in Germany unlike France, starting from the eighteenth century. This 
pluralistic power setting and the absence of serious conflicts between different groups 
made the development of the third sector in cooperation with the state possible from 
the very beginning. It was already in the late 19th century that provision of social 
services were developed in a corporatist system in which municipal authorities and 
voluntary organizations were working together in many cities of Germany (Evers and 
Strünck 2002: 169). Thus, it would not be possible to compare the German third 
sector to its French or American counterparts without taking these historical attributes 
into consideration.  
The specific characteristics of the German third sector are important to mention, to get 
a better understanding of its resistance to change. One of these characteristics is that 
most of the associations are politically motivated and part of a larger corporatist 
structure. Almost all of the nonprofit organizations are members of larger umbrella 
organizations. A second characteristic of the sector is its ideological and religiously 
divided structure. The religious and ideological division lines of the German political 
structure that has been previously mentioned are also present in the welfare 
associations’ area. The German welfare associations has been divided along these 
traditional lines of political and especially religious conflicts (Anheier 1990; Schmid 
1996; Zimmer 1999). As Anheier suggests quite clearly “Organized religion, almost 
exclusively the Catholic and the Protestant Churches, maintain the largest and 
politically most protected presence in the third sector and are, historically, its most 
important part. To some extent, the third sector is both the terrain and result of the 
conflict between organized religion, political opposition, and the state over the 
division of labor and spheres of influence” (Anheier 1990: 329). Caritas and Diakonie 
has been the representative of this division in the German welfare arena. These 
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characteristics of the third sector, in which faith-based/religiously-motivated 
associations are a crucial part, mark the specificity of the German case in comparison 
to the others. The case of Germany has been defined as the case with the least amount 
of change in the sample, due to the well-established and relatively stable position of 
its welfare associations.  
The main reason of revisions after the 1960s was the increasing heterogeneity in the 
third sector. 1960s and 1970s have been periods of expansion for the German third 
sector (see Anheier 1990; Bauer 1990; Zimmer 1999). Evers and Strunck argue that 
the cultural changes of the period after the 1960s resulted in the rise of new voluntary 
associations, separate from the existing traditional umbrella organizations. 
Consequently, the authors present contemporary third sector in Germany as consisting 
of two cultures of organizations: one traditional and one new generation24 (Evers and 
Strünck 2002: 171). One of the main reasons that triggered change in the area of 
welfare associations after the 1990s is the partial deinstitutionalization of the principle 
of subsidiarity. In the previous structure of the social policy provision local 
governments and the welfare associations were the main providers. After the 1990s 
this situation has altered as a result of the flourishing of self-help groups and their 
official recognition as service providers (Bönker and Wollmann 1996: 454). Starting 
from the 1990s, traditional welfare associations of the German corporatist structure 
lost their privileges in the area of social provision. Public funding is not restricted to 
the main umbrella organizations anymore. Thus, an environment of competition has 
been created between the new voluntary organizations like self-help groups and the 
older more traditional ones, which resulted in a restructuring of the social services 
field. Some scholars name these changes as the replacement of the old corporatist 
structures with more pluralist ones (Bönker and Wollmann 1996). 
The single research conducted on FBOs in Germany puts forward that the rise of 
voluntary work in general and FBOs in specific is an outcome of the retrenchment of 
the welfare state and the increasing gap between the state provision and the increasing 
demand for social provision (Friedrichs and Klöckner 2009: 103). Although I do not 
totally discard the claim that the restructuring of the welfare arena is one of the 
                                                 
24 For an in-depth study of new social movements in Germany see Klein, A., H.-J. Legrand, et al. 
(1999). Neue Soziale Bewegungen. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag. 
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reasons contributing to this change, I prefer to put more emphasis on the 
transformations that took place as a result of the inevitable need to integrate diverse 
faith groups into the existing welfare structures. When I assert that the main reason of 
change concerning the FBOs in the case of Germany is the changing relevance of 
religion in politics, I do not point at a adjustment in the strong constitutional positions 
of the Catholic and the Protestant churches. Their established position is still in 
presence. Yet, as an outcome of increasing faith diversity in the society and its 
increasing visibility in the public sphere, the well-established connections between the 
state and the umbrella organizations representing the main population is undergoing a 
process of change. A reorganization of the corporatist structures of welfare was 
inevitable in order to meet the newly rising needs of the migrant populations with 
different faith backgrounds. Until a couple of years ago, any organization that had 
something to do with public welfare had to belong to the one of the six umbrella 
organizations in order to get their tax exemption, or to have access to any government 
money at all. The recent abolishment of this rule is an important example showing 
how the situation is getting more favorable for the rise of FBOs.  
The major activity area of the newly rising FBOs is another reason why I do not find 
the welfare retrenchment argument sufficient. The research I have conducted on the 
Muslim organizations in Germany shows that social provision is not one of the main 
areas of activity for them. Instead, the Muslim FBOs are mainly active in areas such 
as interest representation, cultural activities and religious education. This finding also 
supports my claim that the reason behind their rise is not retrenchments in the welfare 
arena, but the reorganization of the relations between the German state and the 
existing faith groups in order to integrate them to the existing structures. 
 
 4.2.2. The inclusion of the third sector to the social policy arena in France 
France is marked as a case of minor change due to the persistence of strict secularism 
in the political sphere. As discussed in detail in the last chapter, the strict separation 
between state and church in the beginning of the 20th century resulted in the 
secularization of the social welfare arena. Therefore, the Catholic Church, which has 
been a major player in the area of voluntary welfare in some other countries, did not 
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have an important standing in France. In the period after the revolution and the 
separation of the state and the church in 1905, the Catholic Church’s welfare activities 
were limited to its believers (Bahle 2003: 8). The Church’s charitable organizations 
were closed down and properties were nationalized. As Archambault suggests the 
secularization of the social policy area in France shifted the position of the Catholic 
Church from being “the direct manager of the charitable institutions” to “offering 
moral inspiration to the leaders of most health and welfare organizations” 
(Archambault 2001: 219). The principle of subsidiarity that has been crucial for 
organizing the social policy arena of the German case was not influential in the 
French one. Although religious charities were the main providers in the previous ages, 
a tradition of private action and subsidiarity did not develop in France (ibid: 206). 
One of the main reasons for that was the early replacement of the Church by the 
central government in hospitals, asylums and schools. As Archambault puts forward 
“the consequence of French etatism was a reverse subsidiarity principle: the nonprofit 
sector, whether religious or secular, dealt with public concerns that the state 
neglected, outside the scope of state provision” (ibid). The secular characteristics of 
the French welfare state did not go through any major transformations until today. 
There have been changes in the perception of voluntary organizations, but the issue of 
religion is still a taboo in French politics. Consequently, I define the settled strict 
separation between religion and state as the main reason hindering the rise of 
religiously motivated associations in France. Similar to the other European countries, 
France is also going thorough an era of increasing migration and multiculturalism. 
Yet, the established state-church separation and the principle of laicism still prevent 
the rise of any kind of religiously related welfare organizations in France. 
In contrast to the relative stability of the laicism principle, etatist characteristic of the 
French social policy has been reformed in the last decades. The relative 
underdevelopment of the nonprofit sector has been a recurrently mentioned topic in 
French history. Rather than perceiving the third sector as a sphere of citizen activism 
and an indicator of pluralism of democracy, French had a historical mistrust towards 
voluntary associations. Archambault describes this rejection of any third party in 
between the state and the citizen as an outcome of the Rousseauian concept of the 
state: “No one is allowed to incite citizens to have an intermediary interest-between 
their own and the state’s, to separate them from the Nation by spirit of cooperation” 
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(Archambault 1993: 2). This tradition has been continued to in the post World War II 
period. Centralization has been one of the aims of the newly establishing welfare 
state. As Ullman explains, “when the welfare state was consolidated in 1945, 
nonprofit organizations had a long history of managing such institutions as hospitals, 
orphanages, old age homes, and long term emergency shelters” (Ullman 1998: 52). In 
the new established system of state welfare these organizations were taken under the 
sponsorship of the state and started to function as part of the state. However, one 
important fact to bear in mind in the context of this research is that, while these 
associations were included in the state apparatus of welfare, some others like charities 
were totally excluded until the 1980s. As Ullman asserts, the secretary general of 
Secours Catholique—the largest Catholic charity in France—recently disclosed the 
hostility of the state towards his organization and other charities before the changes in 
the 1980s (ibid: 53).  
Archambault in her study of the non-profit sector in France declares that since 1965 
there is a rapid increase in the “associative” factor of the nonprofit sector 
(Archambault 1993: 3). On the one hand, one can argue that the rise of the voluntary 
sector in France in the 1970s and 1980s is parallel to other European countries, being 
an outcome of the crises of the welfare states. On the other hand, there are also other 
factors that are content specific to the case of France. Ullman in her comprehensive 
work on the new partnership between non-profit organizations and state in France 
claims that changing relationships are not an outcome of fiscal crises of the welfare 
state (Ullman 1998). In her explanation delegation of some roles of social assistance 
to the voluntary organizations is part of the efforts to democratize and expand the 
welfare structures in France. In her words:  
In fact, French political elites with a strong stake in the power of the state, many of 
them Socialists, sought to recruit nonprofit organizations as partners of the state, not to 
roll back the state but to bolster and extend its power.(…) They sought to increase state 
capacity in order to achieve two goals: the strengthening of democratic institutions of 
governance and the reform and extension of welfare programs to reach more of the 
disadvantaged and to respond more effectively to the changing needs of society(Ullman 
1998: 4).  
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I interpret this is a hint of the shift in the state-society relations defining the area of 
social policy. Ullman mentions how crucial the role of the epistemic community was, 
which consist of three different intellectual groups, in rearranging the relationships 
between state and the nonprofit sector. Interestingly, the common world view that 
grouped these three intellectual communities together was the ideology of the 
Catholic Left (ibid: 138). Berger in her work Religious Transformation explains that 
these Catholic activists as being socialized in the traditions of Catholic action. 
According to her thesis, this group of Catholic militants rise from the crumbling of the 
Catholic world as an outcome of the collapse of religious structures (Berger 1987: 
114). In her words this group “draw parallels between the two churches, Catholic and 
communist” (Berger 1987: 117). Therefore the French intellectuals in the second half 
of the twentieth century emerged from these groups of people whose basis were in the 
Catholic militants of the early nineteenth century and as Berger puts forward “they 
took with them into politics a highly elaborated set of interpretations and aspirations 
that originate in a religious vision” (Berger 1987: 136). Thus, the emphasis they put 
on voluntary organizations can be seen as a reflection of the subsidiarity principle of 
the Catholic teaching. 
Two important policy changes took place after the Socialist Party coming to power in 
the 1980s enabled the increasing partnerships between the state, cooperatives and 
foundations. The first one is the Decentralization Law of the Socialist government in 
1982, which put an end to the France’s old tradition of centralization. As an outcome 
of decentralization a great number of tasks of social care has been shifted from central 
bodies to local departments and this had an important influence on the non-profit 
sector (Bahle 2003: 12). According to Bahle, this “renaissance of the nonprofit sector” 
resulted in a system of “local corporatism” in the area of social services in France in 
the since the mid-1980s (ibid). The second one is the minimum income of the poor act 
(RIM) in 1989 that also paved the way for the increasing importance of voluntary 
organizations in France, by making the state as the main provider of the funds, but the 
local government agencies and the voluntary organizations as the implementers. As 
Ullman also suggests, every major poverty initiative after the 1980s is implemented 
by the nonprofit organizations (Ullman 1998: 134). 
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In conclusion, similar to other cases in the sample, it is possible to see a rise of 
voluntary organizations in France although its historical reasons are quite different 
from the other cases. One has to note the fact that the voluntary organizations that are 
on the rise in the French case are not the religiously motivated ones due to the relative 
stability of state-religion relations in this country. 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
Table 4.1 summarizes the overall argument of this chapter concerning the dominant 
mechanisms and the degrees of change in the share of FBOs in the welfare arena. To 
emphasize once more, the shift in the relationship between state and society refers to 
transformations in the area of welfare. This criterion questions whether there are any 
adjustments in the position of the state in the area of welfare provision. The shift in 
the area of religion and state digs into the area of politics to see any adjustments in the 
relationships between State, Church, and the new faith communities.  
 
Table 4.1 
               Dominant mechanism  
                          of change 
Degree of          
change25 
Shift in the state-society 
relationship 
Shift in the state-religion 
relationship 
Low France Germany  
Medium Britain Sweden 
 
This brief overview of the European cases demonstrates that the processes that 
triggered change in these countries can be explained in relation to the dominance of 
one of two mechanisms above. Nonetheless, the dominance of one mechanism, do not 
necessarily mean stability in the other mechanism. In the case of Britain, the rise of 
FBOs resulted from the states’ decision to open up more space for voluntary 
                                                 
25 The shifts in the state-society and the state-religion relations in Turkey, which is defined as the only 
case with high level of change, will be the focus of the next two chapters in Part II.   
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organizations and be the steerer of the social policy arena. At the same time, there are 
the increasing demands of a multiplicity of faith groups. In France, there is also an 
invitation by the state to the voluntary actors, but the historical division between state 
and church is still an inhibiting factor for the rise of FBOs. A process of opening of 
the established relationships between the two denominations and the state in the area 
of welfare is visible in Germany, in order to fulfill the needs of the different religious 
groups. Finally, in Sweden we observe the disentanglement of the state-church unity 
creating space for the rise of other faith communities. 
… 
The next part will focus on state-society and state-religion relations in Turkey, in 
order to equip the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the predominant 
historical mechanisms behind the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in 
recent years.  
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5. State-Society Relations and Social Provision in Turkey 
 
The shift in the state-society relations is the first factor26 that I  focus on as being an 
explanatory one for the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in the social 
policy arena. How a state circumscribes the area of welfare provisions; how inclusive 
or exclusive the welfare state is; whether the state defines itself as the main provider 
for fulfilling the needs of its citizens, or if it prefers to be the steerer of social 
provision arena are the important questions that will guide this section in defining the 
nature of state-society relations in a society. When I refer to the relations between 
state and society in the case of Turkey, I will be mainly referring to how the area of 
social policy has been defined by the state actors; on a continuum of being an area of 
philanthropy for the well-off, and an area of state responsibility for fulfilling the 
citizenship rights of the people. Although not as easy to distinguish at the empirical 
level as it is at the theoretical one, the Polanyian concepts of redistribution and 
reciprocity will be kept in mind as the main distinguishing factors defining the nature 
of relations between state and society in the area of welfare provision (see Polanyi 
1957: 45-59). Whether the social welfare arena is dominated by provisions that are 
based on institutional patterns of centricity or symmetry will be the main defining 
factor for this distinction.  
This chapter will center on a discussion of state-society relations in the area of welfare 
provision in Turkey in the light of international developments. Although the aim is 
not a truly comparative one, the developments in the Turkish case will be studied in 
relation to the general trends in the European welfare arena. While tracing the 
changes, which took place in the Turkish welfare state in the last century, the main 
question will be whether the increasing provision by religiously motivated 
associations marked a shift in the state-society relations or whether it marks continuity 
with the previous periods. In order to give a substantiated answer to this question, the 
chapter will undertake an in-depth study of the state-society relations starting from the 
late nineteenth early twentieth century Ottoman Empire to contemporary times. The 
first sub-part focuses on the hybrid forms of provision in the late Ottoman, early 
                                                 
26 The second explanatory mechanism—shifts in the state-religion relations—will be the focus of 
discussion in Chapter 6.  
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Republican era. The second section concentrates on the establishment of the Turkish 
welfare state in the post-1940s, by paying specific attention to the informal channels 
of provision and the role of different societal and political actors in paving the road 
for access to these channels. Following that, the last part focuses on the 
transformations of the welfare arena in the post-1980s.  
 
5.1. Late Ottoman Period and National Revolution 
An analysis of the social policy sphere in the Ottoman Empire is not possible 
independent of the analysis of the religious sphere, since a division between the two 
was not present in the period before the early twentieth century. Religious institutions 
called vakifs/religious endowments dominated the social provision arena of the 
Empire for centuries. In line with the religious charities in the pre-modern times in 
Europe, one of the main functions of the religious elite and the Sufi orders in the 
Ottoman Empire was social service provision through charitable endowments/vakifs.  
Vakif/waqf has been the main institution undertaking social provision activities in the 
Empire in the period until the late nineteenth century. The origins of the vakif 
institution lie in the Islamic traditions of taking care of the poor which existed long 
before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. As defined by Yediyildiz “waqf is a 
social, legal, and religious institution which played an important role in social, 
cultural, and economic life of the Islamic world, especially the Turkic world of the 
Seljuk and Ottoman period from middle of the eighth century until the end of the 
nineteenth”(Yediyildiz 1996: 50). There are even discussions about the roots of the 
vakif structure in times of the Prophet (see Gil 1998). Nevertheless, as any other 
institution, vakifs have gone through tremendous change in this time period of more 
than ten centuries. First and foremost, vakifs were born out of the religious obligations 
of taking care of the poor; and were institutionalized for the sake of God. The private 
properties that are endowed for public use made the financing of basic forms of 
welfare such as health, education, housing and food possible. Since the property 
dedicated cannot be taken back or used for other purposes, the vast number of vakifs 
on the Ottoman land made the provision of welfare services possible in a permanent 
fashion. With these characteristics, the institution of vakif was mainly the predecessor 
 76
of the public services in the modern state (Cizakca 1998; Cizakca 2000; Singer 2002; 
Abou-El-Haj 2005; Ozbek 2005; Ozbek 2007). One important characteristic of the 
vakif structure is that the establishment of a vakif has always been an act performed by 
an individual or a group of individuals. In that sense, the institution of vakif in the 
Ottoman Empire is similar to the contemporary civil society organizations working in 
the area of welfare provision. Nevertheless, the specific type of sultanic charity, 
which combines private and public forms of giving, has been one of the peculiarities 
of vakif structures (see Ozbek 2003), which distinguish them from charities and other 
forms of civil society organizations.  
While analyzing vakifs in a comparative framework to today’s religiously motivated 
associations and to the religious charities in Europe, one has to be aware of both the 
similarities and the differences these institutions had to charities in the Christian 
world and to contemporary RMAs. First and foremost, social provision was not the 
only or the main function of vakifs in the Ottoman Empire. The functions vakif 
fulfilled in the Empire were manifold and dynamic. As argued by Singer “waqf is one 
kind of property holding, one form of capital investment, one form of patronage, one 
mode of beneficence.” According to her, the benefits of the institution also derive 
from these multiple and overlapping contexts (Singer 2002: 12). From the fourteenth 
to the nineteenth century the establishment of vakifs by the imperial family was the 
main ways of settling, developing and sustaining their sphere of influence on the 
subject populations and reinforcing legitimacy (ibid: 298). The interrelations between 
founding vakifs and political legitimation has been subject to research by many 
historians and social scientists (see Hodgson 1974; Singer 2002; Ergin, Neumann et 
al. 2007). Vakifs were instrumental to the conquest and colonization policies of the 
Ottomans by developing public and commercial institutions. When vakifs were 
created in the newly occupied lands, then the culture of the central state, as well as 
public services and security would have been transferred (McChesney 1981). 
Provision of services in the newly conquered lands created a sense of loyalty and 
eased the legitimization of the new political authority. When seen from this 
perspective, it is impossible to realize the close connection between social provision 
and politics, and especially how social provision becomes a crucial arena for creating 
influence especially at the time of political change or instability. These interactions 
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between politics and social provision will be repeated over time, as the following 
sections will demonstrate.  
Endowment of private property as a vakif was not always an outcome of pious aims. 
A related benefit that the vakifs provided the founders with, was the social prestige: 
Since establishment of a vakif was seen as a religious and altruistic activity, these 
people gained a trustworthy and honest reputation in the society. Economic 
independence and the facilities provided by the vakif structures to the pious elite-
ulema were important factors that increased the power of these elite in this era27. As 
summarized aptly by Singer “beneficence is never an expression of pure altruism, but 
is always practiced with some sort of benefit in mind: Non material ways: qurba, 
prestige, legitimacy and patronage were their reward” (Singer 2002: 35). As this 
picture presents, vakif can be understood both as a religious and political institution 
which combined private and public ambitions and resources in the provision of 
welfare. As the following sub-sections will present, most of these characteristics of 
the Ottoman vakifs are tried to be reproduced in the contemporary state vakifs, which 
are established in the period after the 1980s. 
Vakifs started to lose their significance in the Ottoman Empire starting from the 
nineteenth century onwards. After this century, both their numbers and function in the 
area of welfare decreased in the Empire due to centralization reforms undertaken in 
the political arena. The establishment of a vakif ministry (Evkaf-i Humayun Nezareti) 
in 1826 put an end to the autonomy of the vakif structures by taking away their control 
from the religious elite. The following step was taken in 1840, which brought an end 
to the financial autonomy of vakifs. Attaching vakifs to an imperial ministry that is 
empowered to regulate them resulted in the repudiation of the major principles of the 
system (Kuran 2001: 62). As Kuran argues, “It became a routine for the Waqf 
Ministry to subsidize one waqf’s operations through the receipts of another, even to 
use pooled waqf revenues to finance new expenditures lacking any particular waqf 
founder’s authorization. During the final century of the Ottoman Empire, the activities 
financed by the Waqf Ministry included imperial parades, the construction of new 
palaces, streetcar services and even the repayment of foreign debt” (ibid.). 
                                                 
27 This close connection between access to power through provision of social services, and 
transferability of capital from one form to the others (social, political and economic) will also be a 
point of discussion in the following sections on the contemporary period.  
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Functioning of vakifs in their traditional forms became nearly impossible under these 
conditions.  
In parallel to the developments in Europe, this era in Turkey was also stage to power 
struggles between the old and the new elite. The transformations the Empire had been 
through resulted in the gradual washing away of power and influence of religion and 
religious elite especially in the political arena, which also result in an erosion of their 
roles in social provision. A political group that had crucial influence in the politics of 
the early twentieth century was Young Turks28. This progressive group, who was the 
main force in the transition of the Empire from monarchy to constitutional monarchy 
and had crucial influence on the intellectual arena of the period, also triggered a shift 
in the area of social welfare. Parla defines the economic philosophy of the period as 
solidarist corporatism, as a middle way between liberalism and socialism (Parla 
2006). Similarly, Mardin explains, the economic philosophy of the Young Turks as 
solidarism, which is characterized by the plurality of the reciprocal ties, as the middle 
ground between Marxism and bourgeois elements of ideology of the French 
revolution (Mardin 2006). Consequently, the period witnessed the first reforms in 
order to centralize, modernize and secularize the social institutions of the Empire.  
The models for the newly established institutions were the European countries like 
France and Germany. The first step undertaken to achieve these aims was to destroy 
or totally restructure the institutions of the previous regime. Establishment of the 
Administration of Public Assistance (Muessesdat-i Hayriye-i Sihhiye Idaresi), which 
brought together all social assistance institutions established by Abdulhamid II (1876-
1909) can be interpreted as a symbolic move towards this aim. Özbek claims that the 
main ideals of the political era was to cut all the possible connections to the past, and 
to abolish all the traditional forms of social assistance (Ozbek 2000). By the end of 
World War I, following the developments in the social policy spheres of the European 
countries, “social economics” started to be used as a concept and ideal by Young 
Turks (Toprak 1995). The establishment of a “national economy” was the slogan with 
which Young Turks were indicating their own variant of Die Neue Orientierung ideal 
                                                 
28 For a detailed study see Mardin, S. (2000 [1983]). The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. 
Syracuse, Syracuse University Press. 
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in Germany. (Mardin 2006: 21). Nevertheless, although the ideal was in the discourse, 
to put these ideals into full practice was not possible at the time.  
 
The rise of the Republican Turkey 
Secularization of the public and political spheres was the most important defining 
features of the newly rising Republic. As will be discussed in the coming chapter, the 
early twentieth century was marked by the abolishment of all forms of religious 
institutions, which also meant the end of all forms of legal social service delivery by 
the religious endowments, vakifs and tarikats. An important move in the area of social 
provision was the abolishment of Seriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti in 1924, which resulted in 
further loss of power for vakif institutions, whose political and material influence had 
already vanished since the late nineteenth century.  
Compared to the European cases analyzed in the previous part, the kind of welfare 
state that is on the rise in this time period in Turkey is a restricted one. Some 
fragmented welfare measures were introduced; however, a comprehensive 
development of a welfare state did not take place. Talas gives five main reasons while 
explaining the reasons behind the slow development of social policy in Turkey before 
the Second World War. These reasons are (1) the undemocratic character of the 
political regime, (2) the agriculture based economic structures and the 
underdevelopment of the industrial ones, (3) absence of a working class, (3) 1929 
economic depression, (5) the negative attitudes towards leftist ideologies (Talas 1992: 
79). What is also crucial to emphasize at this point is that, unlike European countries, 
the emergence of social policy in Turkey did not come to the stage as a response to 
the rise of capitalism. The social policy needs of this era are not related to 
industrialization or deruralization as it has been the case in other European countries. 
Poverty in the Turkish context in this period is an outcome of the wars and political 
processes in the last decades.29 Therefore the rise of the first social welfare 
arrangements in this period can be understood in relation to the legitimacy need of the 
newly established Republic and its paternalistic approach towards civil servants. 
                                                 
29 For a detailed study of capitalism, poverty and social policy in Turkey see Bugra, A. (2008). 
Kapitalizm, Yoksulluk ve Turkiye'de Sosyal Politika. Istanbul, Iletisim Yayinlari. 
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Analyzing the issues of poverty and social policy in the first years of the Republic, 
Bugra similarly argues that fighting poverty for the statist elite of the Republic was 
not perceived as a responsibility of the state (Bugra 2008). The only forms of social 
security acts introduced in this era were to meet the needs of the formally employed 
and the civil servants, no measures have been taken in the area of social assistance.  
The single party period (1923-1945), which is generally marked as an etatist period in 
the Turkish politics, was not exclusively marked by the expansion of state provision 
of welfare. Instead, the Party invested great effort in the establishment of voluntary 
organizations in order to support the parts of the populace who are in need. Especially 
following the economic crises of the 1929, the need for formal social assistance—in 
the cities—increased to a level which was not possible to ignore. Nevertheless, the 
main forms of provision introduced by the Party, as a solution to the needs of the poor 
and the needy, were philanthropic organizations that had been initiated and sometimes 
directly established by the Party members. 1930s and 1940s were stage to increasing 
number of philanthropic associations that focused their attention on different publics. 
A brief look on the titles and the focus groups of these associations shows that they 
have been mainly focusing on the religious minorities living in the big cities. (see 
Ozbek 2006: 151). In addition to these associations that mainly concentrates on 
fighting urban poverty, more specific problems such as child poverty was also tried to 
be solved by the benevolent actions of the citizens30 (Ozbek 2006: 145- 146). As 
Özbek presents, in the 1940s, the Party was especially involved in supporting the 
students in the cities through the charitable organizations it has established as a part of 
the Party structure (ibid). Most of the times, these voluntary organizations were 
undertaking activities in the Party offices. Therefore, it was not easy to distinguish the 
activities of the political party and the activities of the voluntary organizations from 
one another. This historical evidence proves that in the early years of the Republic the 
social policy arena of the country was shaped by the absence of a formal social 
protection system, and the dominance of philanthropic foundations.  
The state, instead of defining social provision as an area of responsibility, preferred to 
be a steerer and motivator of the voluntary associations that were undertaking social 
                                                 
30 A state organization—labeled Himaye-I Etfal Cemiyeti—was established in 1917 in order to protect 
the children and was named as Cocuk Esirgeme Kurumu in 1934. Nevertheless the activity of the 
organization was not enough to be a remedy for the increasing child poverty in the rural area.  
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provision activities. The voluntary organizations of this era are partially controlled 
and supported by the state, which makes it harder to classify them as civil society or 
state organizations. As Bugra demonstrates in her research on the era: “the public 
campaigns organized by the members of Republican People’s Party to encourage rich 
to help the poor involved a fair dose of compulsion along with the appeals to 
sentiments of social solidarity” (Yalman 1973; Bugra 2007a: 50). Social services 
provided by these campaigns can be situated in the middle way between state and 
civil action: the money raised from the public by the activities of members of the 
party in power was used to help the poor. The fact that the members of the party 
included some compulsory measures to make citizens support the campaigns gave the 
actions a peculiar outlook. These hybrid forms of provision by public campaigns, 
which integrated some mix-patterns of public and private resources, were similar to 
the provision of welfare in the Ottoman Empire by vakifs. In line with their history, 
the new forms of philanthropy were also used for disseminating the political 
ideologies of the new elite. Establishment of Public Houses—halkevleri is a good 
example of how the politics of provision functioned. These were voluntary 
organizations that are mainly established for spreading the republican ideology to the 
populace but they also undertook services such as distribution of food and coal (Bugra 
2008: 139). These institutions also played an important role in idealizing the Western 
social model for the masses and depict Islam as the “other”31. Establishment of 
numerous women’s organizations combining the aims of presenting the ideal secular 
republican women’s identity and outlook to the poor and needy parts of population 
was also part of the philanthropic activities by the new Republican elite32.  
This period of late Ottoman and early Republican history presents continuity in state-
society relations. Social policy arena was reshaped following the lines of dominant 
political ideologies such as nationalism and modernization, but the form of 
relationship between the state and the society did not go through a fundamental 
                                                 
31 See Karaömerlioglu, A. (1998). "The Village Institute Experience in Turkey." British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 25(1). 
 , Karaömerlioglu, A. (1998). "The People's Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey." 
Middle Eastern Studies 34(4). 
 , Komsuoglu, A. and N. S. Turan (2007). "Turkiye'de Ulus Insasi Surecinde Halkevleri 
Temsilleri." Bilgi ve Bellek 7. 
  
32 Baykan, A. and B. Ötüs-Baskett (2009). Nezihe Muhittin ve Türk Kadini. Istanbul Iletisim Yayinlari. 
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change. The reforms undertaken by the new political elite did not establish a social 
policy arena that is based on social citizenship rights. Instead, they only reproduced 
the philanthropic institutions of the previous period along the lines of their ideologies. 
 
5.2. The Golden Ages of Welfare State Development  
The epoch between 1945 and the early 1970s has generally been marked as the golden 
age of welfare states. Rapid initial reforms to create a much more comprehensive and 
generous welfare state, based on the idea of social citizenship, were strengthened in 
this period. Publications such as English economist J.M. Keynes’s The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) British economist and reformist 
W. Beveridge’s Social Assistance and Allied Services (1942) and Full Employment in 
a Free Society (1945) and British Sociologist T.H. Marshall’s Citizenship and Social 
Class (1950) were pioneers shaping the ideals of the newly rising welfare states in 
Europe.  
What was achieved in the closed economies of the nation states during the golden age 
was more or less a consensus among different strata of societies. European states were 
committed to increase resources for the expansion of benefits and coverage within an 
extended system of welfare. Economic growth and full employment were the two 
main goals for the governments to keep this growing system of social welfare going. 
As Pierson suggests, this post-war consensus may be considered in two ways: either 
as a consensus between classes or as a consensus between political parties. At the 
class level, both labor and capital were to share in the common objectives of sustained 
economic growth. In its party form, consensus indicated broad agreement on the 
constitutional rules of the political game, a political style of compromise and 
bargaining (Pierson 1998: 124-125). Obviously, this dual consensus that was achieved 
between the two classes, which had always been rivals in political economy due to 
their competing interests, smoothed the transformations taking place in the welfare 
arena. Following a similar vein, Offe argues that the welfare state served as a peace 
formula in the advanced capitalist democracies of the West after the Second World 
War by limiting and mitigating class conflict, and balancing the asymmetrical power 
relation between labor and capital (Offe 2000: 67). His definition of the welfare state 
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of the post-war period is the political solution to societal contradictions. Throughout 
this period, social policies were one of the most important legitimizing factors of 
modern democratic states in relation to the redistribution role they played in societies. 
The next section will look into how these developments at the European level have 
been reflected on the case of Turkey.  
 
5.2.1. The Establishment of the Two-tier Welfare State in Turkey 
The post Second World War period was also stage to expanding welfare state 
coverage in Turkey. The influences of the war were felt on the already weak economy 
of the new Republic which resulted in the increasing levels of poverty especially in 
the cities. The budget deficits of the early 1940s forced the government to print 
money which resulted in an increase in inflation, and further problems of survival for 
the populace. As an outcome of these developments, the government in power felt the 
urge to take some action in the area of welfare provision which consisted of 
establishment of social security institutions and initiating the founding of voluntary 
organizations.  
The increasing political competition in the period after the mid-1940s can also be 
marked to have a speeding effect for the establishment of formal organizations in the 
welfare state arena. A discourse on the rights of citizens and the responsibilities of the 
state to fulfill the needs of citizens were on the rise for the first time as an outcome of 
the influences from the international arena. In addition to the developments in the 
international arena, the German and Austrian academics that migrated to Turkey due 
to the war in their countries are also considered to be of crucial influence for the rise 
of discussions around the issues of social policy, social security, and labor issues. 
Conferences organized around these issues in the period after 1948 had an important 
triggering effect for the further rise of awareness on these topics (Ozbek 2006: 159- 
173). As a consequence, the first regulations on labor and institutionalization of first 
social security institutions took place under the influence of Bismarckian type of 
welfare ideals in the 1940s.  
One important difference that has to be kept in mind while making an analysis of the 
establishment of the welfare state in Turkey in comparison to the European cases is 
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that the industrialization and urbanization levels of Turkey were extremely low in 
comparison to the European ones. The share of industrial sector in the gross national 
product was 15,9 % while the percentage of agriculture was 43,1 and service sector 
was 41,1 in the year 194533. Although the percentage of industrial sector rise from 
around 8-10 % in the mid-1920s, to around 15-16% in the mid 1940s, the level of 
urbanization did not follow this trend34. The rural population ratio, which was 24,4 
percent in 1927 hardly reached to 24,9 % in 194535. Therefore, the processes behind 
the expansion in the arena of welfare development in Turkey were substantially 
different than the prevailing picture in Europe. The establishment of the Turkish 
welfare state did not follow a parallel line to industrialization and/or capitalist 
development as it has been the case in the West36. The Republic of Turkey was not a 
capitalist economy at the time, so it would be misleading to interpret the rise of social 
policy institutions as an outcome of the accumulation and legitimization needs of the 
capitalist state. Therefore, the rise of the welfare institutions in the period between 
1945 and 1960s can mainly be explained as an outcome of the increasing needs of the 
populace, transition to the multi-party rule and the external influences of the European 
welfare arena. The increasing industrialization and the increasing influence of leftist 
movement on politics in the period between 1960s and 1980s can be marked as an 
additional factor for the development of social provision institutions and of the rise of 
a conception of social state. 
The institutions which founded the basis of a social security system in this period are 
the Social Insurance Institution established in 1945 covering workers, Retirement 
Chest created in 1949 for civil servants, and Bağ-Kur founded in 1971 for the self-
employed. These institutions that are totally independent from each other and serve 
different target groups resulted in the fragmentary structure of the social welfare 
system in Turkey. Moreover, the steps taken in the name of establishing a social 
assistance system in parallel to the social security system were not sufficient, which 
resulted in the underdevelopment of the social assistance arena, and the two-tier 
                                                 
33 Devlet, I. E. (1992). Istatistik Gostergeler 1923-1992. Ankara, DIE. 
  
34 For the reasons of this relatively slow pace of urbanization in the early republican years see (Bugra 
2008:105-128). 
35 See Table 2, in appendix I for rural urban population ratios in the period after the 1970. 
36 For further discussion on the establishment of the social policy structures in Turkey see Bugra, A. 
(2008). Kapitalizm, Yoksulluk ve Turkiye'de Sosyal Politika. Istanbul, Iletisim Yayinlari. 
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structure of the welfare state in Turkey which covers the civil servants and the 
formally employed but leaves out informally employed and unemployed parts of 
population. The establishment of Social Assistance Institute in 1959 was a step to take 
care of these groups. Services to meet the needs of the urban poor, unemployed, kids, 
teenagers and supporting families can be listed as the main aims of the Social 
Assistance Institute in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the limited services of this Institute 
were neither enough to be a remedy for increasing levels of poverty, nor did it change 
the mentality that poverty should be fought with the cooperation of charitable action 
of the wealthy individuals and voluntary organizations. An interview conducted with 
the Minister of Health and Social Security in 1959 makes it clear that there were at 
least some state authorities who were aware of the differences between state provided 
social assistance and the charitable actions, yet this awareness did not became widely 
accepted to expand the coverage of the social assistance regulations to include all 
citizens as an outcome of their citizenship rights37. 
The fact that the coverage area of the welfare provisions excluded the rural and the 
informally employed parts of population gives an important hint about the form of 
state-society relations at this stage of the development of a welfare system in Turkey. 
Even in this period, when the Turkish state was defined as a social state by the 1961 
Constitution38 and a discourse around the issues of citizenship was on the rise, the 
needs of more than half of the population was left to the informal support mechanisms 
such as families, communities, benevolent citizens and clientelist relations. Instead of 
establishing institutionalized forms of support to cover all the citizens that are in need, 
Turkish political parties in power (especially the right wing ones that were influential 
in politics after mid-1940s) preferred to establish relations of patronage with the 
masses39. Bugra draws attention to the establishment of a moral economy which 
                                                 
37 The minister Lutfi Kirdar, in the interview he gave to daily Cumhuriyet on 23 September 1959, 
openly puts forward that social assistance is one of the oldest institutions of humanity. He makes 
references to the charitable endowments, soup kitchens, and religious duties. Yet, as he openly asserted 
these acts had an element of benevolence and clemency that limits their outcomes in the long run, they 
cannot be enough to fulfill the needs of the populace. Modern social assistance, in comparison is an 
outcome of social solidarity, which makes it more functional. (Daily Cumhuriyet, 23.10.1959).  
38 1961 institution defines the Turkish Republic as a welfare state in which every citizen has a right to 
social security. As defined by law, it is state’s responsibility to establish the institutions to guarantee 
the social security and social assistance provision for its citizens.  
 
39 For a detailed study see Komsuoglu, A. (2005). "The Right Wing Parties and Political Patronage in 
Turkish Politics." Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies 20: 353-373. 
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function through informal and personalized forms of provision between the state, 
society and other social actors to compensate for the lack of formal social policy 
institutions (Bugra 2008: 157- 158). Therefore, it is possible to talk about continuity 
in the state-society relations between the single party period (1923-1945) and the rules 
of the Democrat party (1950-1960) and Justice Party (1965-1971). Although steps 
have been taken in order to establish a social protection scheme for some parts of the 
population,40 the area of social assistance continued to be an area that is to a great 
extent left out by the state. 
The characteristics of the Turkish welfare state that was mainly developed in this time 
period mostly resemble to the Southern European welfare regimes. Bugra and Keyder 
point to the following similarities between the Turkish and Southern European 
welfare regimes: (1) the fragmented and hierarchical nature of social policy, (2) a 
labor market structure where self-employment, unpaid family labor and informal-
employment practices are very common, (3) lack of universal health care and (4) 
centrality of family in risk situations (Bugra and Keyder 2003; Bugra and Keyder 
2006). I agree with their categorization of the Turkish welfare state in the Southern 
European type, yet I would argue that the fourth characteristic they suggested can be 
enlarged to include community level interactions. Connections at the community 
level, based on mechanical forms of solidarity, can be mentioned as the main 
supplementary form of provision that have been active for the parts of population that 
are left out of the protection schemes of the established welfare state. In the period 
before the 1980s, these connections played a crucial importance for the survival of 
people in the rural areas, and the new migrants in the urban areas.  
Religiosity has also been one of the important criteria in getting access to social help 
through community bounds. The heterodox and multiple forms of peripheral Islam in 
forms of religious communities (cemaat) and Sufi orders (tarikats) were undertaking 
solidarity activities and social help. Although these forms of provision were not 
included in the formal social policy structures of the welfare state, and therefore not 
easily noticeable in the public sphere, the empirical research undertaken in this study 
made it clear that they played an important role especially in the rural areas and in 
                                                 
40 Such as Social Disability and Old Age Pensions in 1976, which guaranteed support for the target 
group who are over 65 years old and/or disabled and do not have a family to take care of them. 
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small Anatolian cities41. Institutionalization of these forms of giving started gradually 
following the rise of small business activities in the Anatolian towns and the 
establishment of the conservative and/or religious network structures around these 
businesses after the 1970s. Nevertheless, these forms of giving did not turn into 
formal civil society organizations in the period before the 1990s due to multiple 
prohibitive factors such as socio-economic situation of the country and economic and 
political maturation level of the networks themselves, which will be discussed in the 
following sub-section. 
The changing political atmosphere of the country after the 1970s had some influences 
on the area of social policy too. The ideals of social justice, welfare and equality 
showed up as important party propagandas of the pro-Islamic National Salvation 
Party (Milli Selamet Partisi/MSP). Especially in the 1970s an egalitarian discourse 
and emphasis on state intervention was in fashion (Bugra 2002b: 124). In addition to 
the political discourse, there were also developments at the local level that were in 
line with the anti-capitalist rhetoric of the party. As put forward by Jenkins, “by the 
time it left power in 1978, the MSP was as much a social movement as a political 
party” (Jenkins 2008: 137). The party invested in the formation of social networks in 
the Anatolian towns and also among the Turkish Diaspora in Europe. It founded many 
cultural and social associations attracting women, youth and businessmen. Owing to 
the socio-economic changes of the last decades new small merchant groups were also 
on the rise in the periphery whose activities are in line with the populist social justice 
ideals of the party. Mardin points out the correlations between economic growth in the 
provincial centers, with the increase of merchants and artisans-esnaf associations and 
support for religious activities (Mardin 1977: 292). Following on these lines, I claim 
these interconnections to be a crucial factor for the rise of religiously motivated civil 
society and new forms of welfare provision by these groups in the following decades.  
This period in the Turkish political economy can be characterized as a period of 
foundation building. In addition to the reforms in the political and legal arenas, rise of 
civil activities marked the period between the 1960s and 1980s. The liberal political 
sphere that was guaranteed to a great extent by the 1961 constitution resulted in the 
rising number of interest groups and civil associations. Nevertheless, the activities of 
                                                 
41 Information gathered from interviews conducted with the RMAs. 
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these groups were mostly organized around the main cleavage line of left-right 
politics, which resulted in increasing unrest in the public sphere and the interruption 
of democracy in 198042. These organizations, although can be marked as the early 
formations of civil activity in Turkey, had exclusively ideological orientations. 
Elementary forms of conservative social networks were also founded in this period, 
yet neither their economic and organizational power nor the political maturation of the 
Republic was enough to tolerate formation and working of religiously motivated civil 
society organizations. The military coup of 1980 was the clear proof of the political 
instability and limited freedoms in the country.  
A shift occurred both in the main political cleavages in the society and representation 
of them in the social sphere after the coup in 1980. Religiously motivated forms of 
social provision only come to the public stage after this period. The maturation of the 
necessary conditions such as further liberalization of religion and exploitation of it in 
the political sphere as an ideology to fight communism in the 1980s, rising economic 
might of the small business in Anatolia throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
strengthening of the new conservative elite networks will be points of discussion in 
the next part, which focuses on the rise of religiously motivated civil society in social 
policy arena.  
 
5.3. Shifts in the Welfare Arena in the post-1980s 
Beginning in the late 1970s, changing economic and political settings of the world 
order started to threaten the functions of the states. Erosion of national borders, 
opening of national economies to global competition, and the position of nation states 
to share their sovereignty with transnational powers are important factors that can be 
listed among many others to explain the changing situation. The crucial points that are 
spotted for the breakdown of closed systems of national economies are the oil crises 
of 1973 and 1979 and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1970/73. 
Therefore, starting from the 1970s, there was a shift from closed to open economies. 
As Genschel points out in his article Globalization and the Welfare State, since the 
                                                 
42 For activities of interest groups before 1980s see Bianchi, R. (1984). Interest Groups and Political 
development in Turkey. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
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1970s international trade has more than doubled in OECD countries. International 
bank lending has grown more than eightfold, and the volume of foreign direct and 
portfolio investment has quadrupled during the past decade alone (Genschel 2004: 
616). The erosion of the control of nation states over their economic borders is of 
crucial importance in this context. As Scharpf and Schmidt argue in their two-volume 
analysis of Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, this is almost always the case for 
the member states of the European Union (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000: 2). The 
autonomy of the European welfare states to design their social policies has declined in 
this period starting from the 1970s. This period starting from the late 1970s can also 
be explained by the increasing disorganization of the order. Disorganization, as 
described by Streeck, “denotes a decline in centralized control and authoritative 
coordination in favor of dispersed competition and spontaneous, market-like 
aggregation of competing preferences and individualized decisions” (Streeck 2009: 
96). The effects of this increasing disorganization, as the main characteristic of the 
neo-liberal era, have been also felt in social areas without any delay. As Mishra states, 
“the process of downgrading the social began with the ascendancy of neo-liberalism 
at the nation-state level in the late 1970s” (Mishra 1999: 115).  
As a consequence, the consensus about welfare states came to an end in this period, 
and the welfare states started to get attacks from all sides of the political spectrum. As 
Offe puts forward, the right wing started to criticize the welfare state as it was 
imposing a burden on taxation and regulation upon capital that amounted to a 
disincentive to investment. A further claim by the right wing was that entitlements 
and collective power positions that welfare states granted to workers and unions 
resulted in a disincentive to work. On the other hand, there were attacks from the 
socialist left. The socialist left argued that the welfare state was ineffective and 
inefficient since the redistribution of the welfare was not vertical but horizontal within 
a class of wage earners, and this resulted in “horizontal equality” which should not 
have been the aim of a welfare state. A further critique from the left pointed out that 
welfare states were repressive arguing that the provisions to the poor were made 
conditional upon conformity to rules and regulations. A third critique from the 
socialist left was related to the politico-ideological control function of the welfare 
structures. They claimed that the false ideological understanding of social and 
political reality created by the welfare states prevented the formation of a political 
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understanding of society as something that must be changed (Offe 2000: 67-76). 
Therefore, all these discussions about the malfunctioning of the welfare states paved 
the way for changes in the social policies of the European welfare states. 
The reasons that led to the restructuring of the welfare regimes after the 1970s are 
manifold. Van Kersbergen mentions seven areas of change after his literature review 
of a great variety of sources: (1) The change in demographic structures: Falling birth 
rates and an aging population in Europe; (2) Change in the traditional family 
structures: The shift from double income double career households to single parent 
households; (3) The loosening of economic growth and the post-industrialization of 
labor markets; (4) The changing roles of men and women that challenge the gender 
assumptions of welfare structures; (5) The weakening position of the organized labor 
which was an economic and a social basis for the welfare states; (6) New risks and 
needs that arose for which welfare states cannot be an answer for; (7) The accelerating 
globalization and specifically, European political and economic integration that 
revolutionized the relatively fixed relations between nation states and the deteriorating 
autonomy of nation states in the sphere of social policy making (Van Kersbergen 
2000: 21-22). I claim that changing position of religion in the political sphere should 
be added as an eighth one in close connection with the sixth and seventh areas of 
change defined by van Kersbergen. As a collective outcome of all the factors listed 
above, starting from the late 1970s and increasing in the 1980s and 1990s, many 
European countries made revisions to their welfare policies in order to reduce the 
direct redistributive role of states.  
Alternative definitions of ideal state-society relationships gained dominance 
especially in the period after the 1980s. These new ideals of the welfare state put more 
emphasis on “reciprocity”; on the duties/responsibilities of the citizens, families and 
civil actors in return of the services provided by the state. I define this as a shift away 
from the ideal of redistributive welfare by the state to a welfare state characterized by 
the multiplicity of the providers and the reciprocal relationships these providers build 
with their supporters43. Mechanisms working on the basis of symmetry on the lines of 
primary forms of belonging gained importance in this period. The emphasis on the 
faith-based organizations as partners of social provision similarly increased both in 
                                                 
43 In-depth analysis of these reciprocal relationships in the case of Turkey will be undertaken in the 
empirical chapters in Part III. 
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some countries of the Middle East and Europe, in this time period. As Bugra draws 
attention, in the contemporary social-policy discourse, where both the role of the 
family and traditional norms of charity are frequently evoked, it is impossible to miss 
the commonality between Islamic and Christian value universes currently salient in 
the formation of the conservative liberal position against public assistance. What 
references to Islam signify seems to be little different from what a conservative 
outlook introduces in the realm of social assistance in any religious context. The 
notions of communal solidarity are as attractive in an Islamic context as they are in a 
Christian one, especially as supporting elements of contemporary neo-liberalism 
(Bugra 2007a: 47). I agree that the original mechanisms triggering change in the 
welfare structures of different states are more or less identical, nevertheless in-depth 
analysis of the Turkish case in the following section will make sure that history still 
matters in defining the outcomes that gradually evolve from the processes triggered 
by these original mechanisms. 
 
5.3.1. Transformations of the Turkish Welfare State 
As increasingly becoming part of the global economy, the transformations Turkish 
political economy went through starting from the critical juncture of the 1980s were 
in many ways in accordance with the changes in the international arena. This sub-part 
of the chapter will undertake an in-depth analysis of these developments such as 
transformation to a market economy, increasing levels of urbanization, and the 
decreasing levels of family support mechanisms in order to shed light on the reasons 
behind the proliferation of religiously motivated welfare associations in the last 
decades. The analysis will prove that the Turkish social policy sphere in the period 
after the 1980s is characterized by the increase of demand for social provision (not a 
decrease of supply) and the expansion of social assistance arena (not contradiction or 
retrenchment of it). 
Transition from an import-substitution to a liberal, export-driven market economy 
marked the socio-economic trends of the period after the 1980s in Turkey. Economic 
liberalization policies—flexibilization of the exchange rate, subsidies for export 
oriented companies, privatization of the State Economic Enterprises, financial and 
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import liberalization and promotion of foreign investment (Aricanli and Rodrik 
1990)—of the Özal period had crucial transforming power for the Turkish socio-
economics. These implementations in the economy caused booming of the GNP and 
the export rates but also resulted in declining living standards due to a decrease in the 
formal employment chances with increasing deregulation, and privatization of the 
state-owned enterprises. By the end of Özal’s time in office, the unemployment rates 
were higher and the average wages of unionized workers were lower than the figures 
of 1980 (see Yeldan 1994). In addition to the liberalization policies, rural to urban 
migration has also been one of the crucial reasons for the rise of unemployment and 
poverty due to reasons such as the cuts in agricultural subsidies. The highest rate of 
migration from rural parts of the country to the cities happened between 1980 and 
1985 with an urbanization rate of 7.7 % and the urban population had been equalized 
to rural population in mid 1980s44. The rise of unemployment and the decreasing 
chances of getting formal employment resulted in an increase in the number of people 
who are in need of formal or informal forms of support.  
As briefly mentioned in the previous part, the important functions, family45 and 
communities fulfill in providing a safety net for their members has been pointed as 
one of the main defining factors for the Southern European Welfare state types 
(Ferrera 1996). These characteristics, being also one of the main defining features of 
the Turkish welfare state, started to lose their functionality in the period after the mid-
1980s. The demographic trend towards nuclear families from extended families has 
been a crucial reason for the decline of the support mechanisms. Increasing rates of 
migration from rural to urban areas and the changing reasons of migration have been 
additional ones. In the period before the 1980s, migration from the rural to urban 
areas was marked by the pull factors such as better employment, higher income, and 
better education facilities available in the cities. Nevertheless, after the 1980s much of 
the migration occurred due to push factors such as economic rupture with the 
countryside, or the threat of violence due to war situation in the case of the Kurds 
                                                 
44 See Appendix II, Table 2. Urban-Rural Population in Turkey. 
 
45 For a study on centrality of family in coping poverty in Turkey see Kalaycioglu, S. (2006). Dynamics 
of poverty in Turkey: Gender, Rural/Urban Poverty, Social Networks and Reciprocal Survival 
Strategies. Poverty and Social Deprivation in the Mediterranean Area: Trends, Policies and Welfare 
Prospects in the New Millennium. M. Petmesidou and C. Papatheodorou. London, Zed Books. 
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(Bugra and Keyder 2006: 225). Once the determinant reason of migration changed 
from pull to push factors, informal support mechanisms —such as in-cash and in-kind 
transfers— that helped the survival of rural migrant in the urban area until the 1980s 
have gone through a process of decline. The empirical research conducted by the 
RMAs also supports the argument that migration to the cities has been one of the 
main reasons for increasing demand for welfare provision. As the interview partners 
claimed, migration to the cities resulted in the decomposition of the traditional and 
religious solidarity bonds that have existed in the countryside. As they suggested, 
older forms of support mechanisms such as cemaats and tarikats lost their 
functionality in the urban arena. The loss of material and moral support from the 
traditional community structures resulted in the search for alternative forms of support 
mechanisms in the cities.  
The decline of these informal forms of support are defined as an “erosion of the 
informal pillars of developmentalist welfare” (Bugra and Keyder 2006) or the 
“decline of the moral economy” (Bugra 2008). This change also points to a turn in the 
state and society relationships in which the informal channels such as possibilities of 
informal housing or access to state rents have come under pressure due to the 
economic, social, political developments and resulted in the rise of phenomenon 
called new forms of poverty (Bugra 2003; Bugra and Keyder 2003). Therefore, the 
newly migrants in the city, being both disconnected from their previous forms of 
support mechanisms and having lost the chances of benefiting from previously 
available informal forms of state support, were in search of state or voluntary 
initiatives that will be a remedy for their needs.  
The existing social security structures that only provide for the formally employed 
and their dependants could not be a solution for the increasing levels of urban 
population that is either unemployed or employed in the informal sector. The 
employed  percent of the potential  labor force, which is only 44%, is an important 
indicator to show the scale of the problem (World 2005b: ii). The data of State 
Institute of Statistics presents the ratio of population that is covered by one of the 
social security institutions as % 46.5 in 1980 and 54.6 in 198546. Although 
formalizing the informal forms of employment has been part of political discussions 
                                                 
46 See Appendix II, Table 1. The Population Covered by Social Insurance Programs. 
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from time to time, the governments did not take any action in this area probably due 
to the belief that these companies will not be able to survive the financial burdens of 
meeting the necessary requirements to be included in the formal sector. Introduction 
of social assistance schemes to support the increasing number of the unemployed and 
the informally employed people without the necessary means to provide a basic 
survival for their families has become inevitable in this period.  
According to the World Bank Report in 2005, 27% of the population lives under the 
complete poverty line, which is calculated as an estimate of total of food and non-
food expenditures (i.e. clothes and shoes, hygiene spending) (World 2005a). The rise 
of religiously motivated associations can only be understood by taking these context 
specific factors seriously. In this neo-liberal atmosphere of increasing need and 
decreasing of older forms of solidarity, belonging to some forms of communal 
networks become crucial for the survival of the poor. In the case of Turkey the main 
defining characteristics of these communal networks were different levels of 
religiosity involved in them. As Bugra puts forward, “in the cultural atmosphere of 
the 1990s, Islam had become a strategic resource in the attempts of an ever-increasing 
number of Turkish city-dwellers trying to cope with the fragmenting and alienating 
forces of urban life” (Bugra 2002b: 126). The details of this process will be discussed 
in the following chapters. Yet, the next part will focus on the transformations in the 
welfare system of Turkey in the period from 1980s to today. 
 
Social assistance arena in the making 
The transformations in the socio-economic structures of the country that were 
accompanied by the increasing demand in the area of social welfare resulted in the 
introduction of new forms of provision and also in reforms in the existing social 
policy structures. One change that took place in this period was the increasing 
emphasis on the social assistance mechanisms in order to support the parts of 
population that are not employed and living in extreme forms of poverty. As 
discussed in the previous sections, assistance for the poor was never regarded as an 
area of public policy intervention by the Turkish state: both in the Ottoman and the 
Early Republican periods, social assistance left to be an area to be handled by the 
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benevolent citizens47. The welfare state that had been established after the Second 
World War in Turkey only focused on the workers with formal contracts, civil 
servants and self-employed; leaving out unemployed, and informally employed. It 
would not be inaccurate to claim that not a single investment was made in the social 
assistance area after the establishment of Darülaceze by the end of the nineteenth 
century, and an institution for the protection of children (SHÇEK) in the early 
twentieth century. The legislation that introduced a Social Disability and Old Age 
Pensions Regime in 1976 is argued to be the only modern legislation in the area of 
social assistance, which guarantees protection for the citizens who are not covered by 
any other social security services and who do not have close relatives to take care of 
them (Bugra and Keyder 2006)48.  
In the period after the mid-1980s, the state felt the urge to undertake some more 
encompassing actions in the area of social assistance. Introduction of the 1986 
legislation on the incitement of a social assistance and solidarity was a first and 
crucial step for the state to take over responsibility for provision of social assistance. 
Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to interpret this step as a divergence from the 
tradition of seeing social assistance as an area of philanthropy. Bugra interprets this 
legislation as an early response of the liberal market economy “to regard poverty as a 
problem that could be best dealt with through the country’s traditional ethos of charity 
involving a society-specific form of state-society cooperation without proper 
delineation of private and public funds used to assist the needy” (Bugra 2007a: 46). 
The talk held by a parliamentarian in 1986 for the justification of the introduction of 
the legislation demonstrated the expected support from the citizens: 
Vakifs have been the long lasting and fundamental institutions of the Turkish Islamic 
civilization that existed in Anatolia for more than thousand years. They have been 
ahead of their time in meeting the social, economic and cultural needs of the society.  
                                                 
47 See Bugra Bugra, A. (2007a). "Poverty and Citizenship: An overview of the social-policy 
environment in Republican Turkey." International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 39: 33-52. 
 , Bugra, A. (2008). Kapitalizm, Yoksulluk ve Turkiye'de Sosyal Politika. Istanbul, Iletisim 
Yayinlari. 
  
48 This is also an example of the approach which considers the family responsible for taking care of the 
needy. Only people who do not have relatives to take care of them are eligible for the assistance.  
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In Ottoman history, vakifs have been active in many areas like infrastructure, 
education, care of the needy and housing. These services not only fulfilled economic 
needs but also had a social function. Unfortunately, vakifs declined in the last years. 
With the introduction of Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund the yearned for 
functions of vakifs will reemerge. Serving the parts of population that are under the 
middle income level and who are not benefiting from social security will once more be 
possible with the support of our benevolent and wealthy citizens in addition to the state 
provision.” (quoted by Bugra 2008: 206, my translation)  
It is possible to see the historical references of the new law to the vakif structures, and 
the nostalgia created around these institutions. Nevertheless, these discussions around 
the ideal of revitalizing the traditional vakif structures did not take into consideration 
that vakifs have never been institutions established with pure aims of social provision. 
Even in their golden ages, they have always been used as instruments of political 
power building, or for protecting the rights of individuals against state (see Cizakca 
2000; Kuran 2001; Singer 2002; Singer 2005; Singer 2008). Therefore, the aim of 
bringing such a politically laden notion back to the center of social assistance arena is 
a decision that needs to be discussed from a social citizenship perspective. Although 
resistance from some of the political parties was the case, and discussions on the 
possible problems and weaknesses of the legislation took place in the parliament, the 
law became effective in 1986. The legislation founded the Social Assistance and 
Solidarity Fund under the Prime Ministry as an umbrella organization that assumes 
“all the social responsibilities on behalf of the state with regards to the needy and the 
destitute that are deprived of any social security provisions” (SYDGM 2009).  
One change that the establishment of this Fund brought to the social policy structure 
of Turkey was the increasing emphasis on the localities. Currently, there are over nine 
hundred vakifs all over the country that are connected to the central directorate in 
Ankara but governed by the local board of trustees that are composed of local 
governors and two philanthropists from the locality. In the period after the 1990s and 
especially after the financial crises of 2000 and 2001 both the budget and the activity 
field of the Fund increased remarkably. One of the most influential projects of the 
Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund in recent years has been the Social Risk 
Mitigation Project, which has been put into use with a loan granted by the World 
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Bank in 2001. The development objective of the Project was “to mitigate the impact 
of economic crisis on poor households (social risk mitigation) and to improve their 
capacity with similar risks in the future (social risk management)” (World Bank 2001: 
2). The main components of the project were conditional cash transfers to the poor, 
assistance programs supporting education and health areas, and development projects 
such as micro-credits. In 2004, the Fund gained an institutional structure of a general 
directorate called Prime Ministry General Directorate of Social Assistance and 
Solidarity, which mainly financed by an off-budgetary funding that is a combination 
of a share of income tax revenues and a share of traffic fines. Since 2006, when the 
loan agreement with the World Bank expired, the Social Assistance and Solidarity 
Vakifs continued undertaking the same services that were started as a part of the loan 
agreement. When the characteristics of them such as their local structures, areas of 
activity and decision-making processes are analyzed it is possible to see the parallels 
of these state institutions with the religiously motivated civil society organizations. 
There is no evidence proving that the state vakifs were the models that RMAs 
followed, nevertheless the similarities signify this possibility.  
 
Social provision by the municipalities 
Social welfare provision by the municipal governments is also a recent development 
of the last decade at the local level. The role local governments play in social policy 
field has been continuously increasing in the period after the mid-1990s. Statistical 
data is not available on the scale of the social assistance work undertaken by the 
municipalities, but their presence in the area of social provision —with social projects 
such as employment creation and their direct social aid programs such as distribution 
of food, coal, clothing the like— is impossible to miss.  
Increasing levels of social provision by the municipalities bring with it questions 
related to politicization of provision. This has been a widely discussed issue in the 
media, especially during the election times.49 Due to the independent structure of the 
municipalities in accepting donations from private individuals, it is not easy to control 
                                                 
49 There was a visible increase in the number of news on distribution of food, coal, and even household 
appliances by the municipalities in the period before the local elections in 2009, and general elections 
in 2007.  
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the sources and the expanses of their budget, which obviously raises concerns about 
possible cases of corruption. In the interviews I have conducted with the 
municipalities, two main lines of argument were dominant in explaining the reasons 
and benefits of social assistance provision by the municipalities. On the one end of the 
continuum, there were the statements of the municipalities that are governed by the 
party in power. They claimed that the main reason for increasing presence of 
municipalities in the social policy arena is the increasing levels of poverty and the 
benevolent nature of Turkish people.  
On the other side, there were the municipalities that are governed by the opposition 
government, which interprets the developments of the last decades as a pure outcome 
of clientelist relations and politicization of social policy. For the opposing group 
social policy should be an outcome of social rights of the citizens, and hence it is 
“dangerous” to leave this field completely to the local governments or civil actors. An 
interview I have conducted with a vice major in one of the municipalities in Istanbul, 
who is in office for the last fifteen years, was interesting in presenting the change that 
happened at the municipal level in the last decade. As she told me, in the last fifteen 
years, she has witnessed a great increase in the number of the families asking for 
assistance. According to her words, fifteen years ago the number of poor families that 
were applying for social aid —in this specific municipality— was around three 
hundred; this number increased to ten thousands now. As she describes, this cannot 
merely be an outcome of increasing poverty levels. She suggested that the right wing 
parties, which are in power in the last decades, have never defined social policies in 
relation to social rights. Instead —according to her— they preferred to keep the 
citizens in a dependency relationship, so that a reciprocal relationship between social 
provision and voting can be continued. Although I mostly agree with the 
interpretations of the vice municipal, I believe that one thing that is lacking in her 
explanation is that social assistance arena has always been an area of philanthropist 
relations independent of the party in power. Therefore, I claim that the novel part of 
the development is not the relations between the providers (either the central state 
institutions or any other private ones) and beneficiaries, which have always been 
marked by clientelistic notes, but the increasing activities of the local governments 
and their dubious relations to both the donators (businessmen) and the recipients in 
the area of social policy. 
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Transformations of the social security arena 
The changes in the area of welfare provision were not limited to the social assistance 
sphere but also influenced the social security institutions of the Republic. The 
influences of the IMF and the World Bank on the Turkish economy increased after the 
crises of 1994. High deficits of the social security system were seen as the major 
problem in failing to achieve the requirement of the stand-by agreement of a fiscal 
surplus of %6.5 of the GDP. Especially the economic crises of the 2000 and 2001 
proved that it is inevitable to undertake some reforms in the social policy arena. In 
addition to the crises, the accession talks with the European Union also triggered a 
chain of changes —such as the preparation of the Joint Inclusion Memorandum— in 
the social welfare arena in the period after 2004.  
The fundamental change that took place in this period was the introduction of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security Institution as an umbrella establishment 
assembling the three existing social security institutions, which were Retirement 
Chest for civil servants, Social Insurance Institution for workers and a pension fund, 
and Bağ-Kur for the self-employed. This implementation resulted in main shifts in the 
health and pension areas of social security. Although some discussions around the 
issues of loss of autonomy for the funds of the previous institutions, and privatization 
of health care personal took place in the public sphere, the reforms were important for 
creating equality for the citizens who were previously supported by different social 
security institutions according to different norms and benefits. The establishment of 
the Social Security Institution and the reforms in the health care had positive effects in 
curing the inequalities of the two-tiered welfare system by taking some basic steps —
such as free distribution of elementary school textbooks— to institutionalize 
universality of services (Bugra 2008: 234-236). Therefore, it would be mistaken to 
mark the period after the 1980s in Turkish welfare state as an era of social policy 
retrenchment50. Although the reforms undertaken were fundamentally aiming to cope 
with the budget deficits, they also had positive outcomes as discussed above.  
 
                                                 
50 For a similar argument see Bugra, A. and S. Adar (2008). "Social Policy Change in Countries 
without Mature Welfare States: The Case of Turkey." New Perspectives on Turkey 38. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
Proliferation of religiously motivated associations in the area of social provision came 
about in this environment of increasing needs but also expanding social assistance by 
both the central and municipal governments. In the light of this historical analysis of 
the state-society relations in the area of social policy in Turkey, the question that 
interests me is whether what we currently witness in the area of social assistance is a 
just a continuation of the dominant logic defining this area. As already mentioned 
before, the area of social assistance has always been dominated by the idea that state 
should not be the main and the only provider. Poverty has always been seen as a 
problem that should be fought with the communal efforts of the public—such as 
family, community, benevolent citizens—and the state. Therefore, philanthropic 
organizations have always been an important part of this area of welfare provision.  
Hence, I do not claim an extensive shift in the state-society relations in Turkey. I 
believe that continuity rather than change marks the characteristics of the new period 
in state-society relations. The first reason supporting my claim is the increasing state 
action in the area of social assistance in the last years. Steps such as establishment of 
state vakifs, introduction of the green card scheme, temporary support to the needy 
families can be counted as some of the important ones that prove that state decided to 
take on responsibility in areas that it did not before. The proliferation of religiously 
motivated associations accompanying this shift looks quite puzzling at first sight. It 
would have been easier to explain the rise of these associations in parallel to 
retrenchments in the area of welfare, as it is the case in some of the European 
countries. Nevertheless, the historical specificities of the Turkish welfare state—its 
fragmented structure, leaving nearly half of its population without any forms of social 
security51 and its lack of an established social assistance structures—resulted in an 
unexpected shift in the area of welfare structures.  
In the period after the 1990s, when the transformation of Turkey to the global market 
economy had been accelerated, the negative consequences of the economic 
                                                 
51 World, B. (2005a). Turkey: Joint Poverty Assesment Report, Volume 1, Main Report. , Human 
Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region. 1. 
 , World, B. (2005b). Turkey Labor Market Study. , Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Unit, Europe and Cental Asia. 
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developments could not be carried by the existing formal social welfare schemes and 
the informal support mechanisms such as families anymore. In a period when the 
European welfare states were searching for ways to share their responsibilities with 
other actors and institutions such as civil society associations and private agencies, 
Turkish state had to expand its responsibilities to cover the ever-growing share of 
population that needs support mechanisms. The state, for the first time, defined the 
social assistance area as a possible responsibility sphere for itself, and took some steps 
in widening the area of coverage of the welfare state by institutionalizing local vakifs 
to meet some extreme forms of need. Yet a closer look to the functioning of these 
organizations will show that the change is not really about the state-society relations, 
since these vakifs are only partially supported by the public funds. 
Even though the developments in the Turkish welfare system seem to be in line with 
the claims of the welfare governance approach, which is characterized by the 
increasing share of private and voluntary contributions in the welfare mixes and the 
new partnerships between different providers and the state, I would deny that this can 
be an explanatory factor for the Turkish case. First of all, these areas have never been 
covered by state action. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the associations are taking 
over what the state has been doing before. Secondly, in contrast to the European cases 
outsourcing of provision or public financing of welfare activities undertaken by civil 
society associations is not common in Turkey. Provision in the area of social 
assistance is quite a recent phenomenon as discussed above, the state is recently 
taking action in the area and there is still a huge gap even to fulfill the survival needs 
of the public. To conclude, it is not possible to talk about a shift in the welfare mix 
that is characterized by a decrease in the role of state in the provision and an increase 
in the roles of civil society and private actors.  
To conclude, what we are witnessing today is much more than a transformation of the 
already existing ways of taking care of the people. The area of social assistance is 
going through a process of establishment and growing. It is possible to talk about a 
pluralization of the existing actors in social provision. Therefore, what requires 
explanation in the case of Turkey is not the transformation of social assistance from a 
social citizenship right to a form of civil society provision, but the characteristics of 
the newly rising social assistance sphere. This is exactly the reason why the next 
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chapter will go into a discussion of the rise of political Islam as an explanatory factor 
for the new developments in the area of social assistance in Turkey and especially for 
the rise of RMAs. Why the associations that are on the rise are the religiously 
motivated ones will be the question to guide the discussion.  
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6. State-Religion Relations and Social Provision in Turkey 
 
The previous chapters defined two main processes to be explanatory for the increasing 
presence of religiously motivated associations in the area of welfare provision. The 
second one, the shifts in the relations between state and religion; the dynamics of 
cooperation and conflict between the main institutions of secular and sacred 
authorities in the area of social provision is the main focus of this chapter. An in-
depth historical analysis of the interaction between state and religion in defining the 
contemporary position of religiously motivated associations in the case of Turkey will 
be undertaken in comparison with the European variety that has been introduced in 
the third and fourth chapters. The analysis of the European variety already introduced 
the idea that the range of state church relationships in different welfare states had a 
decisive effect in determining the future presence of religiously motivated 
associations in the area of social provision. The cases of Britain, France, Germany and 
Sweden demonstrated how different secularization histories influenced the 
establishment of different welfare mixes by the end of nineteenth, early twentieth 
centuries. Following on the main arguments developed in Part I and II, this chapter 
focuses on the dynamics of religion and state relations in Turkey in the time period 
starting from late Ottoman period to today with a special emphasis on the area of 
social provision. The analysis aims to provide an understanding of how the social 
policy patterns established in the early nation state formation period had repercussions 
for the further development of competition and/or cooperation between sacred and 
secular providers of social policy.  
In order to provide a historical answer for the rise of RMAs in Turkey, this chapter is 
founded on the theoretical basis of the religion and welfare literature that is 
introduced in Part I. A systematic analysis of the existing cleavage lines52 in the 
Turkish politics will be undertaken to understand the characteristics of welfare state in 
Turkey. State-religion relations will be analyzed as the peripheral cleavage line in the 
period before the 1970s and as the main one in post-1980s shaping the development 
                                                 
52 Following the main conceptual framework of Stein Rokkan Flora, P., S. Kuhnle, et al., Eds. (1999). 
State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan Based on 
His Collected Works. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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of the welfare mix. How various political conflicts on this main societal cleavage line 
of sacred-secular shaped the development of the Turkish welfare structures will be the 
focus of attention. The historical analysis will confirm that the proliferation of 
religiously motivated associations in the last two decades can only be understood by 
looking into changing relevance of religion in the public and political spheres.  
The first section will concentrate on the first steps of secularization in the nation state 
formation period, after giving a brief introduction to the religion and state relations in 
the late Ottoman Empire. Following that, the second sub-section (1945-1980) will 
focus on the transformation of strict secular codes of the early Republican period in 
the period after the mid 1940s, the gradual rise of Islam in the political and social 
arenas of Turkey and multiple interruptions of this process by the judicial and military 
forces. This part aims to go into an in-depth analysis of the processes behind 
mobilization of Islam in the Turkish politics in order to trace the roots of religiously 
motivated associations in the period before 1980s. I claim that this era between late 
1960s and 1980s is important for the rise53 of Islam as a main social, cultural, and 
political resource setting the background for the establishment of a main political 
cleavage line in politics. The third part will focus on the post-1980s, in which 
religious parties came to a position to exploit the political potential of religion and 
managed to politicize the cleavage line of sacred/secular as the main one in politics. 
The main interest while undertaking this analysis will be on the possible reflections of 
state and religion interactions on the social policy sphere in general, and on the 
destiny of religiously motivated associations in the welfare arena in particular.  
 
6.1. From the Empire to the Republic: Nation State Formation Period 
Situating Turkey in the middle of European cases, representing different forms of 
state church conflicts and collaborations in the area of welfare may look like an 
unconventional decision at first sight. Nevertheless, this part will demonstrate that 
when the nation state formation period is focused on, what has been going on the in 
the social policy sphere of Turkey, especially in terms of religion and state relations 
                                                 
53 Instead of a “resurgence” of Islam in Turkey —as it is commonly referred to in the literature—this 
chapter will focus on the “rise” of it as a resource in the socio-economic and the political spheres, since 
I interpret this to be a novel process more than a revival or a return. 
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can easily be positioned in the European variety and can be explained through the 
same mechanisms of change. The institutions representing the religious and state 
authorities may be different in the case of Turkey, and even lack of church may be 
marked as a big enough difference to make this comparison pointless for some. Yet, 
this section will demonstrate that the period that marked the end of the Ottoman 
Empire and the early years of the Turkish Republic has been scene to conflicts around 
the issue of social provision, which can be easily fit into the European context.  
Religion neither in the Ottoman Empire nor in the Turkish Republic has ever been 
represented as a coherent body of power separate from the state. It has either been 
integrated into the state power—as in the case of Ottoman Empire—or excluded from 
it, as it has been the case after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Islam 
constituted a central ingredient of the state power in the Ottoman Empire, through 
institutions such as Caliphate and Sheikh-al-Islam (Seyhulislam), and the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Seriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti). Following the 
incorporation of Caliphate from the Mamluks in the 16th century, the Ottoman 
Sultan/emperor was entitled to the positions of appointee of God and the leader of the 
Islamic world. Merging the political with the divine power in a single position, the 
religious and state authorities became one and indivisible in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, 
as the historical studies on religion and politics in the Ottoman Empire suggests, the 
political authority although theoretically shared by the religious one, was superior to 
it54. This twofold nature of the Ottoman state power, including both secular and 
religious elements, went through a process of change starting from the nineteenth 
century. Centralization and Westernization being the main aims, religious institutions 
were under siege and the power of the religious elite (ulema) was in decline in this 
period.  
Contrary to the double power structure of church and state in the Catholic Orders, 
Islam, even in its heyday of influence in the Empire, has never been an independent 
political force. Its authority and influence has always been scattered over a 
multiplicity of formal and informal structures. Moreover, the representation of 
religion was not limited to the political arena only. In addition to the ‘Orthodox Islam’ 
                                                 
54 See Berkes, N. (1964). The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Montreal, McGill University 
Press. 
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that was represented by the religious elite/intellectuals (ulema), who are civil servants 
of the state; Islam was also represented by a multiplicity of actors such as Sufi orders- 
tarikats and saints- seyhs at the local level. Mardin describes this as the 
‘heterogeneous and multidimensional’ character of Islam in the Empire (Mardin 
1977). This position of religion as being both part of political power and the ruling 
elite and also being represented by a multiplicity of peripheral organizational forms 
undertaking social activities was the main picture in the Empire.  
The first years of the Republican history were marked by the efforts to demolish the 
presence of religion in the political and social arenas. The duality of the secular and 
the Islamic institutions —schools, courts, laws— that ruled the country through the 
nineteenth century was brought to an end with the Kemalist reforms of the early 
twentieth century (Inalcik 1964: 446-447). The abolishment of the Caliphate, and the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (1924) were the main steps 
undertaken to put an end to this duality in the political sphere. The introduction of the 
Law of Unification of Instruction, which closed down all medreses/religious schools 
and united all educational institutions under the Ministry of Education, and the 
abolition of religious education in schools in 1927 created a national education system 
that was designed along the lines of the French model.  
Secularization in Turkey did not only mean the exclusion of Islam from the political 
sphere, but also established total control of religion by the state. The establishment of 
Diyanet—the Directorate of Religious Affairs55—under the Prime Ministry in 1924 
was the main step to achieve this control. The administration of religious worshipping 
institutions, the regulation of religious belief and rituals, and the guidance of society 
on religious issues were the main tasks of the new institution. The establishment of 
Diyanet and roles of this institution have always been a contested area in the Turkish 
political history. The Republican elite had an interest in using Islam to create social 
cohesion in society. Islamist intellectuals like Kara argued that this institution was not 
founded to regulate the religious affairs of the public but religious affairs of the state 
(Kara 2004). For him and other Islamists the establishment of Diyanet resulted in the 
utilization and exploitation of religion to meet the needs of the state and its total 
                                                 
55 For a study on the uniqueness of Turkish Diyanet see Bardakoglu, A. (2004). "Moderate Perception 
of Islam and the Turkish Model of the Diyanet: The President's Statement." Journal of Muslim 
Minority Affairs 24(2). 
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exclusion from the areas of religious education and vakifs (ibid.). The 
disestablishment of Islam from being the state religion in 1928, the inclusion of 
laicism in the fundamental principles of the Republican People’s Party in 1931, and in 
the constitution in 1937 were the final moves that completed the formal transition to a 
secular order. Kuru defines the period between 1923 to 1937 by the dominance of 
assertive secularism which means the exclusion of religion from the public sphere and 
confinement of it to the private domain (Kuru 2009: 11). I claim that this strict 
elimination of religion from the social and public areas and its total regulation by the 
state resulted in the total exclusion of religious forms of provision from the newly 
establishing area of welfare.  
Reforms in the sphere of religion were one of the priorities of the new regime, in 
order to cut the existing ties with the Ottoman Empire. As argued by Yalman, “[…] 
the intention of the Turkish Reforms is clearly to deal a mortal blow to an entire 
culture and to set up a new culture, with new men. [...] And since Islam was at the 
heart of the ancient regime, it is Islam that receives the heaviest blow”(Yalman 1973: 
154). It is important to mention at this point that the two versions of Islams existing in 
the Empire —the orthodox and the folk Islam— were influenced differently by the 
secularization policies of the Republic. While the Orthodox Islam of the elites totally 
disappeared by the abolishment of the Caliphate and the Ulema, the heterodox Islam 
of the masses survived despite the legal bans on its institutions, religious brotherhoods 
and orders. As suggested by scholars in the area, “not allowed to move and expand 
outwards, peripheral Islam turned deeply inwards” (Sunar and Toprak 1983: 428). 
The main move to wipe out the influence of popular Islam was the introduction of 
Law of 677 in 1925, which closed down all turbes, tekkes and zaviyes, which were the 
main religious organization venues for Sufi tarikats. This significant step illustrates 
that the secularization policies of the early republic did not only cover the political but 
also the social arena. These brotherhoods had served crucial religious and social 
functions throughout the history of the Empire: “On a psychological level they offered 
a mystical, emotional dimension which was lacking in the high religion of the ulema 
and at the same time they served as networks offering cohesion, protection and social 
mobility”(Zurcher 1997: 200). An excerpt from a speech by Mustafa Kemal below 
represents the attitude of the new elite to the traditional organizations of popular 
Islam: 
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To seek help from the dead is a disgrace to a civilized community… What can be the 
objects of the existing brotherhoods (tarikat) other than to secure the well-being, in 
worldly and moral like, of those who follow them? I flatly refuse to believe that today, 
in the luminous presence of science, knowledge, and civilization in all its aspects, there 
exist, in the civilized community of Turkey, men so primitive as to see their material 
and moral well-being from the guidance of one or another seyh. Gentlemen, you and 
the whole nation must know, and know well, that the Republic of Turkey cannot be the 
land of seyhs, dervishes, disciples, and lay brothers. The straightest, truest Way 
(tarikat) is the way of civilization. To be a man, it is enough to do what civilization 
requires. The heads of the brotherhoods will understand this truth that I have uttered in 
all its clarity, and will of their own accord at once close their convents, and accept the 
fact that their disciples have at last come of age (translated and quoted by Lewis 1961). 
The quote makes clear that one of the main aims of secularization reforms were to 
free the individual from the community bounds established on traditional/religious 
forms of belonging. Mardin defines the common ground of the secularism reforms by 
Atatürk as the creation of the individual citizen who is free from the controls and the 
pressures of the gemeinschaft (Mardin 1981). The main aim of the reform movements 
at the time was to replace the traditional forms of authorities with the universal and 
objective truths of science. Nevertheless, the years to follow proved that what was not 
realized at the point in time was that universal truths of science did not provide these 
people with norms, moral values or any other form of belonging. The ideals of the 
new culture —that are marked by dominant notes of Western values and practices—
could not be translated to all parts of society, but only created an identity for the 
newly rising urban elites. Therefore, the space emptied by these traditional 
brotherhoods and tarikats, which were the only resources of networking and support 
for some parts of the public, were now open to be filled. The attempt to dissolve these 
religious and traditional forms of communities, and the failure to replace them with 
other forms of belonging such as social citizenship was probably one of the main 
oversights of the early Republican era.  
Similar to the power struggle between dominant churches and newly rising nation 
states in Europe, this era of nation state formation in Turkey was also stage to a power 
struggle between the old religious and the newly rising secular elites. Yet, the 
authoritarian political atmosphere of the country was not suitable for any possible 
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reflection of the religious cleavage to the political sphere. The single party period did 
not allow the rise of any form of institutionalized opposition against its power. The 
founding of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) in 
1924 was the main attempt of the various groups opposing the rule of Mustafa Kemal. 
Nonetheless, the party was accused of having an Islamic identity and being a threat to 
the ideological foundations of the new Republic and closed down in as short period as 
six months56. The political atmosphere of the new Republic became even more 
authoritarian after this first try out, which prevented the rise of any kind of opposition 
party for the next twenty years. Therefore, groups with more conservative and 
religious motivations were totally excluded from the new order with no chance of 
representation neither in political parties nor in the social arena.  
This authoritarian climate, which dominated the Turkish politics in the first two 
decades after the establishment of the Republic, resulted in the marginalization of 
religion. This exclusion of religion from the political and public spheres has also 
inhibited further presence of it in the social policy sphere, and any possible 
coexistence or cooperation between sacred and secular providers in the area of social 
welfare. Nonetheless, this did not necessarily hinder the possibilities for the rise of 
religiously motivated associations in the future since a comprehensive welfare system 
to fulfill the basic needs of citizens cannot be established.  The coming chapters will 
demonstrate how the politicization of religion, and the increasing needs in the area of 
welfare—being the two main explanatory factors—will result in the proliferation of 
religiously motivated associations by the end of twentieth century.  
 
6.2. The Contested Area of Religion and Politics in Turkey 
Religion has always remained as a contested area in Turkish politics. The relatively 
strict and authoritarian secularization path preferred by the early Republican state 
elite, pushed Islam in the periphery of cultural, social and political life of the modern 
Turkish state. I claim that this approach of the Turkish state towards Islam has been 
the impediment to the rise of religion as a main cleavage in politics. Since the formal 
                                                 
56 For a detailed study see Zürcher, J. E. (1991). Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: 
The Progressive Republican Party. Leiden, Brill. 
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representation of religion in the political party form was not possible, it remained as a 
contested phenomenon with the potential to be politically exploited. This section 
concentrates on the dynamics of state-religion relations in Turkey in the period from 
the mid-1940s to the 1980s, which was stage to partial consolidation of democracy 
and multiple interruptions of it by the military. The changing position of Islam in the 
political and public spheres will be the main focus of attention by following a 
historical sequence of crucial events such as establishment and liquidation of political 
parties and military coups.  
 
1945-1960: the first and careful steps  
The transition to a multi-party system in the mid-1940s and the establishment of right 
wing parties resulted in a growing opposition to the strictly etatist and secular political 
programs of Republican People’s Party57 (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). The 
competition between the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) and CHP resulted in 
the use of religion as political propaganda by both parties. In the 1947 congress of the 
CHP, the idea of liberalizing the role of secularization in the social area was an 
important part of discussions (Toprak 1981: 77). The inclusion of courses on religion 
in the school curricula, opening of religious education institutions like Imam Hatips 
and departments of Theology, the reopening of tombs, and increasing number of 
mosques were some changes that were completed in the last five years of the CHP 
rule. Following these reforms in the pre-election period and the additional ones after 
the election in 1950, the rule of Democrat Party (1950-1960) witnessed the revival of 
religion in the social sphere. This revival is also characterized as a “redefinition of 
laicism” (Sunar and Toprak 1983: 429-430).  
Democrat Party shared many sensitivities of the CHP regarding the issue of 
secularism in the political sphere. Yet, they had a more liberal interpretation of public 
religion. Therefore, after the 1950s visibility of religion in the public realm increased, 
which was legitimized by the argument of fulfilling the needs of the populace.58.This 
period of the DP rule was stage to the re-legitimization of some religious 
                                                 
57 The Republican People’s Party represented both the party and state up until this date.  
58 After their three-decade rule,  CHP has been accused of creating an ethical, moral and cultural void 
in the society as an outcome of its strictly secular reform programs they had implemented. 
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brotherhoods in return of the political support they provided for the party in the 1954 
and 1957 elections (Zurcher 1997: 245). These being the main characteristics, the 
Democrat Party years were marked by the attempts to open a niche for the integration 
of the groups other than the secular Republican elite of the new Republic in the 
political sphere too. As argued by Ayata, the expansion of the clientelist networks to 
include the peasants and newly rising merchants were one of the characteristics of the 
DP rule (Ayata 1996: 44). Religion was one of the crucial organizational resources 
used for the mobilization of these groups in the political sphere.  
The military coup in May 1960 was the first break in the Turkish democracy 
experience. The Democrat Party was closed down for violating the secular principles 
of the Turkish Republic and Kemal Ataturk, as an outcome of its interactions with the 
Islamic groups and its acts in popularizing Islam. This was a proof, showing that there 
was no “normalization” of the relationship between the state and religion. The ruling 
state elite did not approve of the rise of religion in the social and political spheres of 
the country. As aptly argued by many scholars, in the period before the 1970s it was 
not yet possible for the Islamists to present their ideals in the political arena, therefore 
they had to integrate their ideals with other political movements like conservatism or 
nationalism (see Duran 2004). Although the Democrat Party put great effort in 
presenting a secular picture in politics and in keeping a balance between the secular 
tradition of the state and the rising Islamist ideals, it could not prevent the closure of 
the Party in 1961.  
 
1965-1980: further move 
The political environment in the period after the military coup was neither prohibiting 
nor limiting the increasing representation of Islamic forces in the political arena. 
Moreover, the liberal approach of the new constitution towards the political and 
organizational rights opened the way for sneaking of Islamic actors into the political 
arena in the decades to come. In the elections following the military coup in 1960, the 
Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) that was established as a continuation of the 
Democrat Party came to power. Expressing its commitment to the secularist principles 
of the Republic, the AP had been a channel of presentation of Islamic demands in the 
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political arena. As argued by Ayata, Justice Party was different than the Democrat 
Party since they “established direct and lasting relationships with various Islamic 
groups, communities and leaders” which “involved a process of exchanging votes and 
political support for access to public resources and protection against threats from the 
state and the secular forces” (Ayata 1996: 44). In comparison, as he claims, the 
relations of the Democrat Party with the Islamic groups were limited to “mobilize 
provincial local notables who had influence over local religious leaders” (ibid.). The 
relations of the Justice Party could therefore be interpreted as opening a new phase in 
the area of interaction between religion and politics. A further step —the 
establishment of pro-Islamist political parties— was only possible after the 1970s as 
an outcome of these smaller steps that made the integration of the religious groups 
into the right wing political parties possible. Support from the religious brotherhoods, 
like Naksibendis and Nurcus59 was also crucial for the establishment of the Islamic 
parties. 
The rise of political Islam in various Muslim countries was an additional factor that 
paved the way for the establishment of the first Islamist political party in the early 
1970s. The influence of the Islamic movements in countries like Egypt, Iran, Pakistan 
resulted in the rise of a new interpretation of Islam, which emphasized that practicing 
Islam should not be limited to the private sphere.60 After 1960s Islamic texts of 
groups like Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria and Jamaati Islami in Pakistan 
were widely read among Turkish Islamists. This triggered the aspiration of the 
Turkish Islamists for being active participants in the political sphere. The political 
movements in these Islamic countries set an example for the possible ways of 
integrating Islam into the public and political arenas. The founding of the first Islamic 
political parties of Turkey followed these exogenous changes in the Islamic world and 
the endogenous changes—such as increasing migration to the cities, weakening of the 
rural and traditional bounds and socio-economic changes—in the last decades. 
                                                 
59 For a detailed study of Islamic brotherhoods and tarikats in Turkey see Cakir, R. (1994). Ayet ve 
Slogan. Istanbul, Metis Yayinevi. 
  
60 For further information about influence of Islamism see Cetinsaya, G. (1999). "Rethinking 
Nationalism and Islam." The Muslim World LXXXIX(3-4): 350-376. 
 , Tugal, C. (2002). "Islamism in Turkey: beyond instrument and meaning." Economy and 
Society 31(1): 85-111. 
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The establishment of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP) in 1971 and 
the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP) in 1972, following the 
closure of MNP by the military intervention in the same year, marks the beginning of 
a process in which Islamic politics will separate from right wing politics and form 
their own representation channels61 (Cakir 2004). The rise of these political parties 
should be studied in close connection with the parallel rise of small and medium size 
businesses in Anatolia. It is important to mention that the most important figure of 
political Islam—Necmettin Erbakan—prior to establishing a political party, has been 
the spokesman of conservative small businesses in Anatolian towns. Therefore, the 
main political support basis of him were these small and medium scale firms of newly 
rising Anatolian capital/green capital, which would be on the rise in the following 
decades and would form an alternative to the big bourgeoisie of the big cities and 
specifically İstanbul.  
The emphasis on moral values and heavy industrialization were the two main defining 
characteristics of politics by the MSP. The first one has been an important criterion 
for belonging to the networks established at the crossroads of economy and politics 
and the second one defined the most efficient way to increase economic might. As 
Bugra shows in her study on the comparison of TUSIAD and MUSIAD, reciprocity 
networks were especially important for the newly rising Muslim businessman, since 
they lacked the state support that was available for the private enterprises that were 
established earlier (Bugra 1998). The following historical and the empirical chapters 
will go into an in-depth analysis of the functioning of these networks.  
In the period between 1974 and 1978, the MSP took part in three different coalition 
governments, during which it laid the foundations of the Islamic networks established 
at the intersection of business, politics and bureaucracy (see Özbudun 2000). 
Education was one of the main area of activities for the MSP; more than two hundred 
vocational religious education schools (Imam Hatip Okullari) were opened in the 
coalition years of the party62. Nevertheless the party could not establish a stable place 
                                                 
61 Before this date, the presence of Islamism in the political sphere was only possible with an 
integration of it with nationalism, and conservatism as the two other main ideologies of Turkish 
political right. For a study see Bora, T. (1998). Turk Saginin Uc Hali: Milliyetcilik, Muhafazakarlik, 
Islamcilik. Istanbul, Birikim Yayinlari. 
  
62 For a detailed study of these schools see Pak, S.-Y. (2004). "Cultural Politics and Vocational 
Religious Education: The case of Turkey." Comparative Education 40(3). 
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in the political arena and the last coalition government, which the party was also a 
part of, came to an end in 1977. Shortly in the aftermath, the third military coup of the 
Turkish democracy had taken place, and the Turkish Military forces overtook the 
government on September 1980.  
In conclusion, this period from the mid-1940s to the 1980s is marked by the 
increasing presence of religion in the social and political arenas of the Turkish 
Republic and reformation of the strict secularization of the early Republican period, 
which meant total exclusion of any forms of religion from the public and the political 
sphere. In the first interlude from the mid-1940s to mid-1970s the conditions in the 
political field were not ready to allow the establishment of a pro-Islamic party. 
Connections that have been built between the ruling right wing parties and the 
religious groups can be interpreted as a preparation stage for the politicization of 
religion. Nonetheless, even these veiled interactions resulted in the multiple 
interruptions of the regime by the military forces and closures of the political parties.  
The first pro-Islamic parties were founded in the period after the 1970s, even though 
the political environment was not stable enough to make their long-term survival 
possible. Nevertheless, this early presence of the pro-Islamic parties in coalition 
governments facilitated an increase in the number of people with Islamist sensitivities 
in the bureaucracy in various positions of the state, and in business in various fields of 
economics. Access to various spheres of socio-economic and political life resulted in 
the formation of networks cross-cutting these areas. Clientelist networks established 
by the political parties at the intersection of economic, political and social arenas set 
the stage for future success of these groups. Part III, which will focus on the empirical 
findings of the study, will demonstrate the functionality of these networks in 
establishing the necessary economic and social basis for the rise of religiously 
motivated welfare associations in the period after the 1990s. 
This snapshot of the political arena in Turkey demonstrates that religion has not been 
a main cleavage line in the Turkish politics before the 1980s. The main cleavage lines 
of Turkish politics in the pre-1980s period can be defined on the axes of left-right and 
center-periphery, to use the terms of Lipset and Rokkan (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
Religion has always remained as a politically contested arena, and the first parties 
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were established in the early 1970s. Yet the parties were neither long lasting nor 
influential enough to be able to shift the main dividing line in politics. It was only 
after the 1980s that religion shifted from the periphery to the center of political 
interest. The underlying reasons causing this shift will be the focus of attention in the 
following section. 
 
6.3. The Rise of Islam as the Main Cleavage in Politics (post-1980s) 
The shaping of the social policy sphere in society is highly related to the political 
struggles the society is going through. The major lines of conflict eventually reflected 
in the area of social policy, since this has always been one of the main areas of back 
building in politics. Especially in countries where state services do not cover 
fundamental areas of welfare provision, there is a greater room for the politicization 
of services. Subsequently, foundational stages of welfare state development have been 
the period in which the newly established structures were open to any influence from 
the political field. In this subsection of the chapter, I will argue that the proliferation 
of the religiously motivated associations in Turkey can only be understood in relation 
to the developments in the political sphere of the country in the last decades. Hence, 
the rise of RMAs will be explained as an outcome of re-shaping of the welfare state 
structures through the main cleavage lines in the society.  
In Turkey, the proliferation of the religiously motivated welfare associations 
coincides with the rise of Islam as a main cleavage in politics. As already discussed in 
the previous part, due to the specific secularization history of the country, religion has 
remained a phenomenon with the potential to be exploited by political actors. 
Nevertheless, the circumstances for the rise of it as a main cleavage were not 
maturated in the period before the 1990s. This chapter claims that the rise of Islam as 
the main cleavage is the second explanatory factor for the rise of RMAs in the social 
policy sphere63. The networks established in the process of the rise of Islam in the 
economic, political and the social spheres, and the exploitation of social provision 
arena by the political parties set both the examples and the necessary foundational 
                                                 
63 The first one is the increasing demand in the area of social assistance, which was the main point of 
discussion in the previous chapter on the development of welfare state in Turkey. 
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basis for the rise of RMAs. The initial steps of this development were the increasing 
presence of religion in the public sphere in the post-1980s, the rise of the Welfare 
Party to power in the mid-1990s and the rule of the Justice and Development Party in 
the period after 2002.  
 
After the military coup 
The period after the military coup in 1980 marked a new start for state and religion 
relations in Turkey. In order to cope with the polarization of the country on the left-
right axis, the Turkish Islam synthesis has been put forward as the main ideology of 
the state64. The steps taken in the years after the coup were crucial in reintegrating 
Islam into the social, political and cultural life of the society. The leaders of the 
military coup, by fusing Islamic and nationalist goals, aimed to create “a more 
homogenous and less political Islamic community” (Yavuz 1997: 67). For them, 
Islam as a pacifying and submissive ideology was preferable to the threat of 
communism. The Özal era (1983-1989) was marked by the integration of this new 
ideology into state discourse. The public visibility of religion through the 
representation of political figures—including him—in the media during Friday 
prayers or expressing their religious beliefs became common65. Additionally, this 
period was also stage to the opening of new mosques, and İmam Hatip schools and 
the first discussions about whether university students should be allowed to wear the 
headscarf-turban or not. Özal’s pro-Islamic attitudes were most of the time explained 
in relation to his connections to one of the most influential tarikats (Naksibendis) in 
Turkey.  
The increasing visibility of Islam was not limited to the public sphere; steps have also 
been taken in the economic field to introduce Islamic principles into business and 
finance sectors. The introduction of Islamic banking was a crucial step by Özal 
government, which resulted in bringing savings of the pious Muslims into the 
                                                 
64 For historical development of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis see Cetinsaya, G. (1999). "Rethinking 
Nationalism and Islam." The Muslim World LXXXIX(3-4): 350-376. 
  
 
65 For detailed analysis of Özal period see Arat, Y. (1991). Social Change and the 1983 Governing Elite 
in Turkey. Structural Change in Turkish Society. M. Kiray. Indiana, Indiana University Press. 
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financial system and made the business relations with the Arab states easier. DITIB—
the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs—was founded in 1984, to integrate 
the Turkish Diaspora living in Germany into the new Turkish-Islamic ideology. This 
was a move that would facilitate the return of remittances to Turkey in the following 
years. As argued by Yavuz, the moves after the coup in 1980 aimed at the inclusion of 
Muslims into the economic system and as this integration also facilitated the process 
in which they “shape the educational, political and economic spheres with their own 
norms” (Yavuz 1997: 70).  
An important aspect of the rise of political Islam in Turkey was the return of Erbakan 
to the political arena and increasing political support for the Welfare Party in the mid-
1990s. This was an early proof of the ideological change the state and the society had 
gone through in the period between 1950s and 1990s. Islamic identity claims became 
more politicized in this period of the rise of Islamic parties. Önis describes this 
process as the ‘the resurgence of Islam’ (1997, 2001). For him, not only has religion 
been politicized by political parties identified with the Islamic identity and discourse, 
it has also been articulated by economic actors, civil society organizations and 
cultural identity claims.66 Clear proof of the rise of Islam in the economic arena in the 
1990s was the rising power of the “Islamist” or “Green” capital or “Anatolian Tigers” 
and the establishment of MUSIAD, which is the business association of the newly 
rising medium and small scale Anatolian businessman with conservative/religious 
backgrounds67. Yavuz defines the expansion of the economy to include these small 
scale provincial businessman as an important reason for the success of the Welfare 
Party and adds that although the main ideology of the emerging bourgeoisie was 
socially Islamic, it was economically liberal (Yavuz 1997: 72). This combination of 
the Islamic and the liberal ideologies proved to be the main underlying factor for 
success not only in areas of politics and economy. It also introduced a new approach 
to the social provision arena, as will be discussed in the following section.  
                                                 
66 As already briefly mentioned in the previous footnotes, I am hesitant to use the term ‘resurgence of 
religion’ in order to explain the developments in the Turkish political arena in the period after the 
1980s. The term resurgence refers to a rebirth or return. Yet, what we currently witness in the case of 
Turkey is not a recurrence. Religion has never had such a presence in the social, economic or political 
spheres of this country before. Therefore I will prefer the term rise, instead of resurgence.  
 
67 For a detailed study of the two business associations see Bugra, A. (1998). "Class, Culture, and State: 
An analysis of Interest representation by Two Business Associations." International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 30(4): 521-539. 
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Social networks and just order paving the road to power 
The accomplishment of the Welfare Party in the 1995 elections should not be 
understood only as an outcome of rise of Islam in the political and economic arenas. 
The social networks that have been established by the party and the social provision 
activities that were carried out through these networks were crucial factors for its 
success. As Heper argues, before the 1995 elections, the Welfare Party essentially 
functioned not only as a political party, but also as a welfare agency for the needy. As 
widely discussed in the literature, intra-community solidarity of the Anatolian capital 
provides its members with mutual support and cooperation: “Religious groups or 
communities, while building mosques, Qur’an courses, schools and student 
dormitories with the money collected from members or friends, who give to charity 
out of religious duty, also prepare a customer and capital base for the schools, 
business and enterprises of their members”(Demir, Acar et al. 2004: 171). In line with 
this tradition of mutual support and cooperation, Erbakan’s Welfare Party took 
networking activities, which were kicked off in the MSP days, to a highly developed 
stage. The party obtained appointments for people at the hospitals and other public 
service agencies, and distributed coal, clothing, soup and food to the needy through 
the municipalities it controlled (Heper 1997: 36). They invested significant effort in 
mobilizing support from the grassroots, and establishing contact on a personal level 
with each and every possible voter. The role of female party workers was crucial in 
establishing these networks; they made regular visits to households they are 
responsible for in a neighborhood and provided material (food, fuel etc.) and moral 
support to the needy. In addition to grassroots mobilization, the party also invested 
significant effort in establishing networks between business, media and civil 
associations68. In the 1995 elections, the Welfare Party was supported by “a complex 
network of Islamist economic ventures which included companies, chambers of 
commerce and industry, trade unions, women and youth groups, some 50 publishers, 
45 radio stations, 19 television channels and hundreds of video and cassette 
producers” (ibid.). I claim that these networking activities of Welfare Party paved the 
way for the establishment and the success of the religiously motivated associations, 
which would be on the rise in the years to come. 
                                                 
68 1990s were also stage to increasing number of conservative and Islamic media companies-television 
channels, radio stations, and newspapers.  
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The party’s main political program titled “just order” brought claims of social justice 
and equality in to the center of party politics. In a way, just order was an attempt to 
bring Islamic ethics into the capitalist economy and create a community around these 
ideals. As defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, just order “consists of a secure 
social and economic environment, the protection of state property, an end to nepotism 
and corruption, cooperation between state and society to cope with poverty, and an 
end to undue Western influence over Turkey” (2003). For some authors this program 
had been interpreted as a third way between capitalism and socialism (see Ozbudun 
2006). The ideals of the party program—just order—had some similarities to the 
ideals of a welfare state in its emphasis on achieving equality and social justice. 
Nevertheless, the road chosen in order to achieve the just order was not taking 
redistributive state action or widening the scope of welfare policies but establishing 
communities and networks founded on the Islamic ideas of morality and trust. This 
choice can partly be explained by the clientelist relations that has always been part of 
Turkish politics69 and partly by the opposition of pro-capitalist Islamists to the idea of 
redistribution through state provision70. The party was trying to reconcile the needs of 
its support base to the desires of the businessmen, who were part of the Islamic 
networks. Bugra explains the efforts of the party in formulating the Just Order, as an 
attempt to make sure that both the supporters and the potential supporters of the Party 
believe that the party both “contribute to the upward mobility of the newly emerging 
Muslim businessmen and without creating doubts about the party’s position vis-à-vis 
socioeconomic equality” (Bugra 2002b: 127).  
The social provision ideas created around the concept of just order by the Welfare 
Party reflected both continuity and change in comparison to earlier approaches. In line 
with the state-society tradition of the previous periods, the main instruments of 
creating the just order were private benevolence and voluntary initiatives that were 
                                                 
69 For a detailed analysis of clientelism in Turkey see Ayata, S. (1996). "Patronage, Party and the State: 
The Politicization of Islam in Turkey." Middle East Journal 50(1): 40-56. 
 , Komsuoglu, A. (2005). "The Right Wing Parties and Political Patronage in Turkish Politics." 
Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies 20: 353-373. 
 , Komsuoglu, A. (2009). "Birimiz Hepimiz, Hepimiz Birimiz İçin mi? Dağınık bir Siyasetin 
Topluma Sunduğu Elde Kalan Tutkal Klientalist Ağlar." Toplum ve Bilim(116). 
  
 
70 For various reactions to just order by different groups of Islamists see Tugal, C. (2002). "Islamism in 
Turkey: beyond instrument and meaning." Economy and Society 31(1): 85-111. 
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organized around communal forms of belonging and solidarity. The main distinction 
from the early Republican years was the dominant ideologies behind social action; 
Islamic ideals replaced the secular and modernist ideals of the early twentieth century. 
Moreover, they seemed to function better than the previous ones as the main 
motivations for philanthropic action. The main reason for their relative success was 
the intra-community trust and solidarity bounds established on the ideals of Islam. As 
asserted by Bugra, “Only in the cultural setting of Islam could justice acquire a 
meaning, a meaning derived from reciprocal obligations of trust, loyalty and solidarity 
that bind the community of believers” (Bugra 2002b: 129). The functionality of these 
reciprocal bounds for the rise and the successful functioning of the religiously 
motivated associations will be a point of discussion in the empirical chapters.  
 
A short process of stagnation 
The period known as the February 28 process forced Welfare Party to resign and the 
party was banned in 1998 for violating the principle of secularism. In addition to the 
party, Islamic foundations and thousands of Qur’an courses were abolished for being 
a threat to the secular state. The report of the military on June 1997 listed 19 
newspapers, 110 magazines, 51 radio stations and 21 television channels engaged in 
Islamist propaganda; and claimed that there are 2,500 associations, 500 foundations, 
more than 1,000 companies, 1,200 student dormitories and over 800 private schools 
that are established and administrated by Islamists.71 The numbers are informative in 
providing an idea about the rise of the religious groups in the social and economic 
spheres of the society. As an outcome of this increasing pressure on them, many 
religious establishments went underground and political Islam went through a major 
transformation in the years to follow.  
The last years of the Welfare Party already marked a shift from religious right of the 
political spectrum to the center right (Yilmaz 2005). Moreover, the Virtue Party, 
which was established as a follow up of the Welfare Party, engaged in a political 
discourse that included the ideals of democracy, the rule of law, and the EU 
accession. Nevertheless, even this shift was not enough to prevent the closure of the 
                                                 
71 Data taken from the briefing of the Turkish General Staff to the media on June 11th 1997.  
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Virtue Party by the Constitutional Court in 2001. This final closure resulted in a split 
in the Islamist movement between the conservative Islamists who founded the Felicity 
Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) and the liberals—or conservative democrats as they define 
themselves—who established the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi-AKP). The development and the success story of the AKP and how they differ 
from the traditional Islamists are issues that have been widely discussed in the 
literature in the last years. The next section, without going into an in-depth analysis of 
these issues, will focus on some crucial changes that have been taking place in the 
political and social arenas of the country since AKP’s coming to power.  
 
Cohabitation of Islam and Neo-liberalism  
The first steps of cohabitation of Islam and neo-liberalism took place in the 1990s, yet 
the real fusion happened during the rule of Justice and Development Party (AKP). 
The main claim of the party during the 2002 election campaigns was that they 
represent a break from the political Islam tradition of the previous Islamic political 
parties. They did not identify themselves as Islamist but as conservative democrats.  
The differences of the AKP from the previous pro-Islamic parties can be interpreted 
as an outcome of the learning process political Islam has gone through in the electoral 
democracy of Turkey in the last half century. This historical process seems to have 
transformed this branch of the Islamists to a more liberal, modernist, and Western-
oriented group. The electoral success story of the AKP, in addition to many structural 
reasons, should also be understood in relation with their ability to speak to a large 
section of voters including former center-right, moderate Islamists, moderate 
nationalists, and even a section of former center left, and forming a “notion of politics 
that is based on compromise and reconciliation in place of a politics based on 
conflict” (Ozbudun 2006: 549). This shift in the approach towards groups of different 
political and social backgrounds has been a crucial reason for achievement in the 
early years of AKP government. 
Circumstantial factors such as the political and economic instability of the country in 
the period before the 2002 elections and the economic crises of 2001 and 2002, which 
increased poverty and insecurity in the society, were some of the main reasons for the 
 122
AKP’s victory as a newly established party. Nevertheless, these issues were also first 
tests the party had to pass successfully in order to gain further support of the 
populace. Avoiding taking action in the social security and assistance areas would 
have been suicidal for the future success of the government. Reforms in the social 
policy environment of the country kicked off under these conditions, which were 
marked by the cohabitation of Islam and neo-liberal policies. Scholars point to a 
strong conservative-liberal tendency in the current social policy environment in 
Turkey, whereby Islamic notions of charity successfully complement attempts at 
downsizing the state through strict controls over social spending (Bugra and Keyder 
2006: 226). According to them, Islamic elements in the ideological orientation of the 
AKP have been very useful in motivating and mobilizing civil initiatives, such as 
NGOs who appeal to norms and institutions of Islamic solidarity through which they 
generate private donations, towards providing social assistance (ibid. 224). Whether 
there is a direct influence of the party in power on the increasing number of RMAs in 
the social policy arena is debatable. Nevertheless, the increasing presence of them in 
the social policy realm, by making use of the already existing networks established in 
the last decades, is an observable fact.  
Compared to the main emphasis of the previous Islamists on the area of politics, the 
AKP claimed that they put more emphasis on the social and civil society spheres. As 
they argued, their interpretation of secularism highlights the separation of politics and 
religion and protection of religious rights in the private and public realms. 
Nevertheless, the highly contested issues of the period such as the transformation of 
the public sphere along the Islamic lines, compulsory religious courses in the schools, 
existence of a state institution such as Presidency of Religious Affairs and Qur’an 
courses supported by this institution, the increasing number of wives of politicians 
with the headscarf, are all indicators proving that it is not easy to make this distinction 
between politics, and social and civil society spheres. The failure of the AKP 
government to find a solution for the headscarf issue and for the problems of the 
Alevi population are clear indicators demonstrating that it is not really possible to 
draw a strict line between what is called “protecting the religious rights” and 
“separation of religion and politics”. As already put forward, the specific trajectory of 
secularization in Turkey left religion as a contested phenomenon at the center of the 
political field and the AKP government has been in a unique position to exploit this 
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potential. Therefore, the protection of religious rights in the civil and private sphere 
cannot be discussed without paying attention to their implications in the political 
arena. The functioning of RMAs, which will be the focus of attention in the coming 
chapters, is also a clear prove of the blurred boundaries between these areas.  
Tugal’s emphasis on both society and state transforming attempt of Islamism in 
Turkey is crucial to understand at this point (Tugal 2009). As he claims, the 
transformation Turkey has been undergoing in the last decades, especially under the 
AKP government, is a “passive revolution” which consists of a partial Islamization 
that is parallel to a deeper neo-liberalization and capitalization. The reason why it has 
been easier for the Islamists to achieve this transformation in the socio-economics of 
the country for Tugal is their success in transforming everyday life of the people 
simultaneous to their success in governing and provision (Tugal 2006; Tugal 2009; 
Tugal 2009). Therefore, the rise of Islamic civil society should be analyzed as only 
one part of the ongoing process of change Turkey has been going through.  
 
Transformation of Sufi Islam  
The transformation of Sufi Islam is the last crucial mechanism of change one has to 
get a grasp of for a better understanding of how religion became a cleavage line in 
Turkish politics and how this has been reflected in the area of social provision. As 
already mentioned in the historical chapter on the Ottoman Empire, Sufi Islam has 
been one of the major forms of how religion has existed in the society. Sufi Islam can 
be defined as a total of the Islamic brotherhoods and tarikats, which have been more 
peripheral ways of practicing Islam following the goals of Sufi tradition. In the time 
frame in which strict secularization of the country excluded religion from the political 
and public spheres, Sufi orders have been the main niches for the survival of religion.  
As generally mentioned in the interviews I have conducted with the Islamists, the 
socio-economic changes in the country also influenced the traditions and institutions 
of Sufi Islam. Increasing urbanization, individualization and globalization changed 
how Islamists interpret the world and also religion. As demonstrated in the quotation 
below, these transformations facilitated the spreading of the Islamic codes of conduct 
to the public and political spheres. As one of my respondents put quite openly, 
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Muslims’ perception of the economics and politics changed in the period after the 
1990s: 
There was activity before the 1990s, but it was in traditional forms of brotherhoods-
cemaat or tarikats. Muslims went through a transformation since the 1980s and 1990s. 
They started perceiving the world in a different way. The traditional structures in which 
we did not question the authority and obedience to the seyh (sufi master) do not exist 
anymore. The need to institutionalize increased after the 1980s. We—as Muslims—
need to organize in bigger circles. Before, the image of a good Muslim was one who 
goes from home to mosque, and from mosque to home, who does not take part in any 
kind of trade or economic activities. That was the mentality for a long time. Now, have 
a look around you, the number of holdings, foundations, organizations owned by pious 
Muslims increased remarkably. I believe that Muslims opened their eyes. Before, the 
idea was to leave the economic and political arenas to other people. But now it is not 
like that. It would not be even possible for you to come here and talk to us before 
1980s. People would have thought that it is not allowed for a man and woman to sit in 
the same room and talk. But now it is possible if we have an open door.  
Here, an old aged respondent, who has been part of the same Sufi order for a period of 
over twenty years, explains the transformations he has witnessed in the last decade. 
As an insider, he points out how both the mentalities of Islamists towards capitalism, 
and politics changed in the last decades, and values such as individualization and 
democracy are on the rise in the religious communities. By also mentioning that it 
would be impossible for me to interview them before the 1980s, he made sure that the 
amount of change and “modernization” they have been through was clear to me. 
Nevertheless he also included the condition that the door should be open, which can 
be interpreted as an emphasis on the particularity of their own values and morals in 
comparison to the Western ones. I believe this quote is highly representative of the 
transformations of the Sufi Islam and the current stage of many Islamic groups in 
constructing and deconstructing both the tradition and modernity in their way of 
creating a mode of conduct. Moreover, the quote also points to the changes in the 
political sphere of the country, which made the involvement of these groups in the 
social, political and economic fields of action much more welcoming.  
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6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter undertook an analysis of the path Islam followed in the Turkish politics 
from marginalization in the early Republican years to becoming a mainstream 
cleavage line in the post-1980s. The main aim was to show how the increasing 
relevance of religion in politics and the formal representation of it through the rise of 
pro-Islamic political parties triggered change in the social policy sphere, which 
resulted in the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in welfare provision.  
The historical analysis demonstrated that the specific secularization history of the 
Turkish state resulted in the formation of a welfare state that excluded religious forms 
of provision. I claim that the lack of a coherent authority representing religion, and the 
strict reforms established not only to separate religion and state but also to achieve 
complete regulation of religion by the state resulted in the removal of religion from 
the formal social policy arena. Yet, although religion vanished both from the political 
and the welfare arena for a period of time, this did not necessarily mean total 
disappearance of religious groups. They went underground, they become invisible but 
their activities have always continued. This also served to feed the multiplicity in the 
area of religion. Peripheral forms of religion survived in different communities 
without a central authority resulted in the heterogeneity in the religious field72. The 
only central authority, which produced Turkish State’s interpretation of Islam, has 
been Diyanet, yet social provision has never been one of its area of activities.  
As Manow and Kersbergen claim, the criteria for a cleavage line to be determinant for 
welfare state type is its politicization or partization (Manow and Van Kersbergen 
2009), yet neither of this was the case in Turkey in the period before the 1970s. Apart 
from some minor attempts, religion has remained as a contested phenomenon, neither 
totally separate nor totally free from the influences of the state. This picture changed 
in the last decades with the rise of pro-Islamic political parties. The post 1980s period 
has been stage to the utilization of social provision as one of the most important and 
successful ways of political back building by the newly rising pro-Islamic parties. 
Following the developments in the political sphere, social policy began to be 
characterized with a dominant note of Islam. Religiously motivated welfare 
                                                 
72 The reflections of this heterogeneity and multiplicity in the area of religion on RMAs will be the 
main focus of Chapter 8.  
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associations, due to their sensitivity towards poor and needy and their attachment to 
Islam, became the main representatives of the Islamic and conservative parties in the 
public realm. Therefore, the increasing power of the parties has been going hand in 
hand with the proliferation of the religiously motivated welfare associations in the 
social policy arena. 
In comparison to the minor levels of change in the European countries, change in the 
social policy sphere of Turkey is defined as a major one, due to the proliferation of 
the RMAs in the last decades. As this chapter demonstrated the determining factor of 
this change has been the shift in the area of state-religion relations. The two chapters 
in Part II have proven that in comparison to Turkey the struggles between religion and 
state in the social provision arena have been settled much earlier in the European 
countries under analysis. The settlements were an outcome of different trajectories in 
each of the cases: In Germany we have seen the solution of the state-church conflict 
by systematic integration of the two churches in the welfare system. In France, the 
settlement meant the complete exclusion of religious institutions from the provision 
arena. In Sweden, church remained as a part of state power until the peaceful division 
in 2000. Finally, Britain has always been the example of a state church tolerating 
diversity. As the study of these European cases manifest, the presence of 
church/churches as institutional representatives of religion has been a crucial 
determining factor in the establishment of a balance between state and religion. In the 
case of Turkey, however, both the lack of an institution similar to church, and the 
impossibility of establishing a political party that will represent religious motivations 
in the period before the 1970s and the hardship of keeping it in the system in the 
period after, postponed this settlement of the relations between state and religion.  
The fact that a balance in state-religion relations has already been established in 
Europe by the end of nineteenth, early twentieth century does not mean that there 
have been no transformations in this area in the last decades. As argued in Part II, the 
increasing ethnic and religious diversity is one of the main reasons of change in the 
well-institutionalized religion-state relations in Europe. The established structures 
which either gave monopolistic power to the single state churches (as in the cases of 
Sweden and Britain) or that prioritize the main faith groups (as it is in the case of 
Germany) are getting under serious revision in the last decades. Re-structuring of the 
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welfare systems in order to give more material and discursive support to the new faith 
groups seems to be a necessity for the peaceful integration of these populations into 
the existing systems.  
In conclusion, when the cases of Turkey and the other European countries are 
compared it is possible to see that the restructuring is happening at a much more 
central arena of state-religion relations in Turkey, whereas at a more peripheral arena 
in the European cases.  
… 
 
The next main part focuses on a study of these organizations at the micro-level. The 
findings of the empirical research will be presented in order to demonstrate the inner 
structures, functioning and the motivations of these organizations to get a better 
understanding of the possible changes they bring to the area of welfare provision. 
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7. Religiously Motivated Welfare Associations in Turkey 
 
The rise of religion as a main cleavage in the political sphere, and the increasing 
demand in the area of social provision have been defined as the main reasons for the 
proliferation of religiously motivated welfare provision in Turkey. This third part, 
building upon the findings of the previous ones, takes the analysis to a meso level and 
focuses on a comprehensive study of twenty-six RMAs in Turkey, as the main focus 
of empirical research. Questions such as: “How big is the population of RMAs? What 
kind of activities do they undertake? Are they a homogenous group?” If not, what 
kind of differences defines the demarcations in the population?” have been the main 
ones guiding this research. These chapters (seven and eight) will provide answers to 
these questions through the detailed presentation of the outcomes of the field research 
undertaken. The results that will be discussed in this empirical part of the study are 
the outcomes of two rounds of interviews undertaken in Turkey in the time period in 
between January 2008 and May 2009. Ethnographies from the field will be included 
in addition to the systemic analysis of the in-depth interviews conducted with the 
associations, to provide the reader with a more comprehensive picture of the arena.  
The last decades in Turkey have been stage to an increase in the interest on the actions 
and the motivations of RMAs, as “new” welfare providers. The fact that the biggest 
associations have been started as television programs increased their visibility in the 
public arena. Media coverage of the associations slowly increased in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Especially the names of the biggest three—Deniz Feneri, IHH and 
Kimse Yok mu73—started to be frequently mentioned in the media. Yet, whether the 
population is limited to a couple of big associations that are active at the national and 
international scales, or it is possible to talk about an increasing presence of RMAs at 
the local level was an open question at the time when I decided to undertake research 
in this arena. In order to offer a preliminary answer to this question and inform the 
reader about the details of the field research undertaken, this chapter will start with an 
exploration of the social policy universe in Turkey, which will be followed by 
discussion of sampling, and access to the field. On overview of the main areas of 
                                                 
73 Further analysis of these three associations is included in Chapter 8. 
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activity and organizational characteristics of the associations will be under focus in 
the last section.   
 
7.1. Exploring the Universe of Social Provision and RMAs 
Post-1990s saw the increasing presence of civil society associations with religious 
connections in the public sphere. Yet, none of these associations are registered as 
religiously motivated or faith based in Turkey, as it is the case in most of the 
European countries and the United States. For that reason, it is not easy to define the 
universe of them. None of the questions such as “How many RMAs are active in the 
welfare sphere of Turkey? Are they concentrated in some cities? Are they more a 
rural or an urban phenomenon? How big are their budgets and how big is their share 
in the total welfare expenditure of the country?” are easy to answer. Therefore, the 
lack of factual information has been the main problem for me as I was trying to get a 
grasp of the universe and to decide on a proper sampling method.  
An exploratory field trip was the first step I took in order to overcome these problems 
and to find preliminary answers to some of my questions. During this first field trip I 
have conducted interviews with scholars (conducting research on poverty, social 
policy, and welfare state), state officers (in state institutions of social policy planning 
and implementation), and mayors and vice mayors in municipalities of the biggest 
cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Bursa. This first round of interviews I have conducted 
in early 2008 helped me to do a mapping of the social policy arena in Turkey and to 
position the RMAs in this preliminary map. The interviews also made clear that there 
is an increasing awareness on the growing presence of civil society associations in the 
social policy sphere.  
Social scientists I have interviewed without any exception, called attention to a new 
trend in the area of welfare provision in the post-1990s, and especially in the last 
decade. As they define, this new trend has been mainly marked by the increasing 
presence of a multiplicity of actors other than the central state institutions in the social 
welfare arena. Civil society associations, political parties, and municipalities are the 
actors and institutions that are mentioned the most in the new social provision sphere. 
A second trend that is frequently mentioned in addition to the multiplicity of the 
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actors is the dominance of a discourse on benevolence and charity in the area of 
provision. This is not a totally new phenomenon, yet it has become a much more 
dominant one due to the increasing presence of non-state actors in the social provision 
field. The conservative and religious background of the ruling political party has also 
been marked as one of the main reasons for the increasing emphasis on charity. The 
scholars I have interviewed were quite critical about the rise of RMAs in the social 
policy sphere. Some interpreted this as an outcome of lack of social citizenship rights 
and the creation of a culture of dependency. Some others drew similarities between 
the activities of these RMAs and Islamic Welfare Activism in countries such as 
Egypt, Algeria, Palestine and Lebanon.  
The second group of interviews was undertaken in local and central welfare 
administration institutions. I have visited State Planning Organization, which is not a 
social policy institution as such but is responsible for planning the economical and the 
social priorities in policy making by using instruments like Development Plans. Prime 
Ministry General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity, which is the main 
institution responsible for social assistance that is the administrative body of around 
nine hundred local vakıfs that are active in the provinces and the districts. Republic of 
Turkey Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is the main and the only state 
institution of religion that represents Islam. The aim in all of these visits was to get an 
idea about whether or not these main state institutions are aware of the increasing 
numbers of RMAs in the social policy arena, and if yes how they perceive this 
development. The state officers I have talked to were positive about the increasing 
presence of civil society associations in the welfare arena, yet they also always made 
sure to mention that this is not an area that can totally be left to voluntary action. It 
was interesting to see that all of the interview partners, while referring to the 
increasing presence of civil society organizations in welfare provision, avoided any 
reference to religion, religiosity or Islam. Yet, whenever I asked for examples, the 
names dropped were the ones I have included under the title of RMAs. Moreover, 
even my slightest touch upon any issue related to religious motivations in social 
provision, was taken with great caution. In most cases when I expressed I am 
interested in the contemporary developments in how religion and social policy 
interact, I got odd looks and instant comments stating that Turkey is a secular state. In 
order to make my point clear, I had to start my questions with an introductory phrase 
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on the historical roots of religion and welfare relations. I referred to the examples in 
Europe—such as historical presence of the Churches in the area and the contemporary 
interactions between state institutions and faith-based organizations in many 
countries. Following my positive presentation and “normalization” of religious 
motivations in the area of provision some of my interview partners in the state 
institutions openly put forward that religiosity is the main incentive guiding the 
actions of these civil society associations.  
In the interviews I have conducted with the Republic of Turkey Presidency of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet), I was looking for any possible influence from above 
which may be supportive of the activities of the newly rising RMAs. Diyanet is the 
only institution that may be comparable to the State Churches in Europe, due to its 
function as the main religious body of the state. The interviews I have conducted with 
the administrators in the social affairs department, made clear that the institution do 
not have connections to the private RMAs. The administrators emphasized that Islam 
is a religion that puts major emphasis on assistance to the poor and social solidarity. 
Nevertheless, the institution of Religious Affairs does not have any direct 
responsibility in this area and do not have any influence on any form of welfare 
provision. The only indirect action they take is to include topics related to poverty and 
social solidarity in the Friday sermons of the imams, in order to raise public 
awareness.  
I was also interested to learn about any social provision role that is played by the 
mosques therefore I also visited the Vice Müfti of Bursa and talked to some imams 
there. When I asked them about social assistance and aid provided by the mosques 
they said that although people who are searching for help sometimes approach them, 
they generally cannot respond to these calls, due to lack of financial resources. They 
said that the community of a mosque might (at some very exceptional and rare 
occurrences) organize some kind of help, in case someone from the community has an 
emergency situation. Nevertheless, this would never take the form of an organized 
and continuous welfare support. The müftis and imams I have interviewed 
emphasized that unlike churches in Christianity; mosques do not have any charity 
roles in Islam. As a last step, I have visited Turkish Religious Foundation which is a 
semi-civil, semi-governmental institution. This institution was both mentioned by 
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imams and the Diyanet administrators as the only one having some form of social 
provision function. Nevertheless, the director general of the foundation specified 
many times during the interview, that the Foundation is not a social aid association. 
As far as he explained, the actions they undertake in the filed are minor, such as 
distributing some scholarships to students, helping some poor families temporarily, 
and distributing some aid in religious festivals.  
The last group of informants I have contacted was municipal governors. Local 
administrators at the municipal level are the main agency most of the RMAs interact 
while planning their actions at the local level. Therefore, before starting my 
interviews with the RMAs I wanted to get a general overview of what municipal 
administrators think about the current situation in the social provision arena. In order 
to get an idea about both sides of the political spectrum, I have visited both 
municipalities governed by the ruling part (Justice and Development Party/ AKP) and 
the ones that are governed by the main opposition party (The Republican People’s 
Party/ CHP). My main questions in my visits were about how they see the increasing 
presence of civil society associations in social provision arena, and whether they have 
partnership projects with any associations. There was a clear divide between the 
responses of the municipal administrators representing the two parties. Although I did 
not provide the respondents with names of any civil society associations, the 
municipal administrators of the CHP automatically started talking about the largest 
RMAs such as Deniz Feneri Social Solidarity Association74. They claimed that 
Islamic parties such as AKP always used social provision as a tool to get votes. They 
claimed that there are direct connections between most of these associations and 
ruling party. In their words, they (as social democrats) never saw social policy as a 
form of charity. For them social policy is an outcome of social rights of the citizens, 
and consequently it is dangerous to leave this field completely to the local 
governments or civil actors. In both of the interviews I had with the municipalities in 
which Republican People’s Party is in power, there were mainly two points the 
interviewees put emphasis on. The first was the danger of usage of social aid in 
serving clientalism, and the second was the increasing role religion plays in the arena 
as a result of the Islamic references of the AKP government. When I asked in what 
                                                 
74 A comprehensive study of the history and connections of this RMA will be undertaken in the next 
chapter.  
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way religion plays a role in the area, the answer was clear: since AKP is an Islamic 
Party, and the municipalities in which its in power are distributing aid without any 
clear criteria, the people who are veiled or going to mosque have a better access to the 
aid distributed by them.  
The municipal administrators where the AKP is in power pointed out the increasing 
levels of poverty and the benevolent nature of Turkish people as the main reasons for 
increasing role of civil society associations in social policy. Different than the 
municipals in the other group, they were careful not to mention any names. It was 
only after I asked for the names of the largest associations in the social provision 
arena that the municipals provided me with names such as Deniz Feneri and Kimse 
Yok mu. When I asked them how they see the roles of these associations in the area, 
answers I got were very positive and supportive of the rise. They made references to 
the achievements of these associations in the last years and the support of their 
government to the associations with legal changes in tax and association laws. As one 
of the vice-majors told me, the area of social provision cannot be left to the action of 
the central state. The support from civil society associations is crucial, and their role 
as the municipal administrators is to encourage partnerships between local level 
welfare administration and the associations.  
Following this brief exploration of the state institutions, I decided to contact the 
RMAs whose names have been frequently mentioned by the state actors and 
academics as the most active associations in the social policy sphere. These were 
Deniz Feneri Dernegi (Light House Association), IHH (The Foundation for Human 
Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief), Kimse Yok mu Association, and 
Cansuyu Social Aid Association. These four RMAs are well known in the public 
sphere through their television programs, and/or their affiliation with pro-Islamic 
parties or religious brotherhoods. The foundation dates of these most influential 
associations (1998, 1992, 2003, and 2005) prove that civil society associations 
undertaking religiously motivated provision is a recent phenomenon in Turkey. 
During these exploratory interviews my aim was to get a grasp of the human and 
financial resources of these associations, the activities they undertake and their 
perception towards poverty and their specific role in fighting poverty. Religious 
affiliations of the associations were noticeable during these exploratory interviews 
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undertaken. In my interviews in three out of four associations the members of 
administrative boards were open to put forward that religious beliefs are important 
motive for their actions. During the interviews the administrators referred to religious 
responsibilities such as zekat, to Prophet Muhammad’s sayings about solidarity and 
helping coreligionists. Another clue that indicated the religious characteristics of the 
associations was the fact that the work scope of these associations is not limited to 
Turkey. All of them are active in other Muslim countries and in countries where 
Muslim minorities live, and the peak times of their activities both in Turkey and in the 
other countries are the two religious festivals (Ramazan and Kurban). The 
administrators also made references to the activities of their branches in other cities, 
and/or the local associations they are working together with. In either of the cases this 
was a signifier of many more associations at the local level. In this first contact with 
the associations, the scale of activities and the human and financial resources they 
have access to surprised me. Information I gathered in these four interviews clarified 
that what is visible to the general public is only the tip of the iceberg. Although the 
visibility of the RMAs in the public sphere is limited to three or four organizations, 
the first interviews I have conducted with these associations in three cities made it 
clear that it is possible to talk about a mushrooming of them in the last five to ten 
years. 
Nearly all of the interviewees (welfare state administrators in the central state 
institutions, municipal governors, and administrators of the RMAs) mentioned legal 
changes as a crucial reason for the increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy 
sphere. Therefore, before going into a discussion of sampling and data analysis, I 
would like to briefly mention the shifts in the legal structure in the last decades. 
Associational laws have undergone series of transformations of liberalization and 
restriction following the ups and downs of democracy in Turkey. The 1961 Law of 
associations was a relatively libertarian one, granting the citizens with the basic rights 
to form associations without many restrictions. However, the introduction of the new 
law following the 1980 coup d’etat repudiated an important proportion of citizen 
freedom in forming associations. The introduced law was prohibitive and restrictive 
both for the formation and the functioning of the non-governmental associations. The 
articles of the law were open to interpretation, which opened up a space for practical 
problems and case-to-case subjective decisions. To give an example, the law stated 
 136
that associations that function against the protection of social morale, public peace or 
national security were prohibited. The inclusion of such a highly contestable criteria 
into the law made the functioning of the associations extremely difficult. Although 
minor changes been undertaken in the following years, the issue of civil associations 
continued to remain in the public security arena and the associations were to report 
their actions to the police and the main state institution responsible for controlling 
their activities was the police.  
European Union accession process, which gained acceleration after the 1990s, had 
stimulating effect for the rise of civil society. National Programs designed to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria included legal revisions on the issues of individual rights and 
freedoms, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of association, and 
enlargement of the space of civil society in Turkey.75 It is in such an environment that 
the rise of religiously motivated civil society organizations was possible. The major 
changes in the field came with the introduction of new law of associations in 2004. A 
subdivision titled the Department of Associations has been established under the 
Ministry of Interior, to supervise the establishment and working of civil society 
organizations in 2003 with its 81 local offices. This recent change in the law has been 
referred to as a very positive development by all of my interviewees. The respondents 
mentioned that the Turkish state finally stopped seeing civil associations as potential 
terrorist organizations, and this change in the mentality and perception towards the 
associations made their functioning easier. Some of the main revisions in the law are 
listed below: 
• Associations are no longer required to obtain prior authorization for foreign 
funding, partnerships or activities. 
• Associations are no longer required to inform local government officials of the 
day/time/location of general assembly meetings and no longer required 
to invite a government official to conduct or to supervise general 
assembly meetings. 
• Officials conducting audits must provide 24-hour advance notice and just 
cause in the case of random audits. 
• NGOs are permitted to open representative offices for federations and 
confederations internationally. 
                                                 
75 For further analysis of EU influence see Keyman, E. F. and A. Icduygu (2003). "Globalization, Civil 
Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses." Citizenship Studies 7(2): 219-
234. 
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• Security forces are no longer allowed on the premises of an association 
without a court order. 
• Internal audit standards (i.e. within associations) have been increased to ensure 
accountability of members and management. 
• Associations will be able to form temporary platforms/initiatives to pursue 
common objectives. 
• Government agencies and departments will be able to fund up to 50% of joint 
projects with associations. 
• Associations will be allowed to buy and sell necessary immovable assets 
without prior authorization. (Bikmen 2005)   
 
One more change in the legal order that deserves attention in this context is the 
introduction of food bank system in income tax legislation in 2004. With the 
adaptation in the tax legislation, it is now possible for companies to donate their 
products to civil society organizations and deduct the amount of donations from their 
income taxes. The minor revision of the law in 2005 extended the coverage of the 
food banking to clothing, home cleaning materials, and fuel, which in turn increased 
the amount of donations RMAs get from different business.  
The exploratory research conducted with experts from academia, the central and local 
state institutions of welfare provisioning, and the main religious institutions provided 
insight on this poorly researched area. The information collected has proven that a 
similar phenomenon to FBOs in Europe is present in the case of Turkey too. 
Moreover, it demonstrated that unlike in Europe the associations in Turkey do not 
have any connections to institutionalized religion. Finally, it disclosed that the 
associations in Turkey are not registered under a specific category such as FBOs or 
RMAs. Sampling and data collection strategies have been decided under the light of 
this information. 
 
7.2. Sampling and Data Collection 
The main aim of the empirical research undertaken in Turkey was to get a better 
understanding of the phenomenon of RMAs. Due to lack of previous literature on 
these associations, I aimed to present the variety that is present in the field. The 
purpose of the sample was not being statistically representative, since the universe of 
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the organizations is not known. Instead, the main intention was to talk to as many 
associations as possible in order to understand their position in the overall social 
provision arena; their relations to public welfare providers; their religious, political 
and ideological motivations behind social provision; and their connections to different 
power structures such as political parties or Islamic movements. Having these aims, 
the characteristics of the cases were more important than the quantity of the sample.  
Sampling is done at two levels to meet the aims of this study. The first level was 
deciding on the cities, and the second one was deciding on the associations. My focus 
on three cities was due the difficulty of access to these types of associations. I 
preferred to undertake research in big cities (population over one million) in order to 
have access to a bigger universe of RMAs, out of which I can sample from. In 
addition to being big, I preferred cities in which I have some personal connections 
that can be used to get access to the associations. The first city I have been to was 
Bursa, an industrialized metropolitan center in the Marmara Region. The city is the 
fourth largest city in Turkey with a population around two million76. The second city I 
have been to was Istanbul which is the biggest city in Turkey with a population of 
nearly thirteen million77. The third city was Konya, which is generally labeled as the 
most religious and conservative city in Turkey, with a population around one 
million78. 
The second level of sampling has been undertaken in order to decide on which RMAs 
to contact. The first step I took at this level was to ask the city councils for the list of 
civil society associations active in social solidarity and social provision areas. Yet, the 
lists presented to me included thousands of organizations from every kind of activity 
area. Therefore, the first problem was to find out which of these associations can be 
included under the title of RMAs. The main resource I used for making this decision 
was the internet and the information I gathered from other associations. After creating 
a list, I have gone through their web pages to see whether they do explicit or implicit 
references to Islam, God, Prophet Muhammad, or other divine issues. These first steps 
made it possible to make a preliminary decision on whether an association can be 
considered as a RMA or not. The second concern after creating these lists was how to 
                                                 
76 1,854,634 in the address based population survey conducted in 2009.  
77 12,782,960 in the address based population survey conducted in 2009. 
78 1,003,373 in the address based population survey conducted in 2009. 
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approach them, and how to arrange interviews with them. Civil society associations 
having any affinity with religion or any form of religiosity have always been reluctant 
to talk about their activities, moreover, after the huge corruption scandal of an RMA 
in 200779; it became even harder to reach these groups. The organizations were quite 
doubtful towards my interview requests when I first contacted them. I phoned them 
and asked for appointments by stating that I am a PhD student conducting research in 
the area. I had to talk to the administrators on the phone and introduce myself to them 
and tell them about my research project. In most of the cases I could not get an 
appointment during my first call, I was either asked to talk to someone else in the 
association or the respondent asked me to call again in a day. Often, I managed to set 
an appointment after the second phone call. There were also exceptional cases in 
which they kept postponing me for weeks, or politely refused the interview request. In 
some cases I benefited from personal connections such as family members and 
friends, to reach the associations. Once I got access to a couple of RMAs in a city, I 
continued with snowball sampling. By the end of each interview I have conducted 
with an RMA, I asked them about the other associations working in similar areas. I 
did not specify that I am looking for religiously motivated ones; nevertheless the 
names provided anyways belong to RMAs. This was a further proof of the increasing 
dominance of RMAs in the social provision arena.  
The independent criteria used for the designation of the title “religiously motivated” 
can be summarized under three main categories: religious neutrality of the dominant 
discourse in the organization; religious neutrality of the workplace; and religious 
neutrality of the people active in the organization. The first category—religious 
neutrality of the shared discourse in the association—includes criteria such as whether 
the name of the RMA include terms with religious connotations; whether the 
administrators and volunteers interviewed referred to religious issues while talking 
about the aims, motivations and activities of the organization; and whether they 
mentioned God, Prophet and/or religious duties. The name of the association usually 
gives an idea about whether it is religiously motivated or not. Direct references to 
otherworldly aims, and religious duties—such as infak, hayir, sadaka, zekat, sevap—
have also been important criteria. Absence of these references is not necessarily 
interpreted as a proof that an association is not religiously motivated since people 
                                                 
79 Further discussion of this corruption scandal is discussed in the next chapter.  
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active in these organizations most of the time deliberately avoided presenting their 
religious motivations. In these cases, the second and the third categories, which are 
mostly dependant on observation, were more useful to categorize the association 
under study.  
The second category of variables used is related to religious neutrality in the work 
place. In this category the focus was on whether there is a clear separation between 
the worldly and otherworldly issues in the organization. Participant observation was 
the main method in deciding on the religiosity level of the organization by looking 
into whether regular prayers were practiced in the office or not, whether one has to 
take their shoes off while entering the office or not80, and whether there are religious 
symbols hang on the walls, or prayer books present in the office. There have been 
cases in which my interview partners asked for my excuse and were practicing their 
daily prayers in the office while I was waiting for them to start the interview. I was 
asked to take my shoes off while entering the office of some of the associations. 
Religious books, and symbols were visible in the offices of the majority of the 
associations interviewed. I assert that these three criteria are clearly representing the 
lack of a separation between the activities that are undertaken by the RMAs (such as 
provision of social services) and pursuit of religious practices.  
The third category of variables that has been paid attention was about visible 
religiosity of the administrators and volunteers in the organization. Whether the 
interview partner and the other members of the association that are met in the office 
wear religious symbols such as a headscarf, çarşaf, beard; whether the interviewer 
followed the Islamic rules of conduct between a man and woman—such as avoiding 
eye or body contact—were the criteria used for this category.  
The main data collection method was semi-structured, open-ended interviews. The 
interviews were conducted either with high-level administrators, or experienced 
volunteers. The length of the interviews was one to two hours, in which three main 
groups of questions were addressed to each respondent81. The first group of questions 
was related to the history of the RMA. Founding date of the association, professional 
                                                 
80 Taking off the shoes is a practice for the Muslims for entering a praying place, since cleanness of the 
room that is used for player is a must.  
81 The interview guide can be found in Appendix III. 
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and educational backgrounds of the founders, their main motivations while founding 
the organization were the main questions asked in this part. The second part focused 
on the organizational details of the associations. The number of employees and 
volunteers, the number of branches, main sources of funding, main bodies of decision 
making, scope of action was the topics of this part. The final part concentrated on the 
connections of the associations to the other state institutions, civil society 
organizations, municipalities, political parties and media. Apart from some 
exceptional cases in which the respondents did not want me to use a recording 
machine, the interviews have been recorded. 
In addition to in-depth interview, which was the main data collection method, 
observations in the field was the supplementary method used. Field notes taken during 
the interviews facilitated a much more comprehensive understanding of the 
associations. Information such as the interior design of the offices, the outfit of 
administrators and volunteers in the associations, the dominant code of conduct 
between men and women were paid special attention during the interviews. Therefore, 
the main data set consisted of the transcription of the interviews and observation notes 
from the field. All the information has been collected in Turkish and I have translated 
the direct quotations used in the text. 
 
7.3. Overview of the Sample of RMAs82 
The RMAs that have been under inquiry share a common area of activities, which can 
be defined under the labels of social assistance and welfare provision. Increasing the 
well-being of recipients is the main aim of all of the associations included in the 
sample of the study83. The first group of activity that is universal in the sample is the 
provision of basic supplies such as food, clothing and fuel. These provisions aim to 
meet existential needs of the recipients who are situated under the poverty or extreme 
poverty line. In the majority of the associations, provision in these areas are 
undertaken on a regular basis (either once a month or once in every three months) 
                                                 
82 A complete overview of the organizational characteristics of the  twenty-one RMAs (excluding the 
Alevi and umbrella associations) can be found in appendix IV.  
83 The differences within the sample of RMAs will be the main discussion point in Chapter 8.  
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since they constitute the main survival mechanism for the recipient groups such as 
unemployed, single mothers, sick, disabled and old.  
The second most commonly referred area of activity is education; RMAs pay special 
attention to the issues of formal, cultural, moral and religious education of their target 
populations. In nearly half of the associations I have interviewed, special emphasis is 
put on the issue of “not only feeding the stomach but also feeding the intellect of the 
recipients”. In some cases this means organizing seminars and meetings to educate 
people in certain issues, like the importance of family and its functions, Turkish and 
Islamic culture. In others, it means providing scholarships for the successful kids of 
poor families, and/or provision of free accommodation for students in the dormitories 
of the associations. The main aims in providing education are increasing the 
awareness of recipients about worldly and otherworldly matters, and assist their 
development as responsible citizens and Muslims. These investments are expected to 
increase the beneficiaries’ chances of survival in the existing order in the long run. An 
additional effort that can be included under the title of education is the long-term 
development projects (such as agriculture or animal husbandry) that have been 
introduced in some special communities. The main motivation behind these projects is 
to “teach fishing instead of giving fish”84.  
The third area consists of temporary relief provision in cases of emergency or extreme 
need. These are activities such as paying the electricity and water bills of the families, 
covering travel or health expenses of the applicants, providing support for the couples 
who want to get married. In addition to these activities in Turkey, all of the national 
RMAs and also some of the local ones conduct international projects in countries like 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Niger, and Peru. The main motivations 
are defined as helping those most in need; building ties with the people of these 
countries and helping our co-believers. The main areas of activities in the 
international arena are distributing food in Ramadan, and meat in festival of sacrifice-
Kurban, opening water wells and doing medical surgeries. International aid to the 
African and Middle Eastern countries constitutes an important part of activities for 
                                                 
84 This motto—of making individuals responsible for their future—has always been part of both state 
and civil society discourse in Turkey, in the discussions of social provision.  
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some of the organizations, and their share in the budgets of many RMAs seems to 
have increased in the last years. In this research the activities undertaken in the other 
countries will only briefly be touched upon, since the main focus is on the national 
activities of RMAs. Further research on the issue of international relief by the RMAs 
seems necessary but cannot be achieved within the realm of this project. 
The last area of activities, which is less common than the ones in the first three 
groups, are the orphan projects and sister family projects. In one third of the sample, 
there are special projects for continuous support of needy families and orphan 
children. The programs include coupling of two families (one well-off and one needy) 
or one family and an orphan. The main aim of the projects is not only to meet the 
needs of the family and/or the orphan but also to establish connections that are more 
than material. Sister family and orphan projects are implemented both in Turkey in 
some other countries in Africa, and the Middle East. 
 
Organizational style and scale  
The associations included in the sample represented a great variety in terms of 
organizational scale, as can be seen from the table below. Both the associations that 
are active at the local level with a couple of employees and volunteers and the ones 
active in more than hundred countries are included in the sample. The common 
characteristics of welfare provision and religious motivations were the two criteria 
that resulted in the inclusion of these associations under the same title.  
Table 7.4.1. Organizational scale of RMAs 
 Budget Activity 
scale 
Number of 
branches in 
Turkey 
Number of 
employees 
and 
volunteers 
Number of 
recipients in 
Turkey 
(families) 
Biggest 
RMA 
100 
million 
USD 
112 
countries  
48 100 e. 
10.000 v. 
30.000 
Smallest 
RMA 
2.000 
USD 
A single 
city 
1 2 e. 
7 v. 
100 
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The final sample consisted of twenty-six associations: seven of them active at the 
national level with representative offices or branches in a minimum of ten cities, 
whereas the other nineteen are active at the city or town level. 
Although most of the associations were cautious about providing numbers to me, the 
stated budgets varied between 2.000 USD and 100.000.000 USD, average being 
around 9.000.000 USD. The average budget of the local associations that are only 
active in a single town or city is 1.500.000 USD. While interpreting the scale of the 
organizations it has to be kept in mind that most of these organizations are active only 
at the local level. The total budget of the thirteen associations, which disclosed their 
budget to me, equals to an average of 66.000.000 USD (excluding international aid). 
These numbers compared to the budget of the largest state institution for social 
assistance (SYDGM)85 in Turkey prove that the share of the RMAs in the total social 
assistance arena is not small at all.  
The analysis made clear that decentralized organization and the emphasis on localities 
are the two important characteristics of the organizational structures of the RMAs. 
The organizational structures of the national RMAs are not centralized; the local 
bodies are responsible for management, and fund raising. The idea behind, as 
explained in similar wording by most of the interviewees, is having strong 
connections with the roots of the community. Since private donations are the only 
source of finances for the RMAs, their connections with the community are essential. 
As they claim, the central office can never have a better knowledge of neither the poor 
nor the rich in a city or neighborhood. Therefore, the only aim of the central offices is 
to provide the local ones with the necessary know-how. After the orientation period, 
the new association is left to function with its own resources that are mainly raised 
from the locality. In most of the cases, the main ties that exist between the center and 
the local offices are the shared values and motivations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 The total expenses of the SYDGM in year 2009 equals to an average of 395.000.000 USD (see 
http://www.sydgm.gov.tr/upload/mce/birimler/strateji/2009_faaliyet.pdf) 
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Human Resources 
The administrator and volunteer compositions of the associations are also quite 
diverse. All of my informants were men in between 40 and 65 years of age. Nearly 
half of them can be labeled as middle-class professionals, whereas the other half are 
retired merchants, politicians or people of religion. Out of all occupations represented 
in different associations, medium size merchants and businessman are by far the 
greatest majority.  
The main skeleton of the associations (founders and the administrative body) consists 
of people that are connected to each other through informal connections such as being 
part of the same tarikat (Sufi order), cemaat (religious community), or local 
community. The foundations of the associations are generally based on these 
“mechanical forms of solidarity” no matter whether they have hundreds of employees 
and thousands of volunteers or just a couple of them. Even if the organizations are 
huge, employing hundreds of people and having thousands of volunteers, personal 
connections and informal ties that existed prior to the establishment of the RMA still 
constitute their basis. As it has been communicated in many interviews, without 
having a stable basis of strong ties in these informal networks, the associations do not 
have a great chance to expand86.  
These ties on the community level result from shared social and political interests of 
the members of the community, or in other words from shared motivations about life 
and afterlife. It is not easy to see whether individuals in these networks prioritize one 
form of interest (such as economic, political or social) over another while deciding to 
take part in volunteering work. Yet, it is possible to observe that interconnectedness 
of different forms of interests is the main resource that keeps the associations running. 
There may be a couple of different reasons for a volunteer to take part in social 
provision work. One reason can be their faith in religion, or their belief in the benefits 
of charity. A second reason can be their interest to establish or keep social relations, 
which may bring many benefits in the long run. A third interest can be more political, 
such as contributing to the Islamization of society or the political system. 
Nevertheless, it is important that none of these lines of interests takes a shape to 
                                                 
86 An in-depth discussion on the functioning of different RMAs will be focused in the next chapter. 
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disturb community bounds, since mutual relationships built around these relationships 
are the main resources that bind people together in these associations.  
All of the RMAs, apart from one or two exceptions, work on the principle of 
volunteering. The number of volunteers varies from tens to thousands, depending on 
the size of the association. The main tasks of fund raising, public relations, and 
interaction with the needy are the kinds of tasks volunteers carry out. Volunteers are 
seen as the backbones of the organizations. There are a couple of paid employees in 
each RMA, but the majority is volunteers. My findings show that volunteers that are 
active in the field are mostly women, whereas the administrators of the organizations 
are mostly men. The administrators I have interviewed think that women are more 
successful in interacting with the recipients and fulfilling their needs, whereas men 
are more successful in fund raising, organizing budget issues and formal 
arrangements. So it would not be inaccurate to argue that there is a gender division of 
labor present in most of the RMAs.  
 
Funding 
Donations are the main and only resources of these associations. Local RMAs are 
generally dependent on personal and neighborhood connections, whereas the national 
scale organizations use all kinds of media (such as television shows, advertisements in 
the radios and newspapers) to increase donations. 
One of the common ways of fund raising for the local RMAs is to visit merchants and 
businessman and inform them about the aims and functions of the RMA. These forms 
of primary ties are vital especially in the early stages of establishment by facilitating 
enlargement of financial resources. The fact that the founders of most of these 
organizations are or had been businessmen themselves makes the establishment of 
these ties easier. These visits are the most successful way of getting access to 
sustainable resources at the local level. Following the same logic, the priority in the 
distribution of services and assistance is also given to the localities, so that the 
successful functioning of the associations at the local level can be made public. In 
some RMAs, special emphasis is put on bringing together the donators and the 
receiver of benefits. This is believed to maximize satisfaction for both sides. When 
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the provider witness the vulnerability of the receivers, their self-evaluation of their 
contribution increases, which in turn result in further attachment to the RMA and 
continuation of regular donation. 
Most of the largest associations that are active at the national level started as 
television programs in channels owned by big business groups that have close 
connections to some political parties and cemaats87. The television programs share a 
similar format: they visit some poor families, expose the conditions under which these 
people try to make a living and ask the audience for donations. In addition to the 
audience, philanthropist people from the locality and the local governorship and 
municipalities are also asked to assist the family. At the end of the programs audience 
always sees a happy family picture, content with the assistance they got and thanking 
the contributors and God. It is impossible to miss the constant effort to give religious 
messages to the public in these programs. The way the spokespersons dress up, the 
way men and women approach each other, the discourse in use all seem to be 
exemplary from an Islamic point of view. The language used includes ample 
references to Quran, to the Prophet and God. Both the reasons and the solutions to 
poverty are explained in relation to the will and power of God. The RMAs are 
presented as the delegates that transfer God’s allowance to the poor. Poverty and 
hunger are defined as ways of examination for the human beings–aclikla imtihan—in 
the Islamic belief. The main message transferred is if human beings manage to 
survive in these times as well behaved Muslims—without rebelling (isyan) and 
without committing any religiously prohibited action such as stealing, or 
prostitution—God will reward them. This is a commonly shared discourse in the 
television shows. On the other hand, the viewers are warned that wealthy Muslims are 
examined through their possessions: rich people ought to share their belongings with 
the poor and the needy. Only by sharing their wealth with the people around them, 
can they live the life of a content Muslim. Therefore, the main motivation of the 
associations is to make this transfer possible between the giving and the receiving 
hands, to help both parties to be successful in the religious examinations they are 
going through. When this is done publicly in the television programs, it plays an 
                                                 
87 Further discussion of connections between religious communities, television shows and RMAs will 
be a point of discussion in the next chapter.  
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important educational role for the audience, by reminding them about their religious 
duties and results in increasing donations. 
Currently out of twenty-six RMAs interviewed, nine of them have weekly television 
shows and radio programs to support the activities of their association, and more than 
half of them have advertisements in the TV channels, radios and newspapers. Media 
connections, by increasing the visibility of the associations, increase support for the 
activities they are undertaking. The television and radio shows do not only make it 
possible for the associations to publicize their activities, but also include 
advertisements of the business holdings’ and companies’ that support them 
financially.  
 
Means testing, decision-making and practices of provision 
Definitions of the associations on who is eligible for social provision vary. Some 
organizations have a strict policy of helping only the people who are under the 
extreme poverty line. Some others are more flexible about their target audience. 
However, one issue that came up in all interviews is the necessity that people should 
be first and foremost responsible to earn their own livings. None of the RMAs have an 
interest in supporting people who are able to work; beggars are not perceived 
positively.  
The application process the needy should go through to be eligible for assistance is 
more or less the same in all RMAs. At first, the prospective recipient should compose 
a file of documents showing that s/he qualifies to apply for assistance. An official 
document of poverty from the lowest municipal governor of the neighborhood is a 
must to apply for help in any of these organizations. In addition, one should document 
demographic information like age, income, disabilities, home ownership, and 
employment status. When this first file of information is provided to the organization, 
volunteers or employees go through it and make the first selection. If one qualifies for 
the second round, then one or two employees or volunteers from the association make 
a visit to the neighborhood of the applicant to complete what they call the “social 
investigation form”. In order to fill this form, the volunteers talk to the grocery store, 
butcher, municipal representatives and neighbors in the district and check if the 
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information provided by the applicant is correct. Only after making the final visit to 
the applicants’ residence and meeting the family and seeing the household does the 
responsible person from the RMA fill out the social investigation form. The decision 
to provide is generally made by the employees at the administrative levels of the 
association after an examination of the form.  
This procedure, although claimed to be objective by most of the RMAs, have some 
problems inherent to it. First of all, the decision-making practices lack 
professionalism. As already mentioned in the previous parts, the employee and the 
volunteer structures of the associations are composed of merchants, retired tradesman 
and housewives, so neither the people who undertake the social assessment, nor the 
ones making the final decision have any social work expertise. As it has been 
communicated in most of the interviews, personal judgments and experience are the 
main sources of decision-making. The second problem is the lack of objective criteria 
and transparency. Every association has different levels of flexibility while 
conducting their application processes. The rules and regulations of application 
processes are more closely followed in the larger organizations working at the 
national level, whereas the role of personal judgments is ruling in the local ones. 
Some respondents put it openly that there is always the likelihood that a decision is 
biased: 
We do not discriminate against any belief, religion or political affinity. We do not 
decide on whom to help by looking at their eye color. It is possible that when I enter a 
house I do not like how people behave, how they sit and stand but this will at most 
have an influence of ten percent on my decision. Although we are trying to base our 
system on objective criteria, you know we are also human beings, we may also make 
mistakes.  
Although the respondent is stating that they do not discriminate, the absence of any 
kind of expertise system opens room for subjective decisions. 
Once a decision is made to help a family, the provision is regular in most of the cases. 
Either it is once a month or once in three months. How the delivery of supply is 
organized also varies from one organization to the other. In some exceptional cases 
the associations follow clear-cut principles of religious or traditional motives of 
giving in the Turkish culture. For example “the giving hand and the receiving hand 
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should not know about each other” or the service should be delivered “as if the giving 
party owes the recipient”. As one of my respondents claimed, “Sometimes these visits 
are much more important then the package delivered. These people value the fact that 
someone rings their bell and cares about how they are more than the material help that 
is delivered.” In general, volunteers of the association are the ones to deliver the 
packages to the households. This delivery is more than a material exchange, 
volunteers most of the time frame this as a “visit” to the recipient family. The 
members of the RMA ask if everything is fine in the recipient families’ life, if they 
have any problems or if they need anything. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind 
that these visits may also be used as important mechanisms of control. The quote 
below gives some idea: 
Regular visits are made to the households of the recipients to update information about 
their situation, to see whether there is any change in the household, to see whether they 
still need help or not and to see whether the given supplies are used properly. 
Matters such as lack of criteria about what is proper or not, and lack of expertise in 
the area of provision hints at the subjectivity of the processes undertaken. The means 
testing process is generally open to stigmatization of the poor and increasing social 
control on their daily lives. How far these controls can go, and what their effects on 
the recipients may be, are crucial questions that need to be analyzed by further 
research. 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to give an insight of the field research conducted by presenting the 
sampling and the data collection techniques and giving a first overview of the 
findings. As discussed in the first part, the scarcity of the existing literature and the 
lack of formal information on these associations have been the decisive factors in the 
preference of the sampling and the data collection methods.  
The preliminary findings gathered from the interviews with social science scholars, 
administrators in the state institutions of social provision and central and local level 
religious authorities, made clear that there is an increasing presence of RMAs in the 
 151
social welfare arena in Turkey. The interviews in the state institutions clarified that 
authorities are aware of the rise and the activities about the associations and are not 
critical about them as long as they are in line with the legal structure. The interviews 
with the religious representatives such as imams, muftis and administrators in Diyanet 
were informative in demonstrating that mosques or any other state institution of 
religion is not included under the title or RMAs. 
The activity areas of the RMAs indicate a clear difference of the Turkish case from 
the European ones. As the analysis demonstrated the target populations of the RMAs 
in Turkey are citizens under poverty or extreme poverty line, who are not covered by 
any forms of state provision such as social security or social assistance. Unlike in 
Turkey, faith-based organizations in the European cases fill specific niches in the area 
of social provision. They are mainly active in areas where community tailored 
provision is preferred rather than general provision in order to help solve the problems 
of the multicultural societies such as social cohesion and integration. The outsourcing 
of social provision activities by the states to faith-based organizations is another 
common practice in some of the European cases. Nevertheless, even under these 
conditions, beneficiaries are provided with alternative sources of provision, which 
protect them from being fully dependent on provision by FBOs. In the case of Turkey, 
the lack of adequate state support frames the nature of the relationships between the 
recipients and the associations. The organizational analysis of the RMAs 
demonstrates the amount of diversity in the sample. The budgets, activity scales, 
employee and volunteer compositions of the RMAs diverge to a great extend. An in-
depth analysis of the variance in the sample and the reasons behind this variance will 
be the main focus of next chapter.  
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8. Religion, Politics and Social Welfare Revisited 
 
The fact that Turkey is a country with 99% Muslim population creates the myth of 
homogeneity in the religious arena. The increasing number of studies on the rise of 
political Islam in the last decade supports the misinterpretation of a single Islamic 
movement. Yet, the findings of the empirical research made clear that RMAs in 
Turkey do not compose a coherent group; they differ in many respects such as their 
relations to central and local state institutions, political and ideological standpoints, 
the level of religiosity involved in them, and their main motivations of action being 
the most important ones.  
This chapter will focus on the classification of the associations at multiple levels, 
detailed explanations of the history of some of the largest ones and in-depth 
discussion of observations from the field. First of all, I will introduce the main divide 
in the sample, which is the one between “new” and “vintage”88 RMAs. This first level 
of classification will focus on the foundation dates and the histories of the 
associations interviewed. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that this 
classification, which is introduced with the aim of a better understanding of the field, 
will not present homogenous groups either. As the next sections will demonstrate 
within group differences characterizes both of the groups and the multiple subgroups 
that will be presented. A closer look at different sub-groups of associations and a 
more detailed analysis of single RMAs will provide us with a comprehensive 
understanding of the divides in the universe of RMAs and the historical as well as the 
political reasons behind these divides. An analysis of the existing differences in the 
ideological and political stand points of the associations will shed light on the 
interconnectedness and the blurred boundaries between religion, politics and social 
welfare provision.  
 
 
 
                                                 
88 The term vintage association was inspired by the discussions we had with Prof. Ayse Bugra.  
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8.1. Major divide: New and Vintage RMAs 
The analysis of the associations interviewed made clear that the main dividing line in 
the sample is between what I labeled as the new and the vintage associations. This 
distinction is based on the foundation stories of the associations, which includes 
characteristics such as date of foundation, main aims of founders and main activity 
areas at the time of establishment. It is not very easy to set strict dividing lines in any 
of these areas. Yet, it is still possible to see the common trends that divide the two 
groups, as can be seen in the table below. I explain this variety in the table in relation 
to the transformation of state-religion relations in Turkey. The associations, which are 
defined as the new RMAs, are established in the last decade, in which religion became 
the main cleavage in the political sphere of the country. Vintage associations, on the 
other hand, are the ones that have been established at the earlier stages of the rise of 
Islam. Therefore, they have been transformed and reshaped through ups and downs of 
state-religion relations. The main defining characteristics of the two groups can be 
seen in the table below: 
Table 8.1. New and Vintage RMAs 
 New RMAs Vintage RMAs 
Activity scale National and international Mainly local 
Activity areas Limited to social provision Broader than social provision 
Foundation dates Late 1990s, early 2000s Earlier than 1990s 
Secularization High Low 
Professionalization High Low 
Formulation of 
motivations 
Humanitarian Islamic 
Administrative 
backgrounds 
University graduates, 
young professionals 
People with formal or 
informal religious education 
Funding sources International campaigns, 
TV programs, 
advertisements 
Personal and local 
community connections 
 
New RMAs are the associations that are established in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
whereas the vintage ones have a longer history. The foundation dates of the 
associations, which corresponded to different eras of state-religion relations, defined 
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their main motivations and the characteristics. It is possible to say that both groups 
have been important organizing forces for the rise of political Islam. Yet, they had 
different strategies to achieve this aim. Social provision was not a crucial part of 
Islamist movement in the period before the 1990s; the possible political benefits of 
social welfare provision have been discovered only in the mid-1990s. Therefore, the 
vintage associations and foundations that have been established with different 
motivations such as Qur’an courses, teaching Islamic ways of living or supporting the 
international Islamic movement began to put more emphasis on provision activities in 
the period after the mid 1990s and early 2000s. Most of the vintage associations have 
been involved in activities for Islamization of the society and the political system. 
Some of them have been through times of political pressure; they have been 
prohibited or closed down for periods. Yet, similar to the history of pro-Islamic 
political parties, following every closure, they re-opened with new names.  
How the RMAs in these two groups perceive state and, their position in the social 
provision arena vis-a-vie the state are to important defining characteristics. The new 
RMAs see state institutions as possible partners, and define their role in the social 
provision arena as supporting the state. Unlike the new RMAs, the vintage ones see 
state institutions as control mechanisms, and define their actions in the provision 
arena either totally free of state action (outcome of religious aims) or as fixing the 
failures of state (such as failing to institutionalize zekat). I interpret these two clearly 
defined positions of the new and vintage RMAs as a reflection of the shifts in the 
state-religion relations. Whether the associations were established in a time period in 
which the political environment was welcoming or not has been an important defining 
factor in shaping state-RMA relations. Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasize that the 
picture presented here is a quite dynamic one. Since the relations between state and 
religion is still not a settled one in the case of Turkey, it is possible to see the 
reflections of any change at the macro level on the identities and characteristics of the 
associations. Therefore, dynamism is the main characteristic both defining the state-
religion relations at the macro level, and the relations between state institutions and 
RMAs at the meso level.  
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8.1.1. New RMAs 
After a long bus trip to the outer skirts of Istanbul, I arrive to the headquarters of one 
of the largest religiously motivated welfare associations in Turkey. I have read a lot 
and heard a lot about this association before; I have attended to a conference they 
organized on poverty, watched their television programs, and seen their 
advertisements. Yet, this will be my first interview with them. After getting off the bus 
and walking in the middle of nowhere for some five minutes, there it is, the big 
signboard of the association. The closer I get, the bigger it looks and I realize that I 
am not walking towards a single office or building, but towards a big complex 
consisting of a bunch of storage and administrative buildings in a garden (about 3000 
to 3500 m2)  that is separated from the street with walls and fences on them. When I 
arrive at the gate of the headquarters, I realize that the entrance is possible only 
going through private security. The guard in the small security cabin asks me why I 
am there and if I have an appointment and then asks for my ID. So I give him my ID 
and he gives me a visitor’s card. My first impression is “wow, this is much bigger and 
professional than I have imagined”. After checking my ID, the guard takes me 
through the gate and accompanies me to the building where I will have the interview 
with the PR manager of the association. Here a young lady, who has  increased my 
feeling of “wow” with her appearance, welcomes me. She is unveiled, with dyed 
blonde hair and heavy make-up.  Frankly, she is not the type of woman I would expect 
to be welcomed by in a religiously motivated association. Trying to hide my surprise, 
I ask for the PR manager and finally I am in his office.  
The office is big and furnished with stylish, new furniture. There are no visible 
religious symbols or books in the room. The interview partner, who looks like a 
westernized professional dressed in a suit and tie, with a clean-shaved face, welcomes 
me with a handshake and takes me to smaller room where we can sit together around 
a table. I start asking general questions about the aims, motivations, foundation story 
of the association, and yet he does not look like he is into talking. He answers nearly 
all of my questions by saying he can give me documents about it, or that I can read 
about it in the web-page. Not an easy start, but I am trying to find a way out to make 
him talk about the motivations of the employees and the missions of the association. I 
am asking about the backgrounds of the people at the administrative positions, he 
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says it is a mixture but many of them are highly educated, as he is. The language he 
uses is totally free of any religious references. Even a slight touch to any religious 
motivation or belief is not present in his talk. He insistently puts emphasis on the 
humanitarian motivations as the main missions of the association. The interview is 
relatively shorter compared to the other interviews I have conducted in RMAs. 
Therefore, I thank him and say I am sure he is very busy and ask him whether I can 
have a walk in the association and talk to some other employees and volunteers. He 
unwillingly agrees and accompanies me to the floor below, to an office where the 
small library of the organization is present and where four employees of the 
association have their desks. After meeting with the woman at the entrance and the 
interview with the PR manager, this is a step behind the façade. The two men in the 
office greets me with a slight head shake, but do not shake my hand, whereas the two 
young women with headscarves stand up and welcome me with warm handshakes. I 
only have the chance to have a short talk with them, which is also not possible to 
record since I am not there to interview them. However, this brief talk and a quick 
look into the library of the association is much more enlightening than the interview 
with the PR manager. The volunteers and employees are interested in talking to me; 
they are quite open about their religious beliefs and tell me how important it is in our 
religion to help other people who are in need. They openly put forward that religious 
motivations play a crucial role for the volunteering activities of the association. The 
library contains many religious books related to poverty, inequality, and helping 
others. After a total of one and a half hours, I leave the association after thanking the 
volunteers and employees. The lady with the short cut dress is not there when I am 
leaving. 
This introduction, composed from my field notes and observations of the visit in the 
headquarters of one of the largest RMAs in Turkey, gives an idea about how a typical 
new RMA looks like. Most of the new RMAs are active at the national and 
international levels, with big budgets and large area of influence. The number of 
associations included in this section is thirteen (half of the whole sample); four of 
them are the biggest ones with nearly total coverage in Turkey and activities in more 
than ten countries around the globe. The other nine are associations that are local 
representatives or branches of these four big RMAs or independent ones that share 
similar missions.  
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The associations included in this group can be labeled as the “kids” born after the last 
turn of political Islam in the last decade. This last turn, as already discussed in the 
historical chapters, brought a more modernist, liberal and western oriented group of 
Islamists (or conservative democrats, as they define themselves) to the power. The 
rise of the new RMAs corresponds to such a time period. Therefore, the traits of the 
associations included in this group, such as relatively high levels of 
professionalization and secularization should be seen as the outcomes of the learning 
process Islamic groups have been going through in the post-1970s period. As the 
introductory observation notes makes clear, work and religious practices seem quite 
separate in these RMAs. There are not many religious symbols present in the offices, 
the administrators and employees do not practice daily prayers in the office, but 
instead go to a mosque.  
The majority of the administrators of the new RMAs are university graduates. They 
explain the establishment of their associations in relation to humanitarian and moral 
motivations. The way they frame their missions is relatively secular than the vintage 
RMAs. They are careful to use a religiously neutral discourse:  
We value human beings. Humanitarianism is the main motivation behind our actions. 
We do not only provide for people, but we also undertake research on the issue of 
poverty. We invest in the scientific and academic field.  We provide people with the 
necessary skills to work and earn their life.  
We are founded with humanitarian aims. What motivated us was the generosity of 
Anatolian people. Turkish people are known to be the most generous people on earth.  
The founders/administrators define their ideal as the wish to become a partial remedy 
for the increasing number of people living in poverty, or as one respondent put it, “to 
be beneficial to the society”. In their responses to the questions related to motivations 
and aims of the organizations, they mainly touched upon issues of personal and social 
responsibility to fight the inequalities and poverty existing in the society.  
If I do not care about this poverty around me, I will lose my humanity. To be 
indifferent to people who need help would have been a weakness of personality. So that 
is why we started this association. Our idea at first was not to form an association, we 
just wanted to help some people around us, but then when both demand and supply 
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increased, we thought maybe it is a good idea to institutionalize what we are doing. 
Therefore we established this association.   
Religious beliefs came to the picture when the administrators started to talk about the 
personal motivations of the volunteers. The interviewees did not avoid making clear 
statements about religiosity involved in the provision practices and the motivations 
behind these practices, especially at a personal level.  
People apply as volunteers by saying that they want to acquire God’s merit. This world 
is temporary; there will be an assessment in the other one. 
Religious motivations have a very important influence. People do not come here to 
increase their economic gains, social status or political power. Some can try it, but they 
would not stay for a long time. People know that this world is a place of examination; 
they know that there will be an assessment of all what we have done in the otherworld. 
They know that they have humanistic and religious responsibilities. If one lives in 
prosperity and do not help the needy around them, this is a big question mark that they 
have to pay for at some point. Our Prophet had said: you earn God’s merit when you 
pet the Orphan’s head. Nothing apart from religion can make someone to go to the 
other end of the world to help others.  
As can be seen from the quotes above although the associations in this group prefer to 
define the main motivations of their associations as humanitarian, when specially 
asked about the volunteer and employee motivations, they do not hide from 
mentioning religiosity as a crucial drive. This moderate level of religiosity present in 
their discourse is also visible in their publications, web pages, and the television and 
radio programs they produce.    
The associations included in this group have quite positive interactions with central 
and local state institutions of social provision and also government. Their answers to 
my questions like how they see their role in the provision arena and whether they are 
open to working with state institutions were quite positive. As I already mentioned in 
the introduction these associations see public welfare offices as possible partners. 
Partnerships between a civil society association and a state institution in local, 
national or international projects are still rare, but there are some examples89. In 
                                                 
89 Such as a project of Cansuyu association with Ministry of Education on distributing free wheelchairs 
to disabled children.  
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addition to partnerships, the most common interaction between welfare administrators 
at the local level and RMAs is information exchange. The public welfare agencies and 
RMAs do their own means testing but they share their lists of beneficiaries at the end 
of the day, in order to prevent double provision.  
The founders of the RMAs in this group conveyed that the state cannot be a remedy 
for all needs in the society. In their perception, civil society associations should also 
play a role in social provision. Therefore, they decided to fulfill what they interpret as 
their responsibilities. As the passages below exemplifies: 
We see what we do as a part of our social responsibility. I believe that is how things 
should work. I am very happy that the number of civil society organizations working in 
this area has been increasing. Of course the state has to provide social provision, but 
civil society organizations also have very important roles.  
State has to be more active in the area of social policy. We see our role as guiding and 
stimulating for the state. We do not dream of overtaking the role of the state in the area 
of welfare. We just want to be a role model for the state activities. Civil society has to 
function as a role model in this area.  
There are some things that you cannot expect the state to achieve; they are not a part of 
state’s responsibility. State has responsibility in the areas of education, health and 
infrastructure; however, it cannot be expected to create solidarity. Creating solidarity 
bounds can only be a function of the civil society organizations like us. In a way what 
we do is complimentary to state activities.  
This positive approach of believing in a necessary cooperation between state and civil 
society in the area of provision is common in the associations in this group.  
A last characteristics of the associations included in this group can be marked as their 
positive interactions with the ruling government. An important indicator of this is the 
status of Association for Public Interest that has been awarded to some of the largest 
RMAs in this group. The title, which can only be decided by the Council of Ministers 
in Turkey, guarantees important rights such as tax exceptions for associations that are 
active at the national level. Two of the new RMAs—Deniz Feneri and Kimse Yok 
mu—achieved this status of Association for Public Interest in 2004 and 2006 
subsequently. The fact that these entitlements were only possible in the Justice and 
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Development Party’s time in office can be seen as an indicator of the positive 
relations between these associations and the government. A second indicator of the 
positive relations between new RMAs and the Justice and Development Party 
government is the discursive support that is given to some associations in the media90.  
As already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, although the associations 
that are included under the title of new RMAs have many characteristics in common, 
it should still be kept in mind that the group in itself is not homogenous. The positions 
of the associations within the constituency of political Islam determine the differences 
that will be presented at the second level of classification. The next section focuses on 
three of the biggest associations in the field, which have yearly budgets over million 
dollars. These grand RMAs that have presence in all parts of Turkey, and in many 
other countries, have a more or less common activity area. Nevertheless, their outlook 
to politics and connections to different power structures (such as different religious 
communities and political parties in Turkey, international Islamic movement) are 
crucial in defining their motivations in the social provision arena. These three 
associations will be analyzed as the ideal types of three different Islamic identities 
present in the field: the first one identified with the rise of a moderate political Islam 
in Turkey (Deniz Feneri) ;  the second one as a more liberally politicized version that 
carries important nationalistic tones (Kimse Yok Mu); and finally the third one which 
represents a more radical version of Islam that defines its identity in relation to the 
International Islamic movement (IHH).  
 
Deniz Feneri Dernegi/ Light House Association 
The history of the association dates back to a television program Sehir ve Ramazan 
(City and Ramadan) started in the religious month of Ramadan in the year 1996. The 
television channel that produced and broadcasted the program was a municipal 
channel in Istanbul at the time when Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the Mayor and the 
Welfare Party was the governing party at the municipal level. Later on this television 
channel has been being privatized and sold to a business group of Islamic capital and 
                                                 
90 For Prime Minister Erdogan’s positive comments on Kimse Yok mu for their activities during the 
religious festivals see the related article in Zaman daily on 22.12.2007). Talks T. Erdogan held after the 
Gaza Flotilla incident in May 2010 was an example of support for IHH.      
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changed its name. The foundation story of the television channel-Kanal 791 is as 
interesting as the foundation of the RMA and gives an idea about the loose boundaries 
between politics, business and civil society. The idea to establish a television channel 
broadcasting according to Islamic standards, which will also support the political 
movement (Milli Gorus), was an idea that appeared in early 1990s92. Many newspaper 
articles (appeared in the years from 2005 to 2008) claimed that this TV channel was 
founded with the money collected from migrant workers in Germany: After the 
decision to establish a TV channel was taken by Necmettin Erbakan and other 
members of Milli Gorus, they started searching for founders/shareholders that will 
support their initiative and most of the needed money had been collected from the 
visits they made to Germany. Supporters of the Milli Gorus movement gathered in the 
mosques and the idea to found a television channel that would broadcast programs 
that were in line with the principles of Islam and would support the Welfare Party 
were explained to them. So, it should be kept in mind that the Deniz Feneri 
Association was an initiative of this first Islamic television channel in Turkey. 
Soon after the program started, it is transformed to a weekly program—called Deniz 
Feneri—of social aid collection and distribution93. As their administrators claim, due 
to the increasing interest and the rise of demand and supply Deniz Feneri Welfare and 
Solidarity Association have been established in 1998. In the years to follow, the 
association grew to be the largest RMA in Turkey. The current organizational 
structure of the association consists of three branches—in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and 
three representative offices—in Thrace, Black Sea Region and Eastern Anatolia. It 
has around 400 professional employees and more than 50.000 volunteers. In addition 
to total coverage of Turkey, the association has also been undertaking activities in 
countries such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Daghestan, 
                                                 
91 See related article in the daily Radikal, 14.10.2005 
92 Rusen Cakir, a journalist who conducted in-depth research on political Islam and Welfare Party, also 
claims that it is interesting that the Welfare Party did not make much investment to media in the period 
before the1990s see Cakir, R. (1994). Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi Refah Partisini Anlamak. Istanbul, 
Metis Yayincilik. 
  
93 The trend television program to association is a quite common story in the establishment of the 
RMAs. The first television programs started in the mid 1990s set an example for further expansion of 
media-RMA relationships. Once the success of the television shows were realized in collecting large 
sums of  money, civil society associations with the same names were established and they have kept up 
expanding since then. 
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Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, Lesotho, Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Moldavia, Mozambique, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, Sudan, 
Slovenia, Tatarstan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. 
The headquarters of the association is in Istanbul. As the administrators of the 
association put forward, this was not a professional effort in the beginning; neither the 
founders nor the volunteers were experienced in what they did. They rented a small 
storage area for the goods collected and started their activities from this base. The big 
earthquake that hit the Marmara Region in 1999 was a time of growth for the 
association; not only their budget, but also their publicity increased owing to the 
social aid activities they undertook in the earthquake region. The institutionalization 
and professionalization continued in the years to come, and the association received 
the ISO 9001 Quality Certificate in 2002. The association has been entitled to the 
Turkish National Assembly Award of Eminent Services and titled as a Leader in 
Social Responsibility in 2005.   
In the interviews I have conducted with the association, I have been informed that the 
association regularly supports 30.000 families every month and in their records they 
have information about 470.000 families in Turkey, meaning nearly 2 million 
individuals. In addition to the headquarters in Istanbul (3300 m2 administrative and 
logistics centre), the association has a major branch in Ankara (5000 m2 area, logistic 
center, a guest house and a modern soup kitchen), and four representative offices94 
that are each responsible from ten to fifteen cities in their region. The coverage area of 
the association and the numbers are informative about the amount of funding it has 
access to.  
Donations are the main and only cash income for the association. In addition to cash, 
they also accept in-kind donations such as food, clothing, furniture, medicine, 
education and cleaning materials. Advertisements broadcasted in television, radio and 
newspapers are the most important tools for increasing donations. As it is 
communicated by the PR manager, the association is very careful about maintaining a 
transparent system. They introduced a barcode system, which makes each and every 
                                                 
94 Aegean Representative Office: 1200 m2 administrative and logistics centre. Thrace Region 
Representative Office: 2500 m2 logistics centre. Eastern Anatolia Representative Office: 3312 m2 
logistics centre. Black Sea Representative Office: 2500 m2 logistics centre.  
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donated good traceable. Moreover, a software program called Help Organization 
Programme is developed by the association in order to gather information about 
incoming donations, donors, volunteers and recipients. This is a central program that 
is available online and can be updated at the national level by any of the branches or 
representative offices. Deniz Feneri Association was the first one introducing these 
technologies to the social provisioning work that are later on taken as an example by 
other large RMAs. 
I only had the chance to visit the headquarters of the association in Istanbul and 
interview the PR responsible and a couple of volunteers. My plan was to revisit the 
association in a couple of months again, but it was not possible due to a corruption 
scandal happened in the coming months. The disappearance of forty-one million euro, 
collected by a Turkish philanthropic association (Deniz Feneri e.V) in Germany, made 
the headlines of the news in all newspapers and television channels in fall 2008. The 
question, whether this association is a branch of the Turkish Deniz Feneri or not, was 
the central discussion in the media. The German association, although not officially a 
branch of the Turkish one, has also been established with the encouragement of Kanal 
7. The suspects in Germany were accused of using the donations collected from the 
Turkish-German population with different aims than charity or philanthropy. An 
amount around twenty million was illegally transferred to some business corporations 
in Turkey. Nevertheless, the interesting situation is not limited to the use of donations 
in an illegal way. The names making the illegal transactions and the corporations that 
the money had been sent to were the real interesting parts of the story for the public in 
Turkey. The head of radio and television supreme council, who is known for his close 
connections to the Justice and Development Party, was one of the founders of the 
business corporation to which the money was sent.  
All three suspects of the trial were convicted of corruption and sentenced to prison by 
the German court in September 2008. In the months following the trial and the 
conviction of corruption, the issue continued to occupy major coverage in the Turkish 
media. The opposition party and some other media groups claimed that money, sent to 
Turkey by the organization in Germany, was mostly used by the political party in 
power (AKP). Following that, Turkish Ministry of Justice inquired the German court 
to send the lawsuit file to Turkey in September 2008. The legal investigation is still 
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ongoing. Yet, all these discussions on the relations between this business corporation, 
the party in political power and the solidarity association has been an extreme 
example of the blurred boundaries between politics, business and philanthropy in 
Turkey. Although the association lost some ground, it is still an important player in 
social provision arena. 
 
Kimse Yok Mu Association 
Kimse Yok Mu is one the three largest social solidarity associations in Turkey which is 
active at the national and international levels. The association defines itself as a 
Turkish non-governmental association that aims to fight poverty and eliminate social 
inequalities and encourage humanitarian aid. They have the mission to play a 
leadership role in aid activities all over the world. They want to be the first association 
to reach people—from all races, religions, nations—in times of natural or man made 
disasters. Currently, Kimse Yok Mu have branches in twenty-eight cities in Turkey, 
and around seventy-five percent of its budget is spent in the country. Social provision 
at the national level was the first area of action, yet it also started to undertake 
activities in other countries with the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004. Humanitarian aid 
campaigns for Palestine-Lebanon, Peru, Bangladesh, Sudan-Darfur, Georgia-Ossetia, 
Myanmar, China, Gaza and Haiti have been organized in the years to follow. 
The foundation story of the association has important similarities to Deniz Feneri. 
Kimse Yok Mu also started as a follow-up of a television program in a TV channel—
Samanyolu—with an Islamic identity. Both the association and the television channel 
are known for their close connection with the Gülen Community95. The television 
program started in the period after the big earthquake in Turkey in August 1999. 
Samanyolu TV96, with the help of the donations from its viewers, started a program 
                                                 
95 An Islamic social movement headed by Fethullah Gülen; a revised and “modernized” version of Nur 
movement which derives from Said Nursi’s teachings. For more information see Esposito, J. L. and M. 
H. Yavuz (2003). Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement. Syracuse, Syracuse 
University Press. 
 , Ebaugh, H. R. (2009). The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of A Civic Movement 
Rooted in Moderate Islam. London, Springer. 
  
96 My interview partner indicates that Samanyolu TV is particular in terms of its organizational style. It 
has many shareholders, who own small shares of the company. As he claims no one is allowed to own 
bigger shares since this is against the mission of the channel to be representative of a population. 
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that calls for help for the survivors of the earthquake. The name of the association, 
which can be translated as “Is there anybody there?” was inspired from the way 
rescue teams were calling while searching for any alive person in the wreckages of the 
buildings. By 2002 a system of organizing help was established under the name of the 
television program, whereas the launching of the NGO as a humanitarian aid 
association happened only in 2004.  
The organizational structure of Kimse Yok Mu is less centralized than Deniz Feneri. 
Branches of the association are organized at the city level and they are responsible for 
raising their own funds. They share the vision and mission of the center and act in 
compliance with the main principles. Once a decision is taken by the association to 
establish a branch in a city, one or two possible candidates are appointed by the 
center. Since the association is organized around an already existing community of 
followers, appointing people for taking over responsibility is not a problem. 
Following the decision on the head of administration and the transfer of know how 
from the center, the branch is expected to function with its human and material 
resources at the local level. In cases of international projects, the branches are 
expected to collect funds and transfer them to the center.  
The growth rate of the association in the last years is impressive. Currently the 
association has branches in 30 cities and only the Istanbul headquarters have access to 
62.000 families with 100.000 volunteers and 110 employers. My interview partner, an 
administrator and volunteer in the headquarters of the association in Istanbul, stated 
that they could not limit or control the rapid growth of the association in the last 
years. As an example, he mentions how the association received 12 million USD 
donations in the two weeks after the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005. The association 
at the time was quite small—they had a two room office in Istanbul. Obviously the 
question I have in mind after this statement of my interview partner is how an 
organization that is one year old can have access to such a large scale of resources. In 
the quote below the respondent explains how their connections to a religious leader 
(Fethullah Gulen) resulted in their extreme popularity in a short time:  
Respondent: When our association was only two rooms, an earthquake happened in a 
country. Then the leader of one of the largest cemaats (religious communities) in 
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Turkey, who is highly respected, made a statement that it is important to help the 
people in this country. In the next month, we received 12 million USD.  
Me: So do you mean that this association has been established by this cemaat whose 
head is this leader?  
Respondent: We can say this association is established with his advice. Whenever he 
briefly mentions that helping our brothers is important, millions are floating into the 
organization. So we cannot control it, we are expanding everyday even if we do not 
want to. Samanyolu television is also an establishment founded by his proposal; Zaman 
daily was also founded with his suggestion. Cihan News Agency is also set up with his 
initiative. But, we do not belong to a single group, we are open to everyone and we 
help everyone. We do not have connections to any political party. 
This quote is an example demonstrating the benefits of the interconnectedness of the 
RMAs to the religious communities and the networks established around them. It is 
possible to see how social and cultural capital that is shared in these communities can 
easily be transferred to economic resources.  
The international activities of the association in different countries are also closely 
connected to the already existing ties of the community. The colleges Türk kolejleri 
that are founded by the supporters of the Gülen community in the last decade in 
different countries have been the helping hand in spreading the activities of the 
association at the international arena. The respondent explains that the foundation 
story of the colleges is quite similar to foundation story of Kimse Yok Mu. In his 
words, after the disestablishment of the Soviet Republic, Fethullah Gülen advised 
people around him to found schools in Middle Asia. In the following years, he 
expanded his advice to cover whole world. This is how Türk Kolejleri were 
established, just like Kimse Yok Mu, just like Samanyolu Tv, Zaman daily and Cihan 
news agency. As my respondent put it, “currently there are more than a thousand of 
these colleges all over the world; they also work like civil society associations, 
although they are not”. As he explains the colleges have been the main guides when 
the association decides to take action in a country. This picture proves that Kimse 
Yokmu is just one branch of the large scale of activities undertaken by this religious 
cemaat, which defines its identity as a protective force against radical Islam.  
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Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) 
The history and foundation story of IHH is quite different from the associations 
analyzed previously. IHH was established in 1992 with the main aim of helping the 
war victims in Bosnia Herzegovina. Supporting the civilians in the war in Chechnya 
in 1995 was their second main activity, where their name started to be heard in the 
public. As the two incidents resulting in the establishment of the association makes 
clear, IHH defines its mission broader than social provision. As they state in their web 
page, they aim to “spread justice and good, and to fight the evil on Earth” by 
protecting values in a changing world. Currently IHH is actively working over one 
hundred ten countries in the world, have around hundred thousand volunteers; and 
their yearly budget is around hundred million dollar97.  
The Islamic characteristic of the foundation is much visible in comparison to the other 
RMAs under study. IHH have been subject to the attention of the Turkish media for 
the first time in 1998. The association was accused of transferring thirty six million 
Turkish liras, collected for helping Muslims in Bosnia, to the Welfare Party98. 
Although the claim was not proved, the disappearance of this large amount of money 
collected for humanitarian aid was in the media as a scandal for a long time; and close 
relations of the association to the Islamist political party was put under light. More 
recently, IHH—as one of the main organizers of humanitarian help to Gaza strip, with 
Free Gaza Movement—came to the center of attention with the Gaza Flotilla raid on 
May 31, 2010. The incident made the connections of the foundation with the 
international Islamist movement more visible. The interview I conducted with a 
member of the administrative board in 2007 gave hints about the broader aims of the 
association in supporting Muslim populations in different parts of the world. The two 
quotes below—the first by an administrator in the headquarters of the association, the 
second by an administrator in a local office—give an idea about the motivations of the 
foundation: 
A new world order is on the rise in the last decades. We first realized this with the war 
in Bosnia. This new world order is creating people who are in need of support. We 
decided that we have to be with these people, we have to support them; not only 
                                                 
97 Numbers are taken from the interviews conducted with the administrator in the Istanbul 
headquarters.  
98 See related article in the daily Radikal, 01.06.2010  
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materially, we also need to make their voice heard, we have to teach them about their 
rights. We have never been an organization who only provides food and clothing to 
needy in order to meet their daily needs. We wanted to learn the reasons behind 
people’s problems; we wanted to have a political standpoint. Mending the wreckages 
others create has never been our only aim. We wanted to fix the sources of the 
problems. We decided that we have to be present in every part of the world where 
Muslims live; we have to be informed about them, take care of them. This is what we 
do in the last decade.  
Not every association services the stomach; servicing the intellect and hearts are 
equally important. These three can be fed by helal (objects or actions that are 
acceptable by Islam) or by haram (objects and actions that are forbidden by Islam). We 
are not only interested in the stomach; we also pay attention to nourish the mind and 
the heart. 
As clear from the quotes, IHH is mainly active in countries with Muslim populations. 
The association did not start as a television program, but uses every kind of media to 
advertise its activities. They have weekly television shows that are broadcasted by 
different national and local television channels. At time of establishment, IHH 
became publicly known as an extension of Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) and its 
leader Necmettin Erbakan. In the following years the association moved to a more 
radical Islamist standpoint and lost its connections to the political party. The 
administrators of Cansuyu99 association, which is also a RMA that is established by 
the Felicity Party, were open in telling the connections of these two associations and 
their political party.  
Cansuyu Administrative: You probably know that we have been established in 
connection with the Felicity Party. IHH was also established by the advice of 
Necmettin Erbakan, but our close connection with them ended at a point. Now we have 
Cansuyu as our welfare association. We also have a television channel. We have a 
program in TV5 channel about social help and solidarity. That is how the idea of 
founding a solidarity association came up. 
                                                 
99 Cansuyu is an RMA that is included in the sample. It was founded in 2005 in Ankara and has offices 
in six major cities in Turkey. The administrative staff of Cansuyu consists of old bureaucrats, mayors 
and activists--many of them from the Saadet Partisi (Virtue Party). A detailed discussion on the 
association is not included due to its smaller scale in comparison to Deniz Feneri and Kimse Yok Mu. 
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Me: How do these connections function? Does someone from the political party 
appoint different people in different cities to establish RMAs?  
Cansuyu Administrative: Not the party, but the higher authorities in the religious 
communities -cemaats- decide who will be the founders of the association in a city. 
Once a person is appointed by the center, and then the assigned person establishes the 
association in that city with the assistance of others, who are also part of this cemaat 
structure. Political party is also part of this whole. You know, we are not the only 
example for this. All of the big solidarity and help associations have been established 
within these cemaats, and most of them also have political party connections.  
Me: Do you think these connections are necessary? What are the benefits of having 
these alliances? 
Cansuyu Administrative: Imagine that some people in a city decide to form an 
association to help the poor. How many people can they reach? When you start as part 
of an already existing structure or political party, then it is much easier to expand. 
Having political connections means having a connection to the whole world. […] 
Another important benefit of these connections is about finding volunteers and working 
with them. Finding committed volunteers is not easy. Not everyone can work as a 
volunteer. One needs a mission. People who are part of these structures (cemaats) work 
for the sake of God and for realizing their mission. This makes things easier. 
Me: What about the connections with the political party? How do they function? 
Cansuyu Administrative: When some needy people come to the political party to ask 
for help, we tell them we have an association distributing social assistance and send 
them to the association. The state cannot achieve everything; we should also fulfill our 
responsibilities. 
This excerpt is exemplary in explaining the underlying structures behind the largest 
RMAs in Turkey. The respondent puts forward that there is a double sided 
relationship between the political party, which is mainly an establishment 
representing a religious community, and the civil society association, which is 
founded to fulfill the needs of the people who come to ask for help from the political 
party. The administrator of the RMA also claims that it is not possible for a civil 
society association to reach a large scale without having connections to some religious 
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community and political parties. Apparently, being part of a big network makes it 
possible for the associations to have access to more resources. 
The organizational structure of IHH is different than Deniz Feneri and Kimse Yok Mu: 
they do not establish branches. As the respondent claimed they are supporting local 
people in different cities to establish associations like IHH. These new associations 
learn from the experiences of IHH, undertake projects such as orphan projects and 
sister family projects, but they are established under different names. I have visited 
two of these local associations in different cities. They told me that they are sister 
associations with IHH.  They raise their own funds and transfer around 50% to 70% 
of their income to IHH for the international projects.  
Orphan Care Programs is an area of action that is kicked in by IHH and followed by 
many other RMAs. Although Turkish state provides accommodation and the 
necessary financial support for the orphans, IHH administrators and volunteers 
emphasize this program as a main area of action. They claim that state support is not 
sufficient to fulfill all needs of a kid. The following quote is an example that shows 
how immaterial forms of support in addition to material are perceived as a must by 
IHH: 
It is important to follow a kid in every respect. The orphans are taken care of in the 
orphanages by the state, but these kids feel lonely. We have a project to take care of 
these kids by our volunteers. The volunteers visit the orphans in the orphanage and they 
invite them to their houses, they make sure that they are being educated about their 
cultural and moral values. It is important that these kids feel themselves as part of a 
structure. It is important that they know that they have a brother supporting them. 
These kids should not feel lonely; they should know that there is a social structure or 
institution that is behind them. Our Prophet (s.a.v) said it: If anyone strokes an orphan's 
head...he will have blessings for every single hair he touches. 
The administrator of the RMA does not seem to agree that belonging to a formal 
structure—a state orphanage—and getting formal education is enough for these kids. 
He also does not think that the moral and the cultural education given in the 
orphanage are sufficient. Therefore, the association volunteers to provide a kid with 
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some informal support mechanisms and a form of belonging that is based on 
traditional, moral, cultural and religious identifications100.  
 
8.1.2. Vintage Associations 
I hardly manage to arrange a meeting after a couple of phone calls and a couple of 
days waiting period. Finally a young voice in the phone tells me that x hoca (master) 
agreed to talk to me. The office of the RMA is inside a big block of offices and shops. 
While going up the stairs, I realize that there are three other social help associations 
in the same block, all with names with open religious connotations. Once I am in front 
of the door, I knock the door and a young man opens it. Careful about not to look at 
me in the eyes, he asks me take off my shoes. Even if he would not, I would have done 
so, since I see at least four or five pairs of shoes in front of the door, and I see he is 
bare foot. I cannot say I feel comfortable entering the office. The single step into the 
office makes clear that I am in an Islamic association. The entrance of the association 
reminds me of entering a mosque, with the carpets covering the floor, the specific 
odor in the air and group of shoes in front of the door. The young guy directly takes 
me to the office where he and my interview partner shares. The office is a very small 
one, consisting of two or three rooms and in the size of not more than sixty square 
meters. My interview partner does not stand up or shake my hand when I enter the 
office. Moreover, he is avoiding eye contact with me. He starts by asking why I am 
there and what I exactly want to know; and while asking these questions he does not 
look at me but the wall just across him. After listening to my explanation about my 
interests, he stands up and says its prayer time so first they need to pray and only 
after that we can start the interview. They (with the younger man) exit the room and 
probably go to the bathroom for ablution, the ritual cleaning of the body before the 
prayer.  To my surprise, they return with bare feet and just lay their prayer rugs in 
front of me, re-put on their socks and practice their prayer in the same room where I 
am sitting. 
                                                 
100 What usually do not even come into question in the study of these forms of belonging—in 
communities of faith or religion—are the possible restrictions it may bring to the freedoms of 
individuals. Especially regarding children, it is not hard to imagine that the restrictions on freedom can 
be even more severe.  
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While waiting for their prayer to end, I have a glance at the room. The room is full of 
religious symbols. Prayers are hanging on the wall. There are religious books on the 
desks and in the bookshelves. Both the administrator and the younger man in the 
room have a similar style of beard and are dressed in baggy trousers. When they 
finish their prayer, both of them put away their prayer rugs, go back to their desks 
and we start our interview. I can feel that my interview partner is quite tense and do 
not really enjoy my presence in the office. At some point when the young guy goes to 
the next room, he asks him to leave the door open, which is a signifier showing that he 
does not want to be alone with an unknown woman in the same room behind closed 
doors. In the first fifteen or twenty minutes of the talk, his answers are quite brief and 
he does not look at me even for a moment. He talks and stairs at the wall against him. 
I am trying to look as supportive and agreeing as possible in order to relax him a 
little bit. I am telling him how it is normal for faith based organizations to be involved 
in social action in Europe and the United States, and giving some examples about the 
current increase of their roles in the welfare arena. The air in the room starts to 
change after my respondent realizes that I am not critical about his remarks and 
really value what he says. I am using every opportunity to show that I am interested in 
hearing more. The interview flows after this point. Now he does not seem 
uncomfortable in looking at me, he does not stare at the wall anymore. There is a 
constant insistence on me to drink more tea, which is in itself enough to show that he 
enjoys the talk and he wants to tell more.  In between the words of explaining about 
their missions, aims and motivations, he is also talking about his beliefs about being a 
good Muslim. Probably to comfort me, he says whether people really believe or not 
cannot always be seen from their outfits. A woman may prefer not to wear the 
headscarf in some period of her life, but if she is a real believer in her heart and 
follows the other rules of religion then she may still be a real Muslim. Towards the 
end of the interview, he gives me a Quran as a present and I politely accept it. It is a 
translation to Turkish by one of the imams in their association.  After getting used to 
my presence and believing in my good will, his approach towards me changes 
completely. Just before I am about to leave the room, he does not forget to mention 
how much Islamists have changed in the last years. He says “it would not be possible 
for you to come here and interview us if it was ten years ago, since we would think 
that it is not acceptable for a man and a woman to sit and talk in the same room if 
they are not relatives, but you see now it is not a problem if the door is open.  
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This is more or less the same picture I witnessed in the associations I have labeled as 
vintage RMAs. Vintage RMAs have a relatively longer history and they are revised 
versions of previously existing institutions; their foundation dates are in the 1970s, 
80s and 90s. Nearly all of the RMAs included under this category are foundations 
(vakifs), which are also civil associations but have some legal differences to 
associations. One important difference that may be important to know is that 
associations work on a membership basis, whereas foundations/vakifs are founded on 
charitable endowments—meaning their main source of funding comes from 
sustainable resources. As the historical chapters demonstrated vakifs have a history 
that dates back to centuries before.  Below are some examples demonstrating how the 
administrators of vintage RMAs interpret transformation of the vakifs institutions 
throughout the Turkish history: 
Turkey has gone through a major transformation after the Turkish War of 
Independence, and some structures like vakifs had disappeared during this 
transformation. Now there is a return to these old structures. For example there are 
some businessmen I know, they ask me saying ‘I have 10.000.000 zekat this year, but I 
do not have time to distribute this’ can you do it for me? They are searching a place 
that they can trust, so they choose one of the associations working in social provision 
area.  
Before 1980s everything was prohibited in this country. People even did not learn 
about their religion. People were afraid of Islam. We all lived through times of 
oppression. The vakifs were afraid of having any assets, thinking that the state can 
confiscate their property at any moment.  
As the quotes hint at, the vintage RMAs were mainly established in order to keep 
alive the practices and teachings of Islam. In the period before the 1980s, most of 
these associations have been organizing places for cemaats (religious communities) 
and tarikats (Sufi orders), some of which have been the main actors behind the rise of 
political Islam. Their initial activities were Qur’an courses, religious education and 
community gatherings such as sohbets101. Nevertheless, they included social 
assistance to their variety of activities in the last years. The military intervention on 
February 28th of 1997 has been an important turning point for most of these 
                                                 
101 Sohbets are “informal meetings where people gather and listened to religiously learned person, pray 
communally and eat snacks” (Tugal 2009: 61). These meetings have also been important recruiting 
grounds for some Islamist groups.  
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associations that were undertaking action with the main aims of Islamization of the 
society and the political system. The more radical ones having aims such as changing 
the political system have been closed down. What I define as the vintage RMAs are 
the associations that redefined their identities and areas of action in the period 
following the February 28th process. Some of the prohibited ones are re-opened with 
different aims; the others that were not closed down just became more aware of the 
possibility of closure and took action to avoid it. The share of social provision in the 
action repertoires of the associations increased after this point. 
A further reason that triggered the inclusion of social provision to the action repertoire 
of the associations was the increasing emphasis of the pro-Islamic political parties on 
social justice. As already discussed in the historical chapters, the Welfare Party has 
been a pioneer in discovering the most efficient ways of how social provision at the 
grass-roots level can be used for political back building. This was an important shift 
in the rise of political Islam. Realizing the impossibility of changing the political 
system in the short-run and digesting the failures of the past, a group of Islamists 
redefined their main aim as the Islamization of the daily life102. Social provision was a 
great instrument for achieving this aim. Many associations took the way Welfare 
Party was organizing social provision as an example for their activities. In a period 
when the political representation chances of the Islamic groups increased, traditional 
communities and vakif structures redefined their areas of action. Instead of focusing 
on the education of their limited number of members in their quite closed 
communities, behind their closed doors, many of them opened up their services to 
larger populations of possible supporters. The associations, which undertook activities 
such as publication of religious books and journals, and offering Quran courses, 
included social provision into their area of activities. Currently, most of the 
associations included in this group fulfill multiple roles such as education in cultural 
and religious matters and social provision.  
Our aim in establishing this association was not social help. Our aim was to educate the 
young people in the neighborhood as responsible Muslims of good character. Young 
people do not know about their identities: You see some young people on the streets; 
you cannot decide whether to categorize them as Muslim, or Christian. They do not 
                                                 
102 For a study on the subject see Tugal, C. (2009). "Transforming everyday life: Islamism and social 
movement theory." Theory and Society 38: 423-458. 
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have an identity. They do not know their history, culture, or values. We are the 
descendants of a great civilization. We have a great history. (…)  
The lack of quality education is the main reason for all problems in the society. The 
families do not educate their kids, religion is not taught, the official education system is 
a wreck anyways (…) so, we thought we should raise young people who know about 
their history, who have higher morality, who know their religion. We want these kinds 
of people to climb up to the upper levels of society. That was our only aim.  
We first started with educational activities; the main aim of the association was to 
educate people in areas of morality, and religion. Even before the legal establishment 
of the association, we were active as a cemaat-religious commnunity. In three years 
time we also started doing activities in the area of infak to help the needy.  
There have been cases in which the respondents defined social provision activities as 
an instrument to educate people. 
If the heads of these people are not filled in addition to their stomachs’, then these 
people will be a burden on our nation, society and Muslims. Consequently, we believe 
that educating people is more important then feeding them. (…) When you help people, 
these people feel that they owe you something in return. We have to make use of this 
feeling and educate them. Some groups in Turkey are very successful in doing this. 
You cannot educate a person that you do not finance materially, but if you give 100TL 
to someone every month then this person will feel obliged to learn from you. Or if you 
support this person today, you can expect that s/he will be a representative, a supporter 
of your association in the future. There are cemaats who make use of these relations 
very wisely: they give one to you today and collects back ten from you in five years 
(bugun bir veriyor, bes yil sonra senden on aliyor). 
The increasing social provision activity is also explained in relation to increasing 
demand: increasing inequalities and social exclusion in the cities. I interpret this as a 
revision of some vakifs that were mainly active in cultural and educational areas in 
order to catch up with the necessities of the contemporary times. I do not claim that 
charitable activities were not a focus area for the vakifs, nevertheless it started to be 
the main area of activity in the period following 2000.  
There is a reality we are facing: everyday, the number of people living below the 
extreme poverty line is increasing. We have to help these people as an outcome of our 
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faith. (…) We are founded with the motivation to help these people. We do this only 
for God’s sake. (…) We’re Muslims. There is a command of God to the Muslim 
societies. God says in your income, there is a portion that belongs to the poor. If 
Muslim people follow this command, I believe there will be nothing called poverty. 
Our duty as an association is to remind people about God’s command. 
As the quote demonstrates, one of the reasons for these associations to step into the 
social provision arena was the increasing poverty in the society. 
The vintage RMAs are mostly active at the local level, their resources are much 
smaller in comparison to the new RMAs. Another important defining characteristic of 
the vintage RMAs is their low level of secularization. To elaborate, the associations in 
this group do not make a necessary separation between practicing religion on the one 
hand, and being active in the area of social provision on the other: Practicing daily 
prayers in the office, taking shoes off while entering the workplace, hanging religious 
symbols on the walls are common practices. In comparison to the new RMAs that 
have been discussed in the previous section, these ones are representing a more 
traditional line of Islamists. This should not necessarily mean that they are more 
fundamentalist when it comes to interpretation of religion, yet they openly put 
forward that that religious principles is at the center of their actions: 
We only work for God’s sake, that is why we have founded this association. I learned 
something from my exhaustive readings of Koran that one does not gain God’s sake 
with praying or fasting. These are the acts of worship one does for himself. The only 
real worshipping for God is to help human beings who are in need. That is why we 
have established this association.  
References to Qur’an and hadis have been crucial in explaining the motivations for 
volunteering. Hadis—the revelations by Muhammad about what he approved or the 
things he said and the things he did— is one of the two main sources of information in 
Islam. Especially while talking about the motivations of volunteers, there were 
numerous citations to Hadis.  
The Prophet said: the first ones to enter Heaven will be the generous people. When our 
people hear about this Hadis, they are motivated to do anything. 
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The most fortunate people are the ones who are help the others, said our Prophet. To 
fulfill this call is the main motivation for many people. 
The Prophet said: You are responsible as much as you have power. That means one 
should be helpful to other people, as long as they have material or physical 
capabilities.” 
The Holy Prophet has said: The man is not from me who sleeps contentedly while his 
neighbors sleep hungry. 
Muhammad gave a promise to us. He said we would live through four different epochs 
after his time. The first was Umayyad Caliphate. The second was Abbasid Caliphate. 
The third is a period of chaos, which is the current period. Finally, the fourth is the one 
in which the prophet is expected to return. So people are getting ready to the fourth one 
by working for God. 
These quotations demonstrate that the sayings of the Prophet or hearings about these 
sayings are important motivating factors for the volunteers in these organizations. 
According to the interview partners, to provide for the poor and the needy is a 
religious duty and the rewards of these services will be presented in the eternal life. In 
comparison to the humanitarian aims of the new RMAs, which are defined closely 
related to making this world a better place to leave, the vintage RMAs are more 
interested in the benefits of their activities in the afterlife103.  
The founders and the staff of the voluntary organizations in this group are mainly 
merchants, theologians, and retired civil servants. In some cases theologians are seen 
as the main source of information for the decisions of who is eligible for help. One of 
my respondents told me that they have both lawyers and theologians in their 
organization, and while the first one is an advisory body for the issues about juridical 
law, the second one is the authority to decide who is entitled to receive help under 
Islamic principles104. The associations in this group believe that the Islamic duty of 
zekat (distribution of alms tax), meaning giving four percent of your income to the 
needy, should be practiced independent of the existence of a welfare state. In their 
belief, in an Islamic state, it should be state’s responsibility to collect and distribute 
                                                 
103 This does not necessary mean that new RMAs do not have motivations related to afterlife, but they 
did not openly talk about them. 
104 It would never have been possible to hear such kind of a statement in one of the newly established, 
professionalized RMAs included in the first group. 
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zekat, as alms tax. They claim that since this rule is not practiced by the Turkish state, 
civil society organizations should assist citizens to fulfill their religious duties. The 
following quote is an example from the interviews:  
We started this association as five small scale tradesmen. You know, there is an 
institution called zekat in Islam. Our aim was to create a pool—from the zekats of five 
of us—from which we can distribute to the poor. In the meantime, however, our friends 
and acquaintances heard about our organization and they offered to give their zekats to 
us. Therefore, we officially established the association in 2001.  
While the new RMAs had a quite positive perception of the state, the vintage ones are 
more critical. An important characteristic of this group is their critical comments 
about the state and how it excluded religion from every realm of society. They 
continuously mention responsibilities the state has failed to meet in area such as 
education (i.e. introduction of eight years compulsory schooling and the lack of 
enough emphasis on religious education) and social provision (i.e. failure to 
institutionalize zekat). In contrast to the complete incorporation of the new RMAs to 
the political system, vintage RMAs—although gone through crucial transformation in 
the last years—still include some traces of Islamist opposition against the existing 
system. In relation to their dissatisfaction with the current system, the administrators 
and the volunteers in this group are nostalgic about the Prophet Mohammed’s time 
and/or the Ottoman Empire period. Creation of myths around stories such as the 
generosity of people in the Ottoman Period and in the times of the Prophet is a way to 
indicate that philanthropy has always been part of the Turkish and the Muslim 
traditions. As I listened to numerous times in different interviews, at the time of 
Prophet, there were no poor people in the society, so Muslims sent their zekats to 
other countries and sometimes even to Christian ones. A second commonly told story 
is about the sadaka stones at the time of Ottoman Empire. During this period, the 
wealthy would leave money to these sadaka stones and the poor would go and get 
only as much as they need, so that the other people who are also in need can benefit 
from the money left.  
In addition to being critical, the associations in this group interpret their function as 
totally independent of the welfare functions of the state. In comparison to the new 
RMAs, vintage RMAs do not prefer to have much interaction with the state. The 
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respondents were quite negative while talking about possible relations with state 
agencies.  
We do not see the kind of work we do as state responsibility. This is our duty. There 
are things that are promised to us by God and Prophet. There are rules we have to obey, 
like sadaka and zekat. That is how we started. Then, in time, we realized that we are 
doing the kind of work that the state has to do.  
Social help/assistance is something about morality. Moral responsibilities do not have 
legal principles. Then, nothing can reinforce these activities better than religious 
sentiments. Religious sentiments are hereditary. Religious rules tell us what is right and 
what is wrong. What we are supposed to do and what we are not supposed to do. 
Wherever you go, this does not change. Think about a city whether in Europe or in 
Turkey. What is in the center? Church or the Mosque. Then, if something is in the 
center, you cannot behave as if it is not there. That is exactly what has been done in 
Turkey for years. In the west the states accept religion and religious organizations as 
legitimate actors. In Turkey, you are only acceptable if you do everything behind a 
secular display. If you do social assistance with religious motivations you are named as 
fundamentalist and/or reactionary. The state expects from me not to have any religious 
motivations. This is impossible not to have any religious motivation and still take part 
in these kind activities. One needs a spiritual source to get his inspiration from.  
 
In their perception, the only kind of interaction state agencies have with the RMAs is 
controlling them. General attitude of this group can be summarized by the statement 
of one of the respondents: “we are glad if they just stand away and do not interfere 
with what we do”. Some RMAs that are reorganizations of previously banned 
associations by the state are especially negative towards the idea of working together 
with the state institutions. As the excerpt below demonstrates, the associations do not 
see a common ground on which partnerships or projects may develop between 
voluntary organizations and the state: “Civil servants who work in state offices of 
social provision do not perceive civil society organizations in a positive way. They try 
to classify us as belonging to this or that fundamentalist or reactionary group.” The 
wording used about belonging to this or that group refers to the Islamic groups or 
tarikats. Although the fragmented structure of social provision is seen as one of the 
crucial problems of the field by all actors and institutions, the RMAs in this group 
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argue that “the organization of social provision through a central body that is shared 
by the state and voluntary actors is not possible”. This ruling mentality that draws 
main lines of separation between the state and the voluntary services does not seem to 
disappear in a short period.  
The picture is somehow different when the relations with local municipalities and 
local welfare administrators are taken into consideration. Especially in cases where 
the governors of the city, mayors of different municipalities and also the civil servants 
in the social assistance offices are supporters of the same political parties, the 
relations between these institutions are quite positive. As one of my respondents 
openly declared “currently, the local municipality lets us use the conference rooms in 
the municipality for free, but if the municipality would not have been represented by 
party x—which is an Islamic one—then they would not let us use it”. One other 
reason I have discovered for positive relations between RMAs and local authorities 
was personal connections.  
 
8.2. Alevi Associations 
A study of religiously motivated associations without going into a brief discussion on 
Alevi groups105 would have been missing. Alevis is the second major religious group 
after Sunnis in Turkey. Their share is estimated to be 10-15 percent of the Turkish 
population106. Assimilative policies of the Ottoman Republic and the Turkish state 
resulted in a long-term absence, invisibility, or silence of this group in the public 
sphere. Nevertheless, a revival/re-politicization/rewaking of Alevilik has been the 
case in the period starting in the 1980s and speeding up in the 1990s107. Increasing 
                                                 
105 I talk about Alevi groups since it would be misleading to talk about a single group of Alevis. It is 
possible to talk about different groups of Alevis with regard to their interpretation of Alevilik, political 
orientation or distance to Sunni Islam. See Bilici, F. (1998). The Function of alevi-Bektashi Theology 
in Modern Turkey. Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. S. E. Olsson, E. 
Özdalga and C. Raudvere. Istanbul, Swedish Research Institute. 
 , Olsson, S. E., E. Özdalga, et al. (1998). Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social 
Perspectives. Istanbul, Swedish Research Institute. 
  
106 See Camuroglu, R. (1998). Alevi Revivalism in Turkey. Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and 
Social Perspectives. S. E. Olsson, E. Özdalga and C. Raudvere. Istanbul, Swedish Research Institute. 
  
107 Erman, T. and E. Göker (2000). "Alevi Politcs in Contemporary Turkey." Middle Eastern Studies 
36(4): 99-118. 
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number of Alevi civil society associations have been the main organizing institutions 
in this revival. I have contacted some of the major ones in the area in order to see the 
share social provision activities have in this movement.  
I have visited three of the most influential Alevi associations in Turkey—
Karacaahmet Sultan Dergahi, Sah Kulu Sultan Dergahi and Cem Vakfi. The first two 
are traditional Alevi dervish lodges that are established in the 13th and 14th centuries. 
They have been through times of political pressure and closures and re-opened in the 
period after the 1970s and 1980s. Cem Vakfi, established in 1996, is a large umbrella 
association, which has its own media (radio and television channels and newspaper). 
The interviews I conducted in these three important institutions made clear that 
welfare provision is not one of the main areas of activity in any of them. They all have 
some support structures for their people, but this only occupies a minor share in the 
overall activity area.  
The relations of this religious community with the state defined the specific 
characteristics of the associations they have developed. Alevism has never been 
included in the state interpretation of religion. Turkish State, due to its Sunni 
dominant view of Islam, failed to meet the needs of Alevi population in areas such as 
education and religious practices. Religious services are included under the title of 
public services in Turkey, and their costs are covered by the state institution of 
religious affairs (Diyanet). Nevertheless, Diyanet represents only Sunni version of 
Islam, and defines mosques as the only worshipping places. Alevism has never been 
taught in schools as a part of curriculum, or in the theology faculties. Their places of 
worship (cemevleri) are still not considered by the state as a place of worshipping. In 
relation to these shortcomings, my respondents voiced that they are undertaking 
voluntary public service provision. What they meant with this is that although they 
pay taxes as every other citizen, their kids cannot learn about their belief system in the 
schools and they have to cover all the costs of their worshipping places. Therefore, 
Alevis had to organize their own resources in order to practice and teach their beliefs. 
Dergahs/Cemevleri meets these multiple needs of the community such as education, 
worshipping, and also provision of food, scholarships to students and in kind transfers 
to needy members. As one of my respondents put forward very clearly: 
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You cannot find a single Alevi organization that only focuses on welfare provision or 
social assistance. These institutions are founded in order to keep Alevi belief and 
tradition alive. We, of course, take care of our people; food and clothing aid is part of 
our activities. Yet, to concentrate on social welfare only would be a luxury for Alevi 
organizations. We can only do this if we solve the main problems of our community. 
Alevis are trying to express themselves in the public sphere in the last twenty years. We 
are fighting for legitimacy and equal citizenship rights.  
As another respondent put forward, at the time when their foundation was established 
in 1996, it was still not even possible to voice the word Alevi. The political 
environment started to change in the mid-1990s, as claimed by the organizations; yet, 
they still have a long way to go to achieve their ideals of equal citizenship rights. 
Until then mere focus on social provision seems like a luxury for them. 
Alevi organizations, I have interviewed, were also quite critical about the idea of 
social provision by associations that have religious and/or political aims. One 
important issue that came up in the interviews I have conducted with Alevi 
organizations was their idea of separating politics from social provision work. All 
three associations I have contacted criticized the connections between political 
parties, religious communities, government and RMAs. They do not reject the idea of 
social solidarity and help, yet they emphasized that this should be mainly the role of 
the state to provide for its citizens. 
If provision is targeting the poor and needy, if there is no other aim involved in it, if the 
needy situation of the individuals is not utilized for steering their political or religious 
ideas, we agree with that kind of provision. We have seen examples of these misuses; 
some of them are on court108 currently. Unfortunately the weakness of the welfare 
state in Turkey opens up free space for these kinds of associations. 
A last issue that came up in the interviews was exclusion of the Alevi citizens from 
provision by the Sunni RMAs. Nearly all of the new and vintage RMAs I have 
interviewed put emphasis on their indifference to people from different religions, 
sects or nations. Nevertheless, administrators of the Alevi associations claimed that 
RMAs do not even enter the neighborhoods where the majority of inhabitants are 
Alevis. 
                                                 
108 The respondent is referring to Deniz Feneri Social Solidarity Association here.  
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In conclusion, general mission of the Alevi associations can be defined as recognition 
of their belief, traditions, and fight the assimilative strategies of the Sunni Islamists. 
To be recognized as equal citizens and to benefit from the services of the state are the 
demands they put priority on. They undertake social provision activities to support 
their people, but these are neither on a large scale nor have any political motives 
behind. Nevertheless, when the historical development of the Sunni RMAs and their 
transformations is taken into consideration, it could be expected that once the Alevi 
organizations solve these more existential problems of their community, they may be 
more active in the social provision sphere.  
 
8.3. Umbrella Organizations 
Umbrella organizations are a relatively new phenomenon in Turkey. Yet, some of the 
RMAs I have interviewed are members of two umbrella organizations: TGTV 
(Turkiye Gonullu Tesekkuller Vakfi) and IDSB (The Union of NGOs of the Islamic 
World/Islam Dunyasi Sivil Toplum Kuruluslari Birligi). I will briefly discuss the main 
motivations and activities of these two umbrella associations in order to shed light on 
the network structures around RMAs and the divides in the population them. 
TGTV is the largest national umbrella organization of the civil society associations 
with “Islamic sensitivities” as its president puts it. The idea to establish such an 
umbrella organization dates back to the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nevertheless, the 
legal establishment was only possible in 1994. The development of TGTV follows a 
parallel path to the development of Milli Gorus political movement109. Therefore, the 
main aim of the umbrella organization is to create coordination between different 
areas of Islamic civil society—such as education, law, worker, businessman, social 
provision associations—sharing the same religious values and sensitivities. An 
additional aim that is mentioned in the interviews is to create a coordinated pressure 
group in politics to protect the rights of their people with the motto of “the rights 
given by God cannot be taken away by anyone else”. Coordination between 
                                                 
109 The political movement where all pro-Islamic parties such as National Order Party, National 
Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Felicity Party and Justice and Development Party rooted from.  
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associations and the use of media are the two important means to raise a collective 
voice in the public sphere, as the principle administrators of TGTV claims.  
In such a body of associations many things that are not achievable for single civil 
society associations become possible and even easy. For the RMAs social capital 
(connections to the network) can easily be turned into economic capital (donations 
from the business firms). For the business associations, economic capital can easily be 
turned into social capital (getting a belonging in the social networks), which in the 
long run is expected to produce more economic capital. As the president puts forward, 
coordination between associations is crucial for the functioning of the whole: “if there 
is an economic need we can collect a huge amount of money in a very short time, if 
there is a need in the juristic order, there are the law associations to solve it.” 
Functioning of these connections across different associations that are immersed in 
areas such as business, law, education, culture and social provision sheds light on how 
the networks established cross cutting these areas makes the transfer of one form of 
capital to the other forms possible. However, it would be a misinterpretation to think 
that TGTV includes all the RMAs that are under study. It is possible to see the 
reflections of the ideological and political differences at this level too. IHH and Deniz 
Feneri, which are both rooted from Milli Gorus movement, are members of TGTV. 
Nevertheless, Kimse Yok Mu is not a member of the umbrella association, due to 
Gülen Movement’s position against political Islam110.  
TGTV aims to be a role model for the formation of local umbrella organizations and 
also assist them. They have initiated the formation of Anatolian Civil Society 
Platforms organized at the city level. These platforms are umbrella associations that 
organize action and information exchange between civil society associations in a city 
and also facilitate communication within the national level which is represented by 
TGTV. As the head of association puts forward, organizations such as these are 
crucial in this century, since the more traditional orders in which the seyh (Sufi 
master) was taking care of the murid (follower) cannot function in the urbanized and 
the industrialized socio-economic structures of Turkey. Therefore, interaction 
between the local, national and international levels is seen as a must in order to meet 
                                                 
110 Kimse Yok Mu Association was also critical of the Gaza Flotilla movement that was headed by IHH. 
The representatives of the association claimed that although they have been sending humanitarian help 
to Gaza since 2006, they never had a problem.  
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the needs of their communities today. In addition to the local civil society platforms, 
TGTV also initiated the establishment of IDSB (The Union of NGOs of the Islamic 
World). The establishment of IDSB is explained as a crucial necessity in the period 
after 9/11 in the interviews I have conducted with the founders. As they claim, they 
aim to be a representation power in this geography of Islamic countries.  
 
8.4. Conclusion 
The variety in the sample of RMAs and the reasons behind it has been the two main 
interests of this chapter. A closer analysis of the associations and the classification of 
them at multiple levels have been undertaken in order to get a clearer picture of 
religiously motivated welfare provision in Turkey. The typology presented 
demonstrated the heterogeneity in the field.  As the discussion of the criteria and the 
grouping of the associations according to these criteria proved, it is not possible to 
talk about a homogenous group of religiously motivated associations. The identities of 
associations, their areas of provision, and relations with the Turkish state and 
contemporary government all vary from one case to the other. This variety in the 
sample is explained not only in relation to the different positions of associations 
within the constituency of political Islam (both at the national and the international 
level), but also dynamic transformations of these positions in time.  
The differences between new and vintage RMAs, the special position of the Alevi 
associations in the sample and activates of the umbrella associations are all crucial 
indicators showing how religion, politics and social provision are interrelated. The 
new RMAs, which are established with the aim of provision at the national and 
international levels, are defined as an end product of the latest transformations of 
political Islam. As the in-depth study of the largest ones proved, although they are 
lumped under the same category, their Islamic identities, relations to different 
religious groups and to international Islamic movement differ to a great extend. On 
the other hand, the study of vintage RMAs exemplified the amount of ongoing change 
and dynamism in the area. Their history of the vintage RMAs demonstrate how the 
associations evolved in parallel to the contextual factors such as transformations in the 
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socio-economic arena, changing state-religion relations at the national level and shifts 
in the strategies of the international Islamic movement.  
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9. Conclusions 
 
Social welfare provision has always played an important stabilizing function for 
societies both by creating legitimacy for existing systems and by establishing bonds of 
solidarity. In the pre-modern times provision had been a crucial might at the hands of 
the churches and religious authorities. In the modern times, however, this power have 
been taken away—either partially or totally—from the religious authorities and given 
to modern welfare states. The period following the rise of the nation state in the late 
19th early 20th century has been stage to struggles between religious and secular 
authorities about who the main provider will be. The conflict was about losing or 
gaining an instrument of loyalty creation, political base building and access to power. 
Some states limited the role of provision to the secular establishments of modern 
welfare states, whereas the others chose to keep the social provision area as a shared 
one between churches and the state. Whatever option was preferred at the time, 
contemporary period is stage to a reworking of these balances in many countries, and 
faith-based organizations/religiously motivated civil society associations are 
prominent figures of this ongoing process of change.  
There are two puzzling facts about this prominence of faith-based 
organizations/religiously-motivated associations in the social policy sphere. The first 
one is the fact that the rise of these associations corresponded with the end of century-
old secularization in the area of social policy. The second is that this rise, although at 
different levels and in different configurations, occurs across various types of welfare 
states. Starting from these two puzzles, a historical in-depth analysis of the 
phenomena of what is named as faith-based organizations in the literature, and what 
I call religiously motivated associations has been the main focus of this study. The 
phenomenon is new, and the available literature on it is not comprehensive. 
Therefore, the first objective has been to achieve a more complete understanding of 
the phenomenon of FBOs / RMAs. The research available on faith-based 
organizations limits its questions to a narrow focus either in terms of literature, in 
terms of timing, or in terms of geography. My aim was to overcome these limitations 
of the existing research by undertaking an inter-disciplinary, historical, and cross-
cultural analysis of these organizations.  
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Existing literature on faith-based organizations is generally limited to the concerns of 
single areas such as voluntary action, urban studies, or social cohesion. The 
capabilities and effectiveness of FBOs as newly rising forms of voluntary 
organizations that are functional in the areas such as social work, cohesion and 
integration are the main interests (see Cnaan 1999; Boddie and Cnaan 2006; Dinham 
2009). Commonly addressed questions by these studies are about the practical use of 
these organizations for increasing well-being of citizens, solving social problems or 
contributing to social integration/cohesion. Broader analytical questions such as 
reasons for their rise or the possible implications of their increasing number, which 
would require taking an interdisciplinary approach, are missing in the literature. In 
order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of faith-
based organizations, the introductory section on theorizing religiously motivated 
welfare provision has been devoted to achieve an inter-disciplinary comprehension of 
the phenomenon by making use of different strands of literature such as religion and 
welfare, sociology of religion and third sector.  
The first step taken in order to achieve a better understanding of the phenomena has 
been the introduction of the term religiously motivated welfare associations, replacing 
faith-based organizations. This term is introduced in order to overcome the haze 
around the concept of FBOs and to expand its coverage in order to include the case of 
Turkey. A relatively broad and flexible definition of the terms religion and religiosity 
are utilized that rejects a clear-cut separation between what is sacred and what is 
secular. Simmel’s definition of religious relations as being diffused in the daily life of 
people (Simmel 1905), and Wuthnow’s emphasis on religion as having communal and 
organic dimensions creating dependencies and obligations (Wuthnow 1988: 308) have 
been used as the main characteristics defining religion and religiosity in the context of 
RMAs. Therefore, the bodies that are included under the title of RMAs were not 
limited to institutionalized forms of religion such as churches, mosques and 
congregations. 
The main research question, “What are the historical processes behind the 
contemporary proliferation of religiously motivated associations?” necessitated to go 
into a discovery on the possible roots of these organizations in the Middle Ages. An 
inquiry into the Christian and Muslim traditions of taking care of the poor 
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demonstrated that religious philanthropy is one of the oldest institutions that have 
been shared by the societies of different geographies, cultures, and religions over 
centuries. Despite the differences in tone, religious texts of Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, all defined care for the poor as a pious and moral duty. Religious charities in 
the Christian context, vakifs and endowments in the Muslim context have been the 
main institutions of social provision before the rise of modern welfare state. These 
institutions have a much longer history than the history of modern welfare states. 
Therefore, what is currently ‘marketed’ as faith-based organizations is not something 
totally novel.  
The rise of the nation state and the modern welfare state was accompanied by an 
expectation of the demise of these long-lived institutions of religious origin. The 
ruling paradigms of modernization and secularization predicted a decline both in the 
need and the sources of religious forms of belonging. Differentiation of religious 
institutions and decline of religion were the main claims of the secularization theorists 
in the mid-twentieth century. As the historical analysis demonstrated, partial 
realization of this expectation has been the case in all of the countries under analysis. 
Nevertheless, a total demise of religious forms of provision has never occurred in any 
of them. The last decades, in contrast, witnessed both increasing visibility of already 
existing institutions and the proliferation of new types of them. I do not interpret what 
we are currently witnessing in the area of religiously motivated provision as a mere 
return of religious forms of charity to the social policy sphere. Instead, I define this 
increasing presence and number of the RMAs in the social policy field as a 
revitalization of religion111 in order to deal with the contemporary problems of 
European societies. The secular democracies of the 21st century seem to volunteer 
reintegrating religious forms of provision to their welfare mixes, in order to fight the 
contemporary problems such as increasing poverty and social exclusion. But how 
does this change come about? What are the mechanisms that triggered this increasing 
presence of RMAs in the social policy arena? These were the questions at the center 
of the research undertaken.  
 
                                                 
111 See Habermas, J. (2006). "Religion in the Public Sphere." European Journal of Philosophy 14(1): 1-
25. 
  
 190
9.1. What have we learned from this study? 
The existing literatures on faith-based organizations do not problematize the 
increasing presence of FBOs as social policy actors. More than the reasons of their 
rise, their functions and organizational characteristics are the focus of the existing 
studies. This study focuses on two possible alternative answers existing literatures 
may give to the main research question. The chapter on theorizing religiously 
motivated welfare provision was stage to a discussion of these alternative 
explanations. The first one, the claim on the rise or return of religion to the public 
sphere, has been based on the modernization and secularization paradigms that are 
prominent in the sociology of religion literature. The second one, the claim on the 
retrenchments in the welfare states, or transformations in the welfare mixes, 
concentrates on a mere analysis of the changes in the area of social policy as the main 
explanatory factor for the rise of FBOs. I argue that neither of these explanations 
offered by the sociology of religion literature and welfare state research is sufficient 
for an overall understanding of the increasing presence of FBOs in the social policy 
arena.  
The most important shortcoming of the available literatures is their failure in paying 
attention to historical specificities. As already discussed in the introduction, the 
phenomenon of FBOs is not limited to the liberal welfare states. Conservative 
corporatist, Scandinavian and Southern European ones are also stage to similar 
changes in the last decades. The majority of the studies on religiously motivated 
welfare provision in these countries provide theories of convergence—either about the 
retrenchments in the area of welfare, or the rise of religion in the public sphere. Yet, 
what they fail to achieve is to shed light on the historical mechanisms bringing about 
this change in various welfare states. One of the main aims of this work has been to 
come up with explanatory factors that can be used in order to understand change by 
taking historical factors seriously.  
Existing literature defines “the problems” and “the solutions” independent of the case 
under study. These generalized explanations that do not take into consideration 
historical specificities do not equip us with the necessary tools to understand change 
in single cases. As discussed in the second chapter, neither the theory of 
secularization can be reduced to the argument of the demise of religion; nor can the 
 191
changes in different welfare state structures be limited to the theory of retrenchment. 
In order to overcome these weaknesses of the literature, I have taken a historical and 
context sensitive approach to explain change in both of these areas. Various 
trajectories of state-religion and state-society relations are defined as the two main 
arenas that are of interest for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the 
increasing presence of RMAs in social policy. 
 
Secularization trajectories defining welfare state transformations 
The use of secularization theories to understand welfare state typologies, or changes 
in the welfare states is not common in the literature. By pointing out how shifts in the 
state-religion relations reflect on the social provision area, I aimed at filling in this 
gap between secularization and welfare state theories. Building on theories of state 
formation in the studies of scholars such Gould (1999), Kalyvas (1996), Gorski 
(2003), Ertman (1997) various histories of secularization have been identified as the 
main factor in determining the position of religious institutions in the newly 
established welfare states by the end of the late nineteenth, early twentieth centuries. 
Since the provision of social policy has always been an important area of 
institutionalization for religion in the public sphere, its relations with state institutions 
was identified to be crucial to study in order to follow the shifts in religiously 
motivated welfare provision. Stein Rokkan, Arnold Heidenheimer and Peter Flora 
have been the pioneers in integrating religion into welfare state research. Following 
this line of scholars and how their theories are used by Van Kersbergen and Manow in 
explaining welfare typologies, historical conflicts between religious institutions and 
newly rising nation states are focused on as an important factor defining the type of 
welfare state established in this period. This has been a step taken in order to use 
state-religion relations to understand the contemporary changes in the social policy 
structures of the European welfare states. In order to achieve this aim, religion has 
been defined as a cleavage line and a resource that organizes society.  
The existing literature on transformations of welfare states and welfare mixes also 
suffer from a similar shortcoming of generalized explanations. Whether the European 
welfare states are converging to the liberal type has been a commonly discussed 
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question in the welfare state research in the last decades. A common state of 
transformation towards a governance approach that puts more emphasis on the private 
and voluntary providers is a widespread argument. I agree that there are general 
mechanisms influencing the configurations of welfare mixes such as globalization, 
supra-nationalization and socio-demographic changes. Nevertheless, I claim that how 
these general mechanisms of change take shape in different countries and what kind 
of outcomes they trigger cannot be understood without looking into the historical 
factors. The historical analysis undertaken for the five cases demonstrated how 
various histories of state-society relations has been a determining factor for shaping 
the contemporary transformations in the welfare arena.   
 
Country studies 
How these two mechanisms—(1) shifts in the area of religion and politics and (2) 
shifts in the social policy sphere—interact and bring about change in the area of 
religiously motivated welfare provision has been the focus of the study in the third 
and fourth chapters. Country studies included were chosen to represent a variety on 
both in terms of state-society and state-religion relationships. The variety on the state-
society axis is defined along the welfare typology: a liberal, a corporatist, a 
Scandinavian and a southern European country is included in the sample. On the 
state-church axis the same countries are placed on a scale between cooperation/non-
separation (liberal) and competition/separation (authoritarian). The variety presented 
in this comparative part made it clear that different secularization histories resulted in 
either marginalization or integration of religious forms of provision in the newly 
rising modern welfare structures. The main finding—bringing together historical and 
contemporary analysis—is that countries with settled/well-institutionalized structures 
either in the area of state-religion or state-society are more resistant to change.  
The historical analysis of the case of Britain demonstrated that the main reason for 
the rise of RMAs in this country is the contemporary transformations in the welfare 
state arena (in other words, the shift in the state-society relations). The neo-liberal 
reforms of the period after the 1980s resulted in a move of voluntary associations 
from the periphery to the center of the social provision arena. As the state redefined 
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its new task as steering of the welfare provisions, RMAs became one of the central 
providers. In comparison with this great shift in the state-society relations, the amount 
of change in the state-religion relatively smaller. The Church of Britain is still the 
main national church, and a liberal atmosphere is present in the relations between 
different religions, congregations and the state. The main ongoing change, similar to 
the other European countries is the increasing number of migrants and 
multiculturalism in the society. This, obviously, results in the rise of a multi-faith 
society, with which the state has to reconsider its interactions. Material and discursive 
support to minority groups and to the RMAs established by them—in order to 
generate social cohesion and integration—are the steps taken in this area. In 
conclusion, the case of Britain is marked as one with much change due to the shift in 
state-society relations. The peaceful settlement of state-religion relations in the nation 
state formation period and the relatively tolerant approach of the state towards 
different faiths prevented any abrupt change in this area. 
Unlike Britain, the dominant change in Sweden has been in the domain of relations 
between state and religion. Sweden is one of the exceptional cases in which research 
on religion and welfare state has been growing in the last years. This can already be 
interpreted as an indicator of the transformations in the arena. Its peculiar relations 
between state and religion, which can be characterized as non-separation and high 
regulation, mark the case of Sweden. The Scandinavian welfare state of Sweden 
marked the state as the main and only provider for its citizens; church or any other 
religious institutions was not guaranteed a presence in the area of social provision. 
This history of a settled and well-defined area of state-society relations makes it clear 
that the main change triggering the rise of RMAs is not a shift on this parameter. This 
does not necessarily mean that there is no change in the welfare state, yet the change 
in this area is smaller in comparison to the change in the state-religion relations. The 
disestablishment of the state-church in 2003, and the increasing plurality in the 
society necessitated the liberalization of the relations of the state with different faith 
communities. The state felt the urge to establish relations with different faith 
communities and to support their actions in the public sphere as possible actors to 
resolve the rising problems of the contemporary society.  
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The case of Germany is one of little change in comparison with the cases of Sweden 
and Britain. Germany is a country where the solution of the conflict between state and 
religion was resolved by the systemic integration of the churches to the welfare 
system. This contracting out of the state functions to non-state actors such as church 
resulted in the establishment of a well-institutionalized solution between state, 
religion and society. The principle of subsidiarity, which has always been an 
important defining feature of German political arena, safeguarded the presence of 
lower-level organizational structures in the area of provision. This resulted in the 
establishment of a well-developed third sector and the cooperative structure between 
third sector organizations and the state. Therefore, what defines the minor increase in 
the number of RMAs in the social sphere is not a shift in state-society relations, but 
one in the area of state-religion relations. The increasing diversity of the population in 
the last decades, made it harder for the state to stick to the established social welfare 
system, which privileged the two churches and the main umbrella organizations as its 
partners. Hence, the last years have been stage to an expansion of the state interest 
towards civil society organizations of various faiths, in order to make the integration 
of them into the system possible. This shift in the corporatist relations between state 
and the existing faith communities is seen as the main reason of change in the case of 
Germany.  
Finally, the case of France is also one of little change. There is not much evidence 
proving a rise of religiously motivated associations in the area of welfare. The nation 
state formation period in France witnessed the most fierce conflicts between the state 
and the church. The strict separation between state and church that have been 
established as an outcome of this conflict and the steps taken with the aim of 
secularization in the early twentieth century resulted in the exclusion of the Catholic 
Church from main areas of welfare such as education and social services. When the 
area of state-society relations is taken into consideration, France can again be marked 
as a peculiar case. The relations between voluntary organizations and the state went 
through an abrupt change after the Revolution. The rise of the solidarity ideal around 
the concept of nation resulted in the rejection of any intermediary organizations 
between the state and the citizens. This ‘etatism’ of the French republic did not allow 
the rise of a viable third sector in the area of social policy. It was only after the late 
1970s and 1980s that the strict etatism of the country went through major 
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transformations. Especially the rule of Socialist party was stage to the establishment 
of some partnerships between the state and foundations, which also brought about the 
increasing presence of voluntary organizations in the social welfare arena. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the principle of etatism, the laicism principle ruling the 
state-religion relations in France did not go through any reformation; it is still well 
established and resistant to change. I define this relative stability in the area of state-
religion relations as the main reason inhibiting the rise of RMAs in the case of France.  
 
Understanding the “foreign”—The case of Turkey 
Turkey has been chosen as the main case of analysis due to its special position on the 
margins of European integration, as a country with ninety-nine percent Muslim 
population with a tradition of laicism, undergoing serious reformation in the last 
decades. The findings of the historical analysis on the state-society and state-religion 
relations in Turkey, in a period starting from the late nineteenth century to today, have 
demonstrated that the proliferation of RMAs in the case of this country can also be 
understood by focusing on the same mechanisms of change that have been active in 
the European cases. In comparison to the other cases, Turkey is the one with the 
highest degree of change, with the rapid rise in the number of RMAs in the last 
decade. I explain this high level of change in the case of Turkey with regard to the 
partial resolution of the unresolved conflicts in the area of religion and state in the 
last decades, and the expansion of the social provision arena.  
State-society relations in the case of Turkey were not shaped under the conditions of 
rising industrialization and capitalism. Different from the developed capitalist 
economies of the West, the initial welfare arrangements grew out of the benevolence 
of the state and the political parties in power. Therefore, state-society relations have 
been shaped along the lines of clientelist relations that rendered the area of social 
policy open for politicization. Especially in times of political crises or change, the 
social policy arena has been used as an area of loyalty creation. The first example of 
this was in the late Ottoman period when the Young Turks were reforming the social 
policy arena that was heavily marked by the notes of the religious elite of the previous 
period. A similar development occurred in the early Republican period when all of the 
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religious institutions of the previous period were either prohibited or closed down and 
were replaced by the voluntary organizations promoting the modernization and 
secularization ideals of the new Republic. This proves that philanthropy has always 
been a crucial ingredient of the social provision arena. Its forms and the political 
ideologies defining the motivations behind it changed in time, but its presence in the 
arena was more or less constant.  
The scale of the gap that is left uncovered by state institutions has been identified as 
the main reason for the presence of philanthropic organizations in the social policy 
arena. A social assistance system, accompanying the social security arrangements was 
not developed in Turkey before the 1990s; the share of populace that was out of the 
protection schemes of the state has always been much larger than its counterpart in the 
European countries. A welfare state, which is defined along the lines of social 
citizenship, has never been established in Turkey. This ideal emerged in the social 
policy discourse at times, but no real action had been taken to undertake the necessary 
reforms. It is only in the last decades that the state felt the urge to take some steps in 
the social policy arena, in order to fight the increasing problems of the contemporary 
period. 
The areas of social assistance and social security have been undergoing 
comprehensive reforms in the last years. The liberalization of the economy and 
politics in the period after the 1980s resulted in increasing levels of unemployment 
and poverty, which in turn increased the demand for social provision. New forms of 
provision by municipalities, local social solidarity vakifs and voluntary organizations 
represent the developments of the last two decades. Aims such as poverty reduction or 
fighting social exclusion have been included in the state social policy discourse for 
the first time. Moreover, some steps have been taken to achieve these aims, which are 
partially triggered by European influence. In short, the current proliferation of 
religiously motivated associations takes place in this environment along with the 
expansion of social assistance by central and municipal governments. The 
contemporary rise of RMAs is scrutinized under the light of these state-society 
developments. As the analysis demonstrated, in contrast to the dominant views, what 
explains this rise is not the retrenchment of the welfare provisions, but instead the 
increasing demand for provision in the last decades.  
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The shift in the state-religion relations is marked as the dominant one in determining 
the direction of contemporary change in the social policy structures in Turkey. The 
history of state-religion relations in Turkey presents a picture that is more 
authoritarian and secular compared to the European cases. The reforms initiated in the 
early years of the Republic adapted a French variant of laicism resulting in the total 
exclusion of religion from public and political spheres, as well as complete control of 
the religious institutions by the state. Religious institutions and authorities were not 
even guaranteed a separate area where they could pursue their activities. One of the 
main reasons that made it possible for the state to achieve this complete control was 
the lack of an institutionalized form of religion similar to the church in Christianity. 
Due to this lack, religion has never been presented as a coherent power; its authority 
has been dispersed in a multiplicity of informal structures in the social sphere. The 
analysis of the European cases demonstrated that the resolution of the conflicts 
between the states and the churches in the early twentieth century resulted in the 
creation of well-defined areas of existence for religious institutions in the social 
provision areas of these countries. The political climate of the early Republican period 
in Turkey resulted in the marginalization of religion not only from the political, but 
also from the public arena.  
One of the main aims of secularization reforms was to change the forms of belonging 
prevailing in the society. The reformers of the early twentieth century hoped that the 
secularization and modernization reforms would annihilate the needs for religious and 
traditional forms of belonging. The abolishment of tekkes, zaviyes, and vakifs was the 
outcome of such a mentality. Nevertheless, none of the institutions established to 
replace them has been sufficient. Nor did these heretical forms of Islam totally 
disappear in the years to come. Religiously motivated provision has not had a formal 
presence in the modern welfare state established, but this did not totally inhibit the 
survival of some functions of these religious institutions in the social sphere. The 
social networks established and utilized by pro-Islamic parties in the period after the 
mid-1970s can partially be explained in relation with these institutions. But only 
partially, since the contemporary networks established, having religiosity as one of 
their main resources, have a much wider area of connectivity that is dispersed to the 
political and economic spheres. The variety of existing interests and easier 
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convertibility of them from one type to another (economic, social, political) mark the 
difference of the contemporary networks to the traditional ones.   
The specific secularization path taken by Turkey had inhibited the presence of 
religion as a main cleavage in the political arena for a while. It was only after the 
1980s that an important shift occurred between state and religion, which also had 
important repercussions in the area of welfare. I assert that without this increasing 
relevance of religion in the political field, the proliferation of RMAs would not have 
taken place. The crowding of the social assistance arena with philanthropic 
associations is similar to the single party period. Nevertheless, the growing discourse 
on issues of benevolence, charity and philanthropy is much more prominent this time, 
due to factors such as fertility of the dominant political atmosphere, and the scale and 
the visibility of the problem. Whether this abundance of RMAs in the social provision 
arena is here to stay or not is still an open question. Yet the historical analysis made 
clear that absence of a well-defined balance between state and religion, and relatively 
immature characteristics of the welfare state resulted in the larger space available for 
the rise of RMAs in the case of Turkey.  
 
The influences at the organizational level  
The empirical research, which was centered on the motivations and functioning of the 
RMAs, aimed to attain a comprehensive understanding of RMAs as social policy 
providers. The first task was to decide on which organizations could be listed under 
this title of “religiously motivated”. Due to the sensitivity of the issue of religiosity, 
and rejection of the label by the organizations, criteria defining what characterizes a 
RMA had to be determined. Following the preliminary research conducted in the 
field, the presence of religion in the discourse of the association, in the workplace and 
in the outlook of the people who are active in the association were the three factors 
decided upon as substantive criteria to label an organization as a religiously motivated 
one.  
The exploratory research undertaken has proven that there is an increasing presence of 
these associations in the social policy sphere of the country in the last decade. 
However, it also gave the first hints of differences of the Turkish case from the 
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European countries. First of all, the issue is more politically laden in the case of 
Turkey, and the respondents were suspicious about the interview request. Secondly, 
there is no available data on the present population of the RMAs, which are active in 
the provision arena. Lastly, institutionalized religion is not part of the population of 
RMAs. 
In-depth interviews conducted with the administrators of the associations have proven 
that the organizational scale of the associations vary to a great extent. RMAs that are 
active at the local, national and international levels are all included in the sample in 
order to represent the present variety. The provided information about the budgets of 
the associations has proven that their share in the social policy arena is much larger 
than expected. In spite of the range in the organizational scale, the associations shared 
common area of activities such as regular support for the poor families by provision 
of basic supplies, temporary relief provision in times of emergency, and informal 
education of the recipients on moral and religious issues. The activity area of the 
international associations covers Muslim countries and the countries in which Muslim 
populations live.  
Decentralized organizational structures of the associations and their emphasis on the 
locality as the main source of human and financial capital were important indicators 
of their ties at the community level. A closer look into decision-making mechanisms 
and the practices of provision shed light on the lack of objective eligibility criteria; 
lack of expertise in the area of provision; informal nature of the relationships between 
the providers and beneficiaries; and tighter surveillance mechanisms to control the use 
of provided help. Volunteers are active in all steps of provision such as deciding on 
who is eligible, making the social investigation to decide on provision, distributing the 
benefits and deciding on the termination of assistance. Although there are some codes 
of conduct defining how all of these steps should be taken, in most of the associations, 
personal judgments and lack of transparency seem to be the rule. The informal 
relations between the volunteers and the beneficiaries that involve a dose of 
surveillance and control—such as visits to the households and to the neighborhood of 
the beneficiaries—raises questions of possible breach of individual freedom.  
An in-depth analysis of sample of RMAs, their histories, religious and political 
identities, missions and motivations demonstrated that the transformations of the 
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associations followed the transformations of the relations at the macro level (between 
religion and state). The main division in the sample of RMAs is marked between the 
new and the vintage ones, whose foundation dates correspond to different stages of 
state-religion relations in Turkey. Secularization and professionalization levels of the 
associations, backgrounds of their founders and administrators, their activity scales 
and areas, their relations to local and central welfare administration all vary 
depending on which stage of the rise of political Islam these associations have been 
established.  
The new RMAs are identified as the end products of the transformations in the 
political sphere of the country in the last decades; whereas the older ones, which have 
recently included social provision in their area of activities, are labeled as vintage 
RMAs. The rise of majority of the associations in both of the groups corresponds to 
the changing political atmosphere of the country in the period after the coup in 1980. 
This period saw the proliferation of the Islamic groups in the public sphere. Increasing 
number of civil society associations provided the Islamists with a possibility to 
undertake activities in a legal context. Education—in the broadest sense of the term—
including Qur’an courses, sohbets, seminars on Islam, has been the main activity 
areas of vintage associations. Social provision became one of the crucial mobilizing 
activities of the Islamic movement only in the period after the early 1990s. The 
military intervention of 1997 has been a turning point for many associations that have 
been the main organizing spaces for political Islam at the local level. They have been 
either closed down or put under strict control, which resulted in social provision 
becoming a more attractive option as a new area of activity. Another contextual 
reason that made undertaking social provision activities more appealing for these 
groups was the increasing poverty in the society as an outcome of the economic 
crises. Therefore, the available space in the social provision arena has also been 
crucial for the newly rising Islamic groups for political back building.  
The variety in the area of religiously motivated provision is not limited to the division 
between new and vintage RMAs. The analysis of a selection of associations 
demonstrated various groups with different political and religious ideologies 
populating the social provision arena. The in-depth analysis of single RMAs made 
clear that the identities of the associations are highly related to their different 
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positions within the constituency of political Islam in Turkey and in the international 
Islamic movement. There is evidence demonstrating that some of the associations 
work as an extension of some political parties. Some others, aiming to keep their 
distance from party politics and defining their position against radical Islam, have  
combined forces in areas such as education, publication, broadcasting and social 
provision. Whether these associations are undertaking action in order to support the 
populations that are already sharing their worldviews, or whether any form of 
indoctrination is inherent to provision activities is not easy to determine. 
Nevertheless, what is clear is that the boundaries between social provision, politics 
and religion are totally blurred.   
 
9.2. Overall Implications 
The increasing presence of RMAs in the public sphere is interpreted as an important 
step for contemporary democracies in learning how to accommodate religious groups 
of different types in the existing political systems in civil society, third sector and 
sociology of religion literatures. This argument might hold true especially when the 
voluntary associations are democratic agents taking up advocacy roles and playing the 
role of watchdog in the political systems they are part of. Nevertheless, I claim that 
the fact that this accommodation mainly takes place in the social provision arena of 
many states is not free from problems concerning social citizenship and democracy. 
In this final section of the study, I will focus on the possible overall implications of 
the increasing presence of these associations in the welfare arena.  
I started this study by pointing at the solidarity-creating and social-stabilizing 
functions of social welfare provision. How these functions have been utilized by 
different providers such as religious institutions, state and civil society associations, 
and how they evolved in time were the focus of the historical chapters. The kind of 
arrangements politics found to reconcile the balance between different providers in 
different periods is studied in the comparative part on the cases of Britain, Germany, 
France and Sweden. The analysis demonstrated that “pre-modern” forms of provision, 
which was mainly a relationship between believer and church or between different 
strata of society, created solidarity built on moral and religious bounds. The 
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establishment of the modern welfare states, with institutionalization of social 
citizenship rights, however, carried this solidarity bounds to the level of nation state. 
Welfare policies have started to be defined as one of the most important legitimizing 
aspects of the European democracies in the period following the mid 20th century. In 
the light of this historical overview, I see three interrelated issues that need to be 
highlighted as implications of the increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy 
arena. I will discuss them starting from the micro level and moving to the macro one.  
The first issue is the possible influences of the increasing presence of RMAs in the 
welfare arena on social precarization. As Marshall defines, the extension of social 
provision was important as far as it reduces the risk and insecurity, and it results in an 
equalization of more and less fortunate at all levels (Marshall 1964: 102). Compared 
to the early 20th century, the world we live in today—with increasing levels of 
flexibilization in the employment contracts and increasing risks of social exclusion for 
the poor—makes the risk-reducing function of social provision even more essential. 
The contemporary world of social welfare, however, is characterized by the 
increasing presence of voluntary associations as providers. Charity in all its forms is 
on the rise in the last decades. Religiously motivated ones are one of the most 
common forms of it, although not the only one. Whether these associations decrease 
insecurity and risk in the lives of their beneficiaries is a key question one has to take 
into consideration at this point. The characteristics of provision such as lack of 
objective eligibility criteria, informal nature of the relationship between the provider 
and beneficiary, co-existence of religious and moral education aims accompanied by 
provision, and tighter surveillance mechanisms to control the use of provided help 
indicate that the provision by RMAs do not necessarily result in the equalization of 
more and less fortunate or reducing insecurity. In Baumann’s words provisions by the 
associations can be defined as “communal insurance against individual misfortune” or  
“charity on the part of ‘those who feel like it’ targeted at ‘those who need it’” 
(Baumann 2001: 59). In an environment where the alternative mechanisms of support 
have been declining, these provisions by the RMAs create relations of dependency 
between the beneficiaries and the providers. The ways means testing is undertaken 
and provision is delivered by the RMAs is open to stigmatization of the poor and 
increasing social control. 
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The second issue that is highly related with the first one is about the transformation of 
the solidarity bounds in societies. Modern welfare states have been the crucial 
institutions that generate social solidarity within the borders of the nation state. In the 
light of my findings both on the case of Turkey and the other European welfare states, 
I see that increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy arena will result in a 
redefinition of the solidarity bounds at various levels. As both the historical and the 
empirical chapters demonstrated, community is a concept that gains importance in 
relation with provision by civil society associations that are established with religious 
motivations. RMAs are establishments with religious and political ideologies. The 
form of safety nets they are providing is generally based on communal forms of 
identification. Even in a case like Turkey, where the great majority of the population 
is Muslim, there are obvious divides between different communities. As the empirical 
analysis of associations in Turkey made clear, we are faced with a situation in which 
different parts of the population are under the influence of different religious groups.  
The situation is somewhat different in the developed capitalist economies of the West, 
with well-established welfare systems. The European democracies under analysis put 
special emphasis on these associations as important instruments in the integration of 
migrant populations and strengthening of social cohesion. Nevertheless, thinking 
about the loyalty creation role of welfare provision, it is very well possible that the 
support given to different faith groups to provide for their communities will in the 
long run result in the intensification of particularistic loyalties, which will impede 
cohesion. As aptly put forward by Baumann, “Insecurity (among the migrant as much 
as among the native population) tends to transform multiculturality into 
‘multicommunitarianism’” (Baumann 2001: 141). Then, the answer to the question 
‘will these communal solidarities be able to fit into the national solidarity?’ will be 
highly determinative for the future of European societies.  
The final issue, which is triggered by the first two, is about the possible influences of 
this transformation in the welfare arena on state-citizen relations and on the 
functioning of a democracy. Social citizenship rights defined by T.H. Marshall put 
emphasis on a level of support that makes it possible for every citizen to pursue a life 
of a “civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society”(Marshall 
1964: 72). As clear from the definition, this level of support brings with it a level of 
 204
basic equality that is granted through the rights of citizenship. The question that arises 
at this point is whether the increasing presence of voluntary associations, whose 
identities are defined on the basis of ideological, religious and political forms of 
belonging, will disturb this level of equality that is necessary for the functioning of 
democracy. Crouch’s definition of post-democracy is also related to this concept of 
citizenship. As he claims democracy requires certain rough equalities in a real 
capacity to affect political outcomes by all citizens (Crouch 2004: 16). How the 
concept of social citizenship will be redefined in this environment of increasing 
presence of RMAs in the welfare arena and what kind of implications this redefinition 
will have on contemporary democracies are crucial questions that needs to be 
addressed.  
The analysis of the case of Turkey demonstrated that these associations do not only 
complement the public provisions of the state, but also substitute their absence in 
many areas. In such an environment, the lack of alternative provision mechanisms 
results in the establishment of dependency relations between the providers and the 
recipients. As already briefly mentioned before, the fact that the RMAs prove for the 
fundamental needs of the poor and needy gives them access both to control the lives 
of these individuals according to their standards of morals and ethics, and to influence 
their choices in the political field. The simple fact that the amount of help rises 
abruptly at times of elections is a clear proof of politicization of social provision. 
Therefore, the increasing presence of these associations in the countries without 
mature welfare states should be paid more attention. It should not be missed out that 
abandoning the needy to the pity of the voluntary associations for survival needs 
opens a major door for the exploitation of social policy provision as a political 
instrument.  
Somewhat different than the case of Turkey, RMAs play a supplementary role in the 
European welfare states. What we see in many of these countries is the outsourcing of 
some main areas of provision to RMAs. There is a discourse on the rise, which claims 
that these associations are better providers than state institutions. I interpret what we 
witness currently in the European cases as the increasing appetite of the states to 
revitalize the material, social and political resources of religion and religious groups 
in an era of increasing needs in the area of welfare. The fact that these associations 
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mainly support the migrant groups, who are more prone to social exclusion, is an 
indication of the transformations in the European welfare states. Answers to the 
questions whether these provisions by RMAs will create the necessary equalities for 
the functioning of a democracy and for the equal attendance of their beneficiaries in 
the life prevailing in the society they live in will be highly determinative for the future 
of the European democracies.  
In the light of my findings, I believe that these three areas should be the focus for 
future research. Raising these three issues, I do not claim that the increasing presence 
of RMAs in the social provision arena will necessarily bring about identical outcomes 
in the democratic systems of all the countries under analysis. As we have learned 
from the historical findings of this study—demonstrating that social provision has 
always been an area of struggle between different providers and any settlement that is 
at place is a dynamic one—historical specificities of the single cases will determine 
how each country will deal with the threads in its social provision arena.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
Table 1. Population Covered by Social Insurance Programs (1950- 2004) 
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Table 2. Urban Rural Population (1970-2006) 
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Table 3. Developments in Domestic Market 
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APENNDIX II 
List of Interviews 
 
Organization Position Date and Place 
Middle East Technical University 
Department of Sociology 
Professor of Sociology 09.01.08 Ankara 
Harran University  
Department of Sociology 
Professor of Sociology 10.01.08 Ankara 
Prime Ministry General 
Directorate of Social Assistance 
and Solidarity  
Resource Management 
Assistant 
11.01.08 Ankara 
Prime Ministry General 
Directorate of Social Assistance 
and Solidarity  
Head of Directorate of 
Project Monitoring and 
Evaluation Department 
 
11.01.2008 Ankara 
Prime Ministry State Planning 
Organization 
Head of Social Sectors 
Coordination Unit 
14.01.08 Ankara 
Prime Ministry State Planning 
Organization 
Head of Strategic 
Planning Unit 
14.01.08 Ankara 
Middle East Technical University 
Department of Sociology 
Professor of Sociology 15.01.08 Ankara 
Middle East Technical University 
Department of Sociology 
Doctor of Sociology  15.01.08 Ankara 
Ankara Cankaya Municipality Member of City Council 15.01.08 Ankara 
Hacettepe University Department 
of Social Work 
Professor of Social Work 16.01.08 Ankara 
Hacettepe University Department 
of Social Work 
Professor of Social Work 16.01.08 Ankara 
Middle East Technical University 
Department of Economics 
Doctor of Economics  16.01.08 Ankara 
Cansuyu Social Aid Association Founder and Head of 
Administration 
17.01.08 Ankara 
Turkish Religious Foundation Head of Social Unit 17.01.08 Ankara 
Republic of Turkey Presidency of 
Religious Affairs  
Head of Social and 
Cultural Services 
18.01.08 Ankara 
The Foundation for Human 
Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief (IHH) 
Founder and 
Administrator 
21.01.08 Istanbul 
Istanbul Kadikoy Municipality  Vice Mayor 22.01.08 Istanbul 
Province of Bursa Vice Mufti 23.01.08 Bursa 
Bursa Nilufer Municipality  Vice Mayor 24.01.08 Bursa 
Bursa Nilufer Municipality Head of Social Work  25.01.08 Bursa 
Kimse Yokmu Social Aid 
Association 
Founder and 
Administrator 
28.01.08 Bursa 
Yildirim Municipality Mayor  29.01.08 Bursa 
Emirsultan Mosque Imam  30.01.08 Bursa 
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Deniz Feneri Dernegi Head of Public Relations 31.01.08 Istanbul 
Deniz Feneri Dernegi Volunteer 31.01.08 Istanbul 
Somuncu Baba Vakfi Administrator 14.04.09 Bursa 
Fakir ve Muhtaclara Yardim 
Dernegi 
Administrator 15.04.09 Bursa 
IHH Bursa Volunteer 16.04.09 Bursa 
Insanliga Hizmet Vakfi Founder and 
Administrator 
22.04.09 Istanbul 
Yardimeli Dernegi Administrator 23.04.09 Istanbul 
Mevlana Celebi Vakfi Administrator 24.04.09 Istanbul 
Gonul Kusagi Dernegi Administrator 27.04.09 Istanbul 
SODEV Administrator 28.04.09 Istanbul 
TGTV Head of Administration 29.04.09 Istanbul 
Karacaahmet SD Head of Administration 30.04.09 Istanbul 
Cansuyu Bursa Head of Administration 01.05.09 Bursa 
Kimse Yokmu Administrator 05.05.09 Istanbul 
Sahkulu SD Head of Administration 06.05.09 Istanbul 
Hudayi Vakfi Administrator 07.05.09 Istanbul 
IRFAN-DER Administrator 11.05.09 Konya 
Dosteli Dernegi Head of Administration 11.05.09 Konya 
Buyuk Selcuklu Vakfi Administrator 11.05.09 Konya 
AYDER Founder and 
Administrator 
12.05.09 Konya 
Cinar Egitim Vakfi Head of Administration 12.05.09 Konya 
Hayir Kapisi Founder and 
Administrator 
12.05.09 Konya 
Konya Union of NGOs Head of Administration 13.05.09 Konya 
Ravza Egitim Vakfi Head of Administration 13.05.09 Konya 
The Union of NGOs of the 
Islamic World 
Administrator 14.05.09 Istanbul 
Bursa Provincial Directorate of 
Associations  
Head of Provincial 
Directorate 
21.05.09 Bursa 
Hayra Hizmet Vakfi Administrator 22.05.09 Bursa 
Ilim Yayma Cemiyeti Administrator 25.05.09 Bursa 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the interviews in Turkey, around five to ten expect interviews were 
undertaken for each country study (Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden).  
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APPENDIX III 
 
Interview Guide  
 
 
History of the RMA 
 
 
• Can you tell me about the history of this association? 
• In which year you have been established? 
• Who were the founders?  
• What are their educational and professional 
backgrounds? 
 
Aims and 
motivations 
 
• What were the main motivations while founding the 
association? 
• Can you tell me about the mission and vision of your 
association? 
• What are the main motivations behind volunteering 
work? 
 
Organizational 
information 
 
• How many people are employed in the association? 
• How many volunteers work for the association? 
• How big is your yearly budget? 
• Do you have branches in other cities? 
• What are your main areas of action? 
• What are the professional and educational backgrounds 
of the employees? 
• What are the professional and educational backgrounds 
of the volunteers? 
• What are your main sources of funding? 
• Can you tell me about your criteria in choosing whom to 
help? 
• How many families or individuals do you support? 
• Are your provisions regular or one time?  
 
Connections 
 
• Do you have connections to any media company? 
• Do you have connections to any political party? 
• Do you undertake political activities? 
• Do you have any contact to local or central welfare 
administration offices? 
• Have you ever worked in partnership with state 
institutions? 
• How do you see the role of civil society in the social 
welfare arena? 
• How would you define your relationship with the state? 
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APPENDIX IV 
Organizational Information on the RMAs  
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09/2006‐06/2007  Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen‐Germany 
Teaching assistant to Prof. Christian Welzel for the course 
“Civic Networks and Social Capital” 
      Tasks included grading of research papers. 
 
06/2004‐ 07/2004  Middle East Technical University, Ankara‐Turkey 
      Research Assistant in a project on labor market in Turkey 
Tasks included assistance to the design process of research 
and the organization of the research schedule; conducting 
interviews with individuals by using life history analysis 
technique. 
       
01/2003‐02/2003  UNICEF and Middle East Technical University, Ankara‐Turkey   
      Research Assistant in a project on Mother and Child Health 
Tasks included conducting surveys and analysis of the survey 
data in SPSS. 
 
 
 
 
Professional Presentations 
 
 
12/2010  The Politics of Religiously Motivated Welfare Provision: the 
Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective 
 Paper Presentation‐ The Forum on Religion, London School of 
Economics 
 
06/2010  The Politics of Religiously Motivated Welfare Provision 
  Paper presentation‐ Economic Sociology, Political Economy 
Summer School, Sciences Po Paris 
 
02/2010  State, Religion and Social Policy in Turkey 
  Invited talk‐ Religious Studies Colloquium at Ruhr University 
Bochum 
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11/2009  Diverse roles of faith based organizations in the Muslim and 
Christian contexts– A comparison of Britain and Turkey 
Paper Presentation‐ ARNOVA 38th Annual Conference 
‘Philanthropy in Communities Finding Opportunities in Crises’‐ 
Cleveland USA 
 
04/ 2008  A Critical analysis of Diffusion of Social Exclusion Discourse  
Paper Presentation‐ HWK Conference ‘Inclusion and Exclusion 
in Contemporary Europe’, Delmenhorst‐ Germany 
 
08/2008  Towards a common European Social Policy Discourse? 
Paper Presentation‐ 2nd ECPR Graduate Conference ‐ 
Barcelona, Spain 
 
 
Conference Appearances 
 
 
07/2010  9th International Conference of the International Society for 
Third Sector Research (ISTR), Istanbul 
 
11/2009  38th Annual Conference of the Association for Research on the 
Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), 
Cleveland 
 
08/2008  2nd Annual Graduate Conference of the European Consortium 
for Political Research (ECPR), Barcelona 
 
09/ 2006  4th Annual Conference of the European Network for Social 
Policy Analysis (ESPAnet), Bremen 
 
 
 
Participation in Summer Schools 
 
06/ 2010   MPIfG Summer School on “Economic Sociology, Political 
Economy”, Sciences Po, Paris 
 
07/2008  Central European University Summer School on “Religion and 
Politics”, Budapest  
 
03/ 2008  Bremen Graduate School of Social Sciences Summer School on 
“Quantitative and Qualitative Methodology”, Bremen 
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Research Interests 
 
Comparative Social Policy    State‐Religion Relations 
Historical Sociology      Civil Society   
Political Economy      Welfare State 
 
 
 
Skills  
 
Languages:     Turkish: native        English: fluent             German: intermediate 
 
 
PC knowledge:  Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint); Internet; SPSS 
 
 
 
Fellowships and Awards: 
 
10/2007‐12/2010  Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Germany 
      Dissertation Fellowship 
   
08/2005‐ 06/2007  German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)  
      Scholarship for the M.A. Program at Jacobs University Bremen  
 
07/2005    Heinrich Boll Foundation  
Awarded to attend to Joint Conference on Globalization, 
organized by Free University Berlin and Middle East Technical 
University  
 
07/2004‐ 08/2004  Middle East Technical University 
Awarded to attend the “Program on American college English” 
at Pitzer College, California, USA     
 
 
 
Referees: 
 
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Streeck 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies 
E‐mail: ws@mpifg.de 
 
Prof. Dr. Ayse Bugra 
Bogazici University Social Policy Forum   
E‐mail: bugray@boun.edu.tr 
   
 
